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Abstract 
The categorization of external stimuli lies at the heart of cognitive science. 
Existing models of perceptual categorization assume (a) information about the absolute 
magnitude of a stimulus is used in the categorization decision, and (b) the representation 
of a stimulus does not change with experience. The three experimental programs 
presented here challenge these two assumptions. The experiments in Chapter 2 
demonstrate that existing models of categorization are unable to predict the 
classification of items intermediate between two categories. Chapter 3 provides 
empirical evidence that categorization responses are heavily influenced by the 
immediately preceding context, consistent with evidence from absolute identification 
showing people have very poor access to absolute magnitude information. A memory 
and contrast model is presented where each categorization decision is based on the 
perceived difference between the current stimulus and immediately preceding stimuli. 
This model is shown to account for the data from Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 explores 
the claim that new features may be created on experience with novel stimuli, and that 
these features serve to alter the representation of stimuli to facilitate new categorization 
tasks. An alternative account is offered for existing feature creation evidence. However, 
experimental work re-establishes a feature creation effect. Consideration is given as to 
how feature creation and memory and contrast accounts of categorization may be 
integrated, together with extensive suggestions for the development of these ideas. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 2 
Perceptual categorization involves the grouping of individual, discriminable 
items together. Novel items may be judged members of these categories, and 
properties of category members generalized to these novel items. A distinction may 
be drawn between how categories are represented, and how the representations are 
used to classify novel items. The distinction then is between information availability 
and information use. Theories of categorization have been instantiated as 
mathematical models of categorization that make explicit the assumptions about both 
representation and process. However, much of the literature focuses on the nature of 
the representation. This issue lies at the heart of cognitive science, for it is central to 
the link between perception and cognition. The development of theories of 
categorization is therefore largely concerned with the representation of categories. 
This chapter provides a review of existing models of perceptual categorization, and 
related experimental evidence. 
The classical theory of categorization (so named by Bruner, Goodnow, & 
Austin, 1956; Smith & Medin, 1981) states that items are categorized into groups on 
the basis of a list of necessary and sufficient features or attributes. If an item 
possesses all the attributes in the category's list then it is said to be a category 
member. Wittgenstein (1958) pointed out that for many natural categories exemplars 
do not all share the same common attribute or property. Further, if necessary and 
sufficient features are to be the basis for categorization, the classical viewpoint 
suggests that all exemplars of a category should be equally good examples of that 
category. 
However, not all exemplars are judged to be equally good examples of their 
category. Rosch (1976) found that people were faster to verify category membership 
statelnents involving more typical members of a natural category. For example. 
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people are faster to verify "a canary is a bird" than "an emu is a bird". This typicality 
effect is also true of categories of novel or artificial stimuli. For example, unseen 
prototypes can be categorized more accurately than the original training stimuli 
(Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1986; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Lamberts, 1996; 
Medin & Schaffer, 1978). Category membership may then be better considered in 
terms of family resemblance (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This idea prompted the 
development of prototype models of categorization (e.g., Homa et aI., 1981; Posner 
& Keele, 1968; Posner & Keele, 1970; Reed, 1972; Rosch, 1973; Rosch et aI., 1976). 
In prototype theories category membership is a matter of degree, and is based on an 
exemplar's similarity to the average category member or central tendency of the 
category. 
The prototype account does not rest easily with other empirical findings. A 
large number of experiments have demonstrated that performance in categorization 
tasks can be influenced by exemplars other than the category prototype (e.g., Ashby 
& Gott, 1988; Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Whittlesea, 1987). Old 
training stimuli can be categorized faster than new, previously unseen stimuli equally 
similar to the prototype (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984). Malt (1989) showed that the 
categorization of an old exemplar could be primed by prior presentation of a similar 
new exemplar, compared to prior presentation of a dissimilar new exemplar. This 
suggests information about old exemplars other than the prototype was retrieved in 
categorization of the new exemplar. According to prototype theory, categorization of 
both prior exemplars should cause the prototype to be retrieved, and therefore equal 
priming should have been observed for both stimuli, which was not the case. 
Similarly, all of the old exemplars were not retrieved for each categorization, as if 
they were then there would again be no difference in priming. (Using a second 
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condition where participants were required to make a perceptual judgement about the 
new exemplar, Malt failed to obtain a priming effect. Thus a perceptual enhancement 
account of the priming seems unlikely.) People are sensitive to correlation 
information about different features within a category (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby 
& Maddox, 1992; Medin, Altom, Edelson, & Freko, 1982) that would be lost if they 
retained only a prototype. Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981) demonstrated that in 
some cases participants can classify non-linearly separable stimuli at least as easily 
as linearly separable stimuli, a finding which cannot be explained by a prototype 
model. Together these findings all suggest that the representation of a category 
consists of memory for more than just the category prototype. 
Exemplar Models of Categorization 
Exemplar models (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Brooks, 1978; Estes, 1994; 
Lamberts, 1994; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) assume participants 
represent categories by storing every single stimulus encountered, together with its 
category label. A novel item is classified by calculating the similarity between the 
item and the stored examples. The notion of similarity is rather unconstrained 
(Goodman, 1972), and therefore problematic. The models of categorization 
described here overcome the criticism that any two items can be similar or 
(dissimilar) in an infinite number of ways by specifying over what features or 
dimensions similarity is to be considered. With perceptual stimuli, the 
implementation of similarity in models differs: some models use a spatial metaphor 
(e.g., Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986), and others use feature matching (Tversky, 1977; 
Tversky & Gati, 1982). 
Whichever model of similarity is used, a stimulus can be thought of as 
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represented as a precise point in multidimensional psychological space, called an 
exemplar. The distance between two points in multidimensional psychological space 
is related to the similarity between the two exemplars they represent, i.e., the 
amount of generalization between the exemplars (Carroll & Wish, 1974b; Shepard, 
Romney, & Nerlove, 1972). Shepard (1958) showed that the idea that distance in 
psychological space could be related to similarity could be derived from stimulus 
generalization in learning theory (Hull, 1943). Nosofsky (1984) applied the proposal 
that distance in psychological space could be related to generalization to the problem 
of similarity in categorization. The structure of psychological space is often 
determined by multidimensional scaling (MDS), whereby pair wise similarity 
judgments or identification confusion data uniquely determine the relative co-
ordinates of the stimuli in the space (Shepard, 1974; 1980). To classify a stimulus a 
participant derives its similarity to each of the stored exemplars. Often, the 
probability of classifying a stimulus as a member of a particular category is a 
function of the summed similarity to all the category's exemplars and the summed 
similarity to all of the possible categories' exemplars. Normally Luce's (1959) 
choice rule is used to map the summed similarities for each category onto the 
probability of responding with each category label. 
Nosofsky's (1986) exemplar model is now described. Other exemplar models 
are described in relation to this model, as many of them are either restricted versions 
of this model, or are closely related to it. 
The Generalized Context Model 
The generalized context model (GCM, Nosofsky, 1986) is an extension of the 
similarity choice model for predicting identification confusion data (Luce, 1963; 
Shepard, 1957; Smith, 1980; Townsend & Landon, 1983). 
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Let Xk= {~p.; n= 1, ... , Nk} be the set of stored category ~ examples. ~!! is a 
vector in multidimensional psychological space (where the superscript n denotes the 
nth trial and is derived from a MDS procedure). The probability that the stimulus ~!! 
is classified in category ~ (where different values of the subscript k denote different 
categories) is given by 
p( Cklxn) = fkhk(x n) 
Lf3;h;(xn) 
;=1 
where fu is a response bias, and hk(~!!) is the summed similarity between ~!! and 
every stored category Ck example: 
Nk 
hk(x) = Lexp(-c.d(x,xnY1 ) 
n=1 
where g= 1 yields an exponential function, and g=2 yields a Gaussian function; 
d(~,~!!) is a measure of the psychological distance from ~ to ~!!. The non-negative 
parameter ~ scales the psychological space and can be interpreted as a measure of the 
overall stimulus discriminability, or as the amount of generalization between stimuli. 
The psychological distance g(~,x!!) is computed using a weighted Minkowski 
r-metric in a d-dimensional space: 
where Wi is the proportion of attention allocated to dimension i. The exponent r 
defines the distance metric: the value r=1 produces the city block metric, r=2 
produces the Euclidean metric. A Euclidean distance metric is most appropriate for 
stimuli with integral dimensions, and a city block metric for those with separable 
dimensions (Garner, 1974; Nosofsky, 1987). 
The Relationships Bet\veen Exemplar Models of Classification 
The Context Model. Nosofsky (1986) has demonstrated that Medin and 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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Schaffer's (1978) context model, hereafter CM, is a special case of the GCM where 
the dimensions are binary and g=r=I. Intuitively, in the context model, the similarity 
between two exemplars is given by ~ raised to the power of the number of features 
the two exemplars differ on, where ~ is the similarity between two exemplars 
differing on only one feature, and 0<~<1. 
The Weighted Ratio Model. Lambert's (1994) weighted ratio model has a 
different definition of similarity. In the case where all dimension weights are the 
same, the summed similarity of exemplar ~!l to all the members of {4 is given by 
h (x) = I (1- t)CF(x, xn ) 
k n=1 (1- t)CF(x, xn ) + t.DF(x, xn ) (4) 
where CF(~,~!l) is the number of dimensions or features 25- and ~!l have in common 
(the number of common features), DF(fi,25-!l) is the number of dimensions 25- and~!l 
differ on (the number of different features) and 1 is the relative weight such that 
0<1<1. This similarity function is effectively a weighted ratio of the number of 
common features over the number of common plus number of different features. It 
differs from the similarity functions for the CM and GCM in that similarity in the 
CM and GCM is only a function of the number of different features, rather than the 
number of similar and the number of different features. If the number of dimensions, 
£, in a given experiment does not vary then the number of different features is a 
function of the number of common features and same the summed similarity of ~ to 
all the members of Ck becomes 
(5) 
where g(~,25-!l) is distance given by the city block metric in a psychological space \\ith 
a binary din1ension representing the presence or absence of each feature. 
The Exemplar-Similarity Model. Estes' (1994) exemplar-similarity model is 
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an extension of Medin and Schaffer's (1978) CM. The probability that a stimulus is 
classified as belonging to a particular category is a function of the stimulus's 
similarity to known category exemplars as in the GCM (Equation 1). The similarity 
function is exponential, as for the CM and the GCM with g=1 (Equation 2). As 
dimensions are binary, the similarity between two exemplars on a particular 
dimension is either unity or ~, where O>p 1. 
At the start of category learning, when there are no category exemplars in 
memory then the parameter ~Q is used to represent the average similarity of any 
stimulus to any category. Without this assumption (or with ~Q=O) then there is no 
effect of repeating trials on categorization performance (see Appendix 3.1 of Estes, 
1994). Heit (1994) has demonstrated that a model that explains the effects of prior 
knowledge by treating prior knowledge as initial exemplars in the new concepts 
provides a good fit to empirical data, lending support to this assumption. 
Each presented exemplar has a probability, 12, of being encoded. Each 
encoded exemplar has a probability, I-a, of being forgotten on a particular trial. 
(Typically once a has been included in the model, including 12 has little effect on the 
goodness of fit to empirical data.) Estes included the a parameter to account for re-
learning at virtually identical rates after either an early or late change in category 
assignments for re-presented exemplars (Estes, 1989). 
The Deterministic Exemplar Model. The deterministic exemplar model 
(Ashby & Maddox, 1993), hereafter DEM, contains the GCM as a special case. 
There are two main differences between the exemplar models discussed here, and the 
parametric models discussed later. First, they make different assumptions about how 
a category is represented. Second, they make different assumptions about how this 
information is integrated when making a categorization decision. The DEM has the 
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same representational assumptions as the exemplar models, but, rather than using a 
probabilistic decision rule, a deterministic decision rule and a decision bound is 
used: 
respond A if log( h A (X) ) - log( h8 (X) ) < 8 + e; otherwise respond B (6) 
where the participant is biased against category B if Q<O, ~ is the noise in the 
decision, and hA(~) is the summed similarity of exemplar ~ to each exemplar of 
category A (Equation 2). 
Ashby and Maddox (1993) show that using this noisy deterministic decision rule is 
equivalent to using this probabilistic decision rule 
(7) 
where 
n eY Y=-- and/3=--
-f3(J 1 + eY 
and the noise, ~, has a logistic distribution of mean ° and variance cr. The DEM can 
be thought of as the GCM with one additional parameter, y.. Depending on the value 
ofy'responding is either more or less variable than the GCM predicts. Nosofsky 
(1991) also produced a deterministic exemplar model, but it does not contain the 
GCM as a special case - Luce's (1959) choice rule is abandoned in favor of a winner 
take all deterministic rule, where the category associated with the highest summed 
similarity is always given in response. 
Parametric Models of Classification 
An alternative approach to including information other than the category 
prototype in the representation of a category is given by parametric models of 
classification. Parametric approaches to categorization include general recognition 
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theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986), prototype models (e.g., Homa et aL 1981; 
Posner & Keele, 1968; Posner & Keele, 1970; Reed, 1972; Rosch, 1973; Rosch et 
aI., 1976), general linear classifiers (e.g., Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Morrison, 
1990; Nilsson, 1965; Townsend & Landon, 1983), optimal decision rules (e.g., 
Fukunaga, 1972; Green & Swets, 1966; Noreen, 1981; Townsend & Landon, 1983) 
and the category density model (Fried & Holyoak, 1984). Parametric approaches 
assume that a specific functional form can represent the density of category members 
in multidimensional psychological space. The form chosen depends on the particular 
model, but is often a multivariate normal distribution. 
There are three main reasons why a normal distribution is often used to 
approximate natural categories: (a) Normally distributed categories share several 
features in common with natural categories. Both contain a very large number of 
potential exemplars (although this is also true of almost any other probability density 
function). The dimensions of both natural and normally distributed categories are 
continuous-valued. Many natural categories overlap, as normally distributed 
categories can. Many researchers (e.g., Ashby, 1992) have used these common 
properties to justify their choice of category structure. (b) Participants enter a 
category learning task assuming the categories are roughly uni-modal and 
symmetric. Flannagan, Fried and Holyoak (1986) have shown that normally 
distributed categories can be learned faster than multi-modal categories, and that in 
the early stages of learning a multi-modal category participants respond as if the 
category were uni-modal. Participants can be facilitated in learning a multi-modal 
category if the previously learned structure was not normally distributed. These 
findings do not, however, rule out other uni-modal representations. (c) If memory is 
limited then assuming categories are multivariate normal approximation is the best 
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solution in terms of maximum entropy if only the mean and covariance matrix are 
known (Myung, 1994). These three reasons certainly do not compel the use of a 
normal distribution as a category representation, but this choice is commonly used. 
Once the form used to approximate the category is chosen, building a representation 
of the category reduces to estimating the functional form's free parameters. The 
value of the category density function at a particular point in psychological space for 
each category is used to compute the classification response for the stimulus 
represented by that particular point. 
Ashby's (1986) general recognition theory is now described. Other 
parametric models of categorization are described with reference to this model, as 
with the exception of Fried and Holyoak's (1984) category density model, they are 
all special cases of general recognition theory. 
General Recognition Theory 
General recognition theory (GRT, Ashby & Townsend, 1986) is a 
multidimensional generalization of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961). Thus a stimulus, li!!, is represented by a vector in 
multidimensional psychological space, li!! 12' where the subscript 12 means perceived. 
GRT assumes there to be noise in the perceptual system, ~!!12' and therefore repeated 
presentation of the same stimulus, ~!!, does not always lead to the same perceptual 
• n 
representatIon, li-12' 
(8) 
Typically, the noise is assumed to be multivariate normal, with covariance 
matrix ~!!12' i.e., ~!!12=N(Q, ~!!~. The perceptual effects of each example of a category 
can be represented by a multivariate normal distribution 
p(X/) = N(X/.L~) (9) 
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The perceptual representation of a category is a probability mixture of the 
individual example distributions. IfXk={~!!; n=l, ... , lli} is the set of stored category 
Ck examples then the probability density function associated with this category is 
given by 
Nk 
p(xlck)= LP(xnICk)N(xn,L;) 
n=! 
where P~!! I ~J is the probability that stimulus ?S.!! is presented as a member of 
category Ck. 
By constraining the covariance matrix ~!!Q special cases of GRT can be 
derived. The stimulus invariant GRT assumes that ~!!Q ~ for all n. The un-correlated 
GRT assumes ~ is diagonal and the simple GRT assumes that ~Q-d 121. (Ashby & 
Maddox, 1993.) 
Once the percept ~!!Q of a stimulus is formed, response selection in the GRT is 
a deterministic process - the category for which the probability of the data, given the 
category, is maximized is chosen as category label. It is assumed that a participant 
divides perceptual space into distinct category regions and responds according to 
which region the percept falls into. The border of each of these regions is called a 
decision bound. Stimuli that fall on the decision bound are therefore equally likely to 
be classified into either category. The decision bound can be computed as 
where g{k,l}(~) is the decision bound between category ~ and category Q. The value 
of the decision bound function determines which region of space the percept falls 
into: 
> 0 respond Ck 
if d{J...I} (x) = 0 guess 
< 0 respond C, 
(10) 
(11 ) 
(12) 
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As this decision bound is the one that maximizes overall categorization 
accuracy this decision bound is called the GRT optimal classifier (Duda & Hart, 
1973). Intuitively, this corresponds to classifying a stimulus into the category it is 
most likely to belong to, according to the inferred category probability density 
functions. The perceptual noise turns this deterministic process into a probabilistic 
one. 
If the examples are normally distributed within the category then the category 
density function P(~ I ~J can be rewritten as 
(13) 
where J!l2k and ~l2k denote the perceived category ~ mean vector and covariance 
matrix respectively. This model is called the normal or Gaussian GRT. Ashby (1992) 
makes the strong assumption that a category can be represented by a multivariate 
normal probability density function even when the true example distribution within 
the category is not normally distributed. A subject using a normal GRT classifier 
will always have a quadratic decision bound (unless the two category covariance 
matrices are equal, then the boundary will be linear). 
The version of the GRT used in this thesis is a further constrained version of 
the normal GRT. The further constrain is that the variance-covariance matrix ~ is 
constrained to be diagonal and to have equal variance for each dimension. 
~ - 2 I ~pk - G'pk (14) 
Thus, only two free parameters must be estimated for each category, the 
mean and the variance. 
Normal GRT is very similar to decision bound theory. Normal GRT and 
decision bound theory predict the same categorization decision and accuracy for 
every stimulus. Howe\,er, participants using GRT are assumed to estimate 
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parameters for the probability density function for each category, which uniquely 
determine the decision bound's parameters. In decision bound theory participants are 
assumed to directly estimate the free parameters of the decision bound. 
Relationships Between Parametric Models of Categorization 
Prototype Models. Prototype models (e.g., Roma et aI., 1981; Posner & 
Keele, 1968; Posner & Keele, 1970; Reed, 1972; Rosch, 1973; Rosch et aI., 1976) 
also use a multidimensional psychological space. The prototype is the central 
tendency of the category, and corresponds to the category mean in GRT. A stimulus 
is categorized as belonging the category with the most similar prototype, where 
similarity corresponds to the distance between the stimulus and the prototype in 
multidimensional psychological space. 
In a binary classification prototype models classify as linear decision bound 
models, where the bound's slope and intercept are completely determined by the two 
category means. Any point on the bound is equidistant from both category means. 
Prototype models are a special case of the Gaussian GRT where the co-variance 
matrix for the each category is constrained to have zero co-variances and equal 
variance for each dimension and each category: 
Lpk = cr~I 
The General Linear Classifier. The general linear classifier (GLC) (e.g., 
Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Morrison, 1990; Nilsson, 1965; Townsend & 
Landon, 1983), also uses a linear decision bound. Unlike the prototype models, the 
slope and intercept of the decision bound are not constrained, and are varied to 
provide optimal categorization performance. In other words, participants are 
assun1ed to estimate the slope and intercept of the decision bound directly, rather 
than deriving then1 fron1 category probability density functions. However. the 
(15) 
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optimal bound is that predicted by GRT. 
The General Quadratic Classifier. The general quadratic classifier (GQC) 
(e.g., Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Maddox, 1992) uses a quadratic decision bound. When 
two categories are normally distributed, but have non-equal covariance matrices the 
GQC is the optimal decision bound. The GQC makes identical categorization 
predictions to the Gaussian GRT, and contains the GLC as a special case. As for the 
general linear classifier, participants are assumed to estimate the free parameters of 
the decision bound directly, but the optimal values are those predicted by GRT. 
Optimal Decision Rules. The optimal decision rule or bound (e.g., Fukunaga, 
1972; Green & Swets, 1966; Noreen, 1981; Townsend & Landon, 1983) is the one 
that maximizes accuracy of categorization, and is therefore not necessarily linear or 
quadratic. In the two category case every stimulus represented by a point on the 
decision bound is equally likely to belong to either category. Unless assumptions are 
made about the density function for each category then it is hard to say anything 
about the shape of the bound. If normality is assumed then categorization accuracy is 
as the Gaussian GRT or the GQC. 
The Category Density Model. Fried and Holyoak's (1984) category density 
model uses the same representational assumptions as Gaussian GRT, with the caveat 
that category covariance matrices are constrained to be diagonal. (A surface of equi-
probability for a category is therefore constrained to be a sphere.) In addition, the 
model uses a tally of the frequency of occurrence of each category. Luce's (1959) 
choice rule is used to calculate the probability that exemplar ?i!! is considered to be a 
member of category ~ 
(16) 
i=l 
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where fu is a decision bias for each category, K is the number of alternative 
categories and Bayes' theorem is used to give the subjective probability that the 
decision maker considers item xn to be a member of category ~ 
( n) _ p( xn ICk )P( Ck ) lfI k X - -K;;--'-----'--~-
L p( xn ICi )p( CJ (17) 
i=l 
where P(~!! I ~J is the subjective conditional probability of item ~ occurring given 
category Ck, and P(~J is the subjective prior probability of~. Fried and Holyoak 
refer to Equations 16 and 17 together as the relative likelihood decision rule. (Note 
how similar this decision rule is to that of the GCM: the similarity to a category 
function has been replaced by a probability of belonging to a category function.) 
The category density model was proposed as a model of category learning. 
An algorithm is provided whereby learning may take place in the absence of 
feedback, and even in the absence of knowledge of the number of categories to be 
learnt. With feedback, the first exemplar of a category provides the category mean. 
The first and second exemplars together with initial parameters representing the 
learner's prior expectations of the variance of the category along each dimension are 
used to estimate the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix. In the absence of 
feedback category, means and variances are estimated after the first ~ exemplars, 
where ~>K. (~represents the size of the short term memory buffer.) Initially ~ groups 
are defined, each containing one of the ~ exemplars so far. A clustering algorithm is 
used to divide the ~ exemplars into K groups, by repeatedly grouping together the 
groups with the closest centroids. The mean of each resulting group then becomes 
the mean of each category, and the initial variances for each dimension for each 
category are constructed by pooling an arbitrarily large value with the variance of 
each group (as in the feedback condition). 
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All that remains now to complete the model is to give an account of how the 
means, variances, and frequencies for each category are updated with each new 
exemplar. In the feedback condition, the value of ~ at time 1, 
_ {I, if x" is labelled as a member of Ck 
lI'i,t - 0, otherwise 
In the no feedback condition Equation 17 for time 1-1 is used to calculate ~,!. 
Now depending on the magnitude of.Y[!,! the mean and covariance vectors for each 
category are updated using standard procedures for revising running means, 
frequencies and variances (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961). Two additional bias 
parameters are included in the model. One reflects the degree to which participants 
believe each category is equally frequent, and the other reflects the degree to which 
participants believe the variances on each dimension are equal across categories. 
Empirical Evidence for Exemplar and Parametric Models of Categorization 
In the introduction to this chapter, evidence was presented that could not be 
explained by a simple prototype theory. The discussion here begins with how, in 
principle, exemplar and parametric accounts of categorization are able to account for 
these data. Work is then reviewed which contrast the fits of exemplar and parametric 
models to human categorization performance. 
Three main empirical results were mentioned in the introduction. First 
mentioned was the typicality effect, where some members of a category are rated as 
better or worse examples of the category than others. In applying an exemplar model 
it is assumed typicality judgments and associated measures such as verification time 
are based on the summed similarity of the probe exelnplar with all members of the 
category. Exemplar accounts are able to accommodate the typicality effect result 
because of the way MDS is used to derive the stimulus space. Items that are 
(18) 
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particularly distinctive and not confusable are placed in the extreme regions of 
multidimensional psychological space. Thus atypical exemplars are of minimal 
summed similarity to all the other category members because they are distant from 
the other category members. Therefore will be rated as less typical, than typical 
exemplars which will be in the central regions of each category. For parametric 
models the probability of category membership is derived from the category density 
function. For reaction time measures, the distance of the exemplar from category 
boundaries is assumed to determine categorization latency (Ashby, Boynton, & Lee, 
1994). Because distinctive atypical exemplars are less close together in physical 
space, the category density associated with that region of space will be low, and 
therefore parametric models predict that these items will be rated as less typical than 
items from areas of space associated with a higher category density. 
The second type of finding described was cases where there is evidence that 
information from a specific, old exemplar influences performance. Exemplar models 
can, not surprisingly, accommodate all of these cases. Parametric models struggle to 
account for many of these specific exemplar effects. Two problematic experiments 
are discussed here. Homa, Stirling and Trepel (1981) showed that old exemplars can 
be classified more accurately than new exemplars equidistant from the prototype. If 
the category probability density function used is, for example, normal, then the 
probability of category membership is equal for the old and new exemplars for 
Homa, Stirling and Trepel's (1981) stimulus structure. Thus without resorting to a 
complicated probability density function a parametric account is unable to account 
for these results. Perhaps less challenging for the parametric models is Malt's (1989) 
priming experiment which provided evidence for the retrieval of individual 
exemplars. The facilitation of categorization of an old exemplar after categorization 
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of a new exemplar could possibly be explained by claiming that looking up or 
calculating the value of the PDF for one exemplar will facilitate the process for a 
similar exemplar more than a dissimilar exemplar. However this explanation is not 
very satisfactory. (It is interesting to note that both these problematic experiments 
involved repeated presentation of a small set of exemplars. This point is taken up 
below.) 
The final finding discussed was that people are sensitive to the correlation 
between features or dimensions of stimuli. An exemplar model is able to predict this 
because memory for each individual exemplar maintains the correlation information 
in the representation. Many parametric models are also able to account for the 
results. Those models, where the covariance matrix used to represent each category 
(e.g., normal GRT) is not constrained to have equal elements on the diagonal, and 
non-zero covariances, maintain the correlation information in the covariance matrix 
for each category. Thus surfaces of equi-probability will be ellipsoids, with the 
correlation indicated by the orientation of the major axis. 
To summarize so far, exemplar and parametric models are able to provide 
accounts of the main findings problematic for classical theory and prototype models. 
Parametric models struggle to account for data supporting episodic retrieval of 
specific exemplars. Examination of one popular category structure reveals that 
exemplar models only outperform prototype models because they reproduce accurate 
performance on old training items better than parametric models (Smith & Minda, 
2000). In other words, the assumption that participants access memories of each 
training example is not necessary to explain their generalization to novel test items. 
When prototype luodels of categorization are granted with the ability to predict 
performance on training items, there is no difference between the fits of the t\\O 
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models. In other words, ignoring performance on training items, both exemplar and 
distributional models provide equally good accounts of the data. Comparison of 
parametric and exemplar models fits to other empirical data will now be considered. 
Maddox and Ashby (1993) compared the performance of the OEM, the GCM 
and decision bound models on a variety of data sets. The first five data sets are taken 
from Ashby and Maddox (1992). These data sets all involve normally distributed 
categories and are illustrated in Figure 1 together with examples of the stimuli used 
in the experiments. (Because of the very large number of exemplars participants 
were exposed to, MDS solutions could not be derived for the stimuli, as is normal in 
the fitting of the GCM.) Participants were asked to classify rectangles that could vary 
in height and width. These dimensions have been shown to be integral (e.g., Garner, 
1974; Wiener-Erlich, 1978). Different participants classified circles that could vary 
in size, with diameters that could vary in orientation. These dimensions have been 
found to be separable (e.g., Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; Shepard, 1964). 
The category structures for the first two data sets involved two categories 
with identical covariance matrices. The variance elements were all identical and the 
co-variance elements were all zero, thus the optimal decision bound is linear. 
Participants were given a large number of trials. The models were fit to single 
participant data. The OEM provided the best fit for 3 participants. The GCM 
provided the best fit for 1 participant. The remaining 8 participants' data were best 
fit by the decision bound model (the general linear classifier), although only slightly 
better than the OEM. 
The next three data sets also involved two normally distributed categories, 
but with unequal co-variance matrices. The optimal decision bounds will therefore 
be non-linear and are in fact quadratic (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Morrison. 1990). 23 of 
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Figure 1. The stimuli and the five category structures used by Ashby & Maddox 
(1992). The top left panel shows two examples of rectangle stimuli and two 
examples of the circular stimuli. The remaining panels show the contours of equal 
likelihood (solid lines) and optimal decision bounds (dashed lines) for five category 
structures used. For the circular stimuli the labels height and width should be 
replaced with orientation and size respectively. 
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the 24 participants tested exceeded the maximum accuracy possible predicted from a 
linear decision bound. Most participants failed to reach the level of performance that 
would be predicted if they were perfectly using the optimal quadratic decision 
bound. The decision bound model, the DEM and the GCM were applied to data from 
the first and last training sessions. For the first training session the decision bound 
model (the general quadratic classifier) best fit data from 16 participants, the DEM 
best fit in 4 participants, and the GCM best fit in the remaining 4 participants. For 
data from the last training session the decision bound model best fit the data from 16 
participants, the DEM from 5 participants and the GCM from the remaining 3 
participants. 
So, modeling individual participant data from participants tested with 
normally distributed categories, the GCM was outperformed by the DEM, which in 
turn was out performed by the relevant decision bound model. Maddox and Ashby 
(1993) also compared the GCM, the D EM and the decision bound model's fit of data 
when participants categorized examples from non-normally distributed categories 
using Nosofsky's (1986; 1989) data. The stimuli are the same as the circles with 
diameters as described before, except the bottom half of the stimulus is missing. The 
category structure used for these data sets is shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
The first data set with non-normally distributed categories (Nosofsky, 1986) 
consists of data from two participants who participated in a large number of 
identification trials for the 16 possible exemplars, so that a MDS solution of the 
psychological space representation could be calculated for each participant for the 
data set. Each participant then took part in four categorization sessions. Each session 
began with a training phase, where participants were presented with repeated 
exanlples of half of the possible exemplars (half of these assigned to each category). 
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Size Interior-Exterior 
0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
<L> 0 0 2 0 2 0 <L> 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 .N N 
(j) 
0 1 0 1 
C/) 
0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 
Angle Angle 
Criss-Cross Diagonal 
0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 
<L> 0 0 1 0 0 <L> 0 1 0 0 2 0 
.N 
.!:::! 
C/) 
0 1 
C/) 
0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Angle Angle 
Figure 2. The four category structures used by Nosofsky (1986). The circles 
correspond to exemplars. Numbered circles are training exemplars, and the 
numbers correspond to the category assignment. The remaining exemplars were 
seen only during the transfer phase. 
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Size Angle 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Q) 0 0 0 2 0 2 Q) 0 1 0 0 2 N 
.N 0 (j) 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
(j) 
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
Angle Angle 
Criss-Cross Diagonal 
0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 
Q) 0 0 1 0 0 Q) 0 0 2 0 0 1 N .~ (j) 
0 1 
(j) 
0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Angle Angle 
Figure 3. The four category structures used by Nosofsky (1989). The circles 
correspond to exemplars. Numbered circles are training exemplars, and the 
numbers correspond to the category assignment. The remaining exemplars were 
seen only during the transfer phase. 
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In the subsequent transfer task all exemplars were repeatedly, sequentially presented 
for categorization with feedback given only when a training exemplar was presented. 
There were four conditions: two conditions (size and diagonal) where the optimal 
decision bound is approximately linear and two conditions the optimal decision 
bound is non-linear. Maddox and Ashby (1993) fitted the DEM, the GCM and two 
decision bound models (the general linear classifier and the general quadratic 
classifier). In the two conditions when the best fitting decision bound was 
approximately linear there was little difference between the fits of the two exemplar 
and the two decision bound models. For the conditions where the best fitting 
decision bound is non-linear the general quadratic classifier fitted the data 
substantially better than the two exemplar models. Ashby and Lee (1992) fitted the 
optimal decision bound model, and although it did perform better than the GCM it 
performed more poorly than the general quadratic classifier, suggesting participants 
used a non-optimal classification strategy. 
The second data set from non-normally distributed categories (Nosofsky, 
1989) differs from the above set in four ways. First, a much larger number of 
participants was run. Separate participants were used to derive the MDS solution. 
The two dimensional MDS solutions looked much like the arrangement of the 
stimuli in physical space shown in (Figure 3). Four new sets of participants took part 
in one condition of the categorization stage of the experiment, each set in a different 
condition. Second, data was averaged across participants, a procedure which 
disadvantages the decision bound models (Maddox, 1999). Third, participants were 
given a smaller amount of training before the transfer phase. Finally, one of the 
conditions where the best fitting decision bound was non-linear was replaced with a 
new condition where the best fitting decision bound was linear. 
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As a test of the attention-optimization hypothesis (N osofsky, 1986) three 
versions of the GCM were fitted to this data set (see also Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky, 
1989; Nosofsky, 1991). The idea is that selective attention on dimensions in the 
psychological space will operate to optimize categorization performance. One of the 
versions of the GCM fitted is unconstrained, as described above. The other two 
versions are constrained in some way. The equal attention GCM assumes that the 
values of Wi in Equation 3 are equal for all g dimensions. The equal bias GCM 
assumes that the values of fu are equal for all k categories. The unconstrained GCM 
could not be rejected for any of the categorization conditions. The equal attention 
GCM fitted the data significantly worse in all four conditions. Some critical transfer 
stimuli were designed so changes in the relative weighting of the dimensions would 
change their probability of assignment to a given category. Observation showed that 
the equal attention GCM failed to account for the probability, but the unconstrained 
GCM did. These results support the idea that the attention weightings for the 
dimensions was different in the identification and categorization tasks. The equal 
bias GCM fitted the data almost as well as the unconstrained GCM, suggesting that 
these results could not be explained by response bias. Lamberts and Chong (1999) 
provide further evidence that this phenomena is indeed an attention shift, by showing 
that categorization performance changes as a result of verbal instructions directing 
attention to particular stimulus dimensions. 
The importance of attention shifts may seem problematic for parametric 
models, given that they do not incorporate attentional parameters to modify the 
perceptual space. However, even without assuming that the perceptual space is 
n10dified across the four conditions, decision bound models can account for the 
results. Maddox and Ashby (1993) also modeled the data, fitting the OEM, the GCM 
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and two decision bound models (the general linear classifier and the general 
quadratic classifier). The GCM provided the best fit in two conditions (criss-cross 
and diagonal), and the general linear classifier provided the best fit in the other two 
conditions (size and angle). It should be noted that the difference between the 
goodness of fits is very small. Further, the GCM fits the averaged participant data 
better than the single participant data. That the general linear classifier better fits the 
two conditions where only one dimension is needed to make the categorization than 
the GCM suggests that shifts in decision bounds may be more important than shifts 
in selective attention. Certainly though, the parametric model is able to account for 
the "attention shift" phenomena better than the exemplar model. 
To summarize the results from data sets from non-normally distributed 
categories, when modeling individual participants' data after extensive training the 
decision bound models provided excellent accounts of the data. However when 
modeling data collapsed across participants after a shorter period of training the 
difference between the fits of exemplar and decision bound models was smaller. 
Overall we have seen that exemplar models like the GCM and parametric decision 
bound models are able to provide a very good account of empirical data. Decision 
bound models outperformed the GCM when category structures were normally 
distributed. However with non-normally distributed categories where a smaller 
number of exemplars were used, the both models performed about equally. 
The Relationship between Exemplar and Parametric Models of Classification 
Exemplar and parametric or distributional models can be though of as lying 
at opposite ends of a continuum of finite mixture models, where the number of 
distributions used to represent a category varies from one, as in GRT, to the number 
of examples of that category, as in the GeM (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; 
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Rosseel, 1996). Also contained in this continuum are back propagation networks 
with sigmoidal activation functions (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) and 
radial basis functions (Moody & Darken, 1989). With small numbers of hidden units 
(and hence small numbers of free parameters in relation to the size of the data to be 
modeled), neural networks are analogous to distributional models, because they can 
only learn data with a particular distributional structure. But if the number of hidden 
units is large in relation to the amount of data to be learned, then the neural network 
becomes analogous to an exemplar model, in that any data set can be modeled, 
whatever its structure, simply learning each piece of data (each example) by rote. 
The relationship between exemplar and parametric models can be described 
formally using Rosseel' s (1998) mixture model of category representation. The 
model makes three assumptions. First, following GRT, it is assumed that the 
presentation of the same stimulus does not always lead to the same perceptual effect. 
The perception of a stimulus is represented as a random vector in multidimensional 
psychological space 
(19) 
where ~!l 12 is a random vector with zero mean representing perceptual noise. ~!l 12 is 
multivariate normal with zero mean and co-variance matrix ~!l12. Normally the noise 
is assumed to be stimulus invariant and is adequately described by ~. 
Second, the probability density function for the whole set of exemplars for all 
K categories is modeled as a finite mixture distribution (McLachlan & Basford, 
1988; Titterington, 1984): 
J 
p(x) = LP(j)p(x/j) (20) 
j=l 
where J is the number of mixture components used in the mixture model, P(j) 
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denotes the mixture proportions and satisfy the constraint 
J L P(j) = 1 and 0::; Pc}) ::; 1 , 
j=i (21 ) 
and I2(?5, I i) is a multivariate normal distribution with mean lli and variance ~. 
Third, this probability density function is shared by each of the K categories. 
Category i4 is modeled by the same set of mixture components I2(?5, I i) as the 
unconditional mixture distribution I2(~). 
J 
p(xICk ) = LPUlk)p(xlJ) (22) 
j=i 
where PG.I k) denotes the class-conditional mixture proportions. 
The category representation of the finite mixture model contains the category 
representations of exemplar and decision bound models (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 
1995; Rosseel, 1996). The category representation of the Gaussian GRT is 
equivalent to a finite mixture model with one multivariate normal mixture 
component. Rosseel (1998) has shown that the category representation of the GeM 
using a Gaussian similarity function and a Euclidean distance metric is equivalent to 
a finite mixture model with multivariate normal mixture components for each 
category exemplar. Further, Rosseel showed that the category representation of the 
GCM using an exponential similarity function and a city block distance metric is 
equivalent to a finite mixture model with multivariate Laplacian mixture components 
for each category exemplar. Thus by altering the number of mixture components, L 
the mixture model can take on the representation assumptions of the GCM (when I 
equals the total number of exemplars across all categories), or Gaussian GRT (when 
I equals the number of categories). 
Conclusions 
Illustrative evidence that prompted the replacement of the classical and 
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prototype theories of categorization has been presented. The two current accounts of 
categorization - exemplar theories and parametric or distributional theories - have 
been described in detail. The relationship between various instantiations of each 
theory have been described. Empirical evidence collected with the intent of 
discriminating between these two accounts has been presented. However, it was 
concluded that exemplar and distributional approaches both provided good accounts 
of the data. Finally the relationship between exemplar and distributional views was 
formalized using a finite mixture model framework. 
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
The experiments presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis investigate 
generalization to novel items between two categories that differ in variability. It is 
shown that exemplar and parametric accounts make qualitatively different 
predictions for the pattern of generalization. Thus the experiments are designed to 
discriminate between the use of exemplar based representations and distributional 
representations. 
The experiments in Chapter 3 of this thesis challenge the assumption that 
participants have access to the absolute location of stimuli in physical space, an 
assumption common to both exemplar and parametric models of categorization. The 
experiments were motivated by evidence from absolute identification and magnitude 
estimation paradigms, which demonstrates that participants typically have poor 
access to absolute magnitude information. Instead participants rely upon 
comparisons with recent stimuli, as evident from the strong effect of preceding 
material demonstrated in these paradigms. Here specific sequence effects are 
examined in categorization - effects that are not predicted by the use of absolute 
magnitude inforn1ation alone. A new model of categorization is developed, \\"here 
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classification is based on the relative magnitude information from comparisons with 
immediately preceding stimuli. 
In Chapter 4 the effects of categorization experience on perception are 
examined. Evidence of perceptual learning during exposure or categorization is 
reviewed. The experiments are concerned with the specific claim that new 
representational features may be created to facilitate novel categorizations, and that 
these features qualitatively alter the perception of stimuli. Such a claim is counter to 
the assumption implicit in existing models of categorization that the representation 
of stimuli is fixed. 
Finally in Chapter 5 an integrated account of the experiments is presented, 
together with extensive suggestions for future work to investigate the claims of the 
integrated account. 
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Chapter 2 
The Effect of Category Variability in Perceptual Categorization 
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Abstract 
Two very different views have been advanced concerning how people learn 
categories from labeled examples. The exemplar view suggests that people store 
some or all examples, and categorize new items by their similarity to these stored 
items. What we call the distributional view suggests, instead, that people fit 
probability distributions using the examples from each category, and classify new 
items by reference to these probability distributions. A key differential prediction 
between these viewpoints concerns the classification of new examples precisely 
intermediate between the nearest examples from two categories that differ in 
variability. The exemplar approach, illustrated using the generalized context model 
(Nosofsky, 1986), predicts that the intermediate item should typically be classified in 
the lower variability category. By contrast the distributional approach, illustrated 
using the general recognition theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986), predicts 
classification into the higher variability category. Neither prediction is confirmed 
experimentally - instead a highly variable pattern of results is found. Experiments 1 
and 2 show that classifications behavior can be strongly influenced by the salience of 
the difference in variability between the categories. Experiments 3 and 4 show great 
variation between participants on the effect of increasing the difference in variability 
between the two categories. Neither the exemplar nor distributional viewpoints can 
predict the behavior of the majority of participants. 
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The Effect of Category Variability in Perceptual Categorization 
This paper considers the accounts of classification given by two successful 
models of categorization. Exemplar models (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
N osofsky, 1986) assume the categorization of a new item is based on the similarity 
of the new item to examples of previously encountered items stored in memory. An 
alternative is that probability distributions used to represent categories, and that these 
distributions are fitted using the encountered examples. Classification of a new item 
is based on the relative likelihood of belonging to each distribution. This alternative 
will be called the distributional approach (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986). The 
difference between these two accounts may be illustrated with a simple example. 
Consider two categories (Figure 4). The examples of one category may be more 
variable than the examples of the other category. If an example intermediate between 
nearest examples of the two categories is presented it may be classified into either 
category. Such an example is more similar to the examples of the low variability 
category, as these examples will be nearer to the intermediate item in perceptual 
space. Exemplar accounts must therefore predict that this intermediate example 
should on average be classified into the lower variability category more often. 
However, often it is rational to classify this example as a member of the category 
with the larger variability, as other things being equal, it is more likely to belong to 
this category. The distributional account may therefore make a different prediction 
for the classification of the intermediate example. It is not always the case that 
distributional and exemplar accounts must lead to opposite categorizations in this 
situation, but it is certainly possible to arrange the relative variability of the pair of 
categories so that the models do. The experiments described in this paper are 
designed to investigate the basis for generalization in categorization by manipulating 
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Figure 4. A one dimensional example of two categories differing in variability. The 
examples of the low variability category happen to take low values on the 
dimension (outline circles). The probability density function from which they were 
generated is represented by the dashed line. The examples of the high variability 
take high values of the dimension (filled circles). The probability density function 
from which they were generated is represented by the solid line. A critical example 
midway between the nearest examples of the two categories (triangle) is more 
likely to belong to the high variability category, but more is more similar to 
examples of the low variability category. 
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the relative variability of two categories in a binary categorization. 
The difference between exemplar and distributional models can be viewed as 
an aspect of a much broader theoretical issue in cognitive science: to what extent is 
human learning 'lazy' or 'eager'? (Aha, 1998; Hahn & Chater, 1997; Hahn & Chater, 
1998). Lazy learning involves storing input material in a relatively unprocessed 
form; the cognitive work required to transfer this knowledge to some new context 
(e.g., generalizing past experiences to a new situation) is applied only when this 
work needs to be done. This style of learning is 'lazy' because cognitive work is only 
done when strictly necessary - otherwise the learning items are simply stored. In 
cognitive science, lazy learning is embodied not only exemplar models of 
categorization (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), but also in exemplar-
based accounts of memory (e.g., Hintzman, 1986), case-based reasoning (e.g., 
Kolodner, 1993), and analogy-based models of reading and morphological 
processing (e.g., Glushko, 1979; Nakisa & Hahn, 1996). By contrast, eager learning 
involves actively attempting to extract regularities from new items, as they are 
encountered. The model of the regularities that has been extracted can then 
straightforwardly be applied to new items, as they are encountered. Eager learning 
methods vary between methods that involve the attempt to seek symbolic rules with 
which to model the incoming data (e.g., Lavrac & Dzeroski, 1993; Thagard, 1988), 
and those that attempt to fit incoming data to some kind of probabilistic model (e.g., 
Ashby & Townsend, 1986). 
The effects of category variability and generalization have been addressed in 
two important studies, by Rips (1989) and Fried and Holyoak (1984). Rips (1989) 
used a binary categorization with categories of differing variability to dissociate 
sin1ilarity and categorization judgments. Participants were presented with sentences 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 33 
giving information about an object's value on a single dimension. In one condition 
participants had to classify the object as a member of one of two available categories 
on the basis of this information alone. For example, "a circular object with a 3-inch 
diameter" could be classified as a pizza or a quarter. In another condition, 
participants were asked to choose the category the object was more similar to. Note 
that participants were not asked for similarity ratings between two objects as is 
typical in predicting classification from similarity or identification (e.g., Nosofsky, 
1986), but rather gave ratings of the similarity between an object and a category. The 
value of the object on the selected dimension was chosen to be half way between 
each participant's estimate of the lowest value of the high value category, and of the 
highest value of the low value category. Participants were told this is how the test 
value they were given was derived. Rips found that similarity decisions favored the 
low variability category, but that categorization decisions favored the high variability 
category. Continuing the above example, the 3-inch diameter circular object was 
rated as similar to quarters, but was categorized as a pizza. The object could not be a 
quarter, as it was too big. Quarters have a fixed size, so even though the object may 
be more similar to the size of quarters it cannot be a quarter. Rips took the 
dissociation between similarity and categorization as evidence that categorization 
decisions were not based on similarity decisions. 
Empirical evidence from Smith and Sloman (1994) provides a pertinent 
boundary condition on this dissociation. Using Rips' stimuli they were unable to 
replicate the dissociation. This failure to replicate Rips' dissociation is probably due 
to a procedural difference. In Rips' study participants were asked to talk aloud about 
the decisions they were making, but in Smith and Sloman's study participants simply 
pressed one of two keys. In a second experiment Smith and Sloman replicated Rips' 
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dissociation when they asked their participants to talk aloud. Analysis of the 
participants' protocols on each trial showed that participants were more likely to 
mention the feature plus corresponding reason (e.g., "quarters cannot be that big") in 
the categorization condition than in the similarity condition. Further, when 
participants mentioned the necessary feature and rule, they were almost always chose 
the more variable category. It seems then that Rips' dissociation of categorization 
and similarity is only obtained under conditions that require verbal rationalization of 
the categorization decision. 
Rips' study leaves open the question of the effect of relative category 
variability in perceptual categorization, the topic of the present paper, for two 
reasons. First, Rips used familiar semantic categories, to encourage participants to 
use prior knowledge from outside the experimental context. Such knowledge is not 
available for the kinds of abstract perceptual category traditionally used in perceptual 
categorization experiments (although it may well be available for natural perceptual 
categories). Second, the effect that Rips describes does not seem to be robust in 
conditions most analogous to typical perceptual categorization task (where 
participants do not produce verbal protocols). 
Fried and Holyoak (1984) have, though, shown that participants are sensitive 
to the relative variability of perceptual categories. For example, in Fried and 
Holyoak's (1984) Experiment 2 participants categorized black and white 
checkerboards. Two prototype checkerboards were generated, one prototype for each 
of the two categories the participants had to learn. Training examples for one 
category (low variability) were created by allowing each square of the prototype a 
small probability of changing color. For the other category (high variability) the 
probability was about double. As low yariability categories are easier to learn a third 
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category (other) was introduced, to prevent subjects learning only the low variability 
category, and classifying all non-members as members of the high variability 
category. Participants classified training examples until they reached criteria. In 
transfer, participants categorized distortions the two standards. Significantly more 
transfer items were classified as belonging to the higher variability category than 
would be expected by chance. Further, there was a tendency to classify items into the 
high variability category even for patterns physically closer to the low variability 
category. Fried and Holyoak had predicted these findings with their category density 
model, and interpret these findings as support for the idea that participants use 
examples to induce distribution functions, and then classify according to a relative 
likelihood rule. 
This conclusion is certainly consistent with a distributional approach, where a 
category probability density function is estimated for each category, based on the 
category's mean and variance in some multidimensional psychological space. 
However, Fried and Holyoak's findings are also consistent with exemplar-based 
categorization. Consider a transfer checkerboard with an equal number of squares in 
common with each of the two base prototypes. Using Fried and Holyoak's "no of 
squares in common" similarity estimate, such a checkerboard would be equally 
similar to each category prototype. Now consider though the distribution of 
exemplars of each category. It is very much more likely that there will be more 
exemplars from the high variability category near the transfer checkerboard than 
exemplars from the low variability category, simply because the checkerboards from 
the high variability category are more scattered in the space. Thus the target 
checkerboard will be a better example of the high variability category than the 10\\/ 
variability category (this intuitive argument is confirmed by the simulations reported 
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below). Thus an exemplar-based model of categorization that assumes memory for 
(at least some) individual exemplars can account for the results Fried and Holyoak 
cite as evidence for the distributional approach I. 
A second issue regarding Fried and Holyoak's interpretation of this study is 
that their similarity estimate may lead to an incorrect assumption about the 
representation of these checkerboard stimuli. There is mounting evidence that new 
functional features are learned during the categorization of checkerboards (see 
Chapter 4, and also McLaren, 1997; Palmeri & Nosofsky, in press; Wills & 
McLaren, 1998). To a first approximation it seems that the largest invariant chunk of 
a stimulus is learned as a feature. If this is the case, then one might expect 
qualitatively different features to be learned for Fried and Holyoak's low and high 
variability features because the low variability checkerboards are more likely to 
contain larger invariant features than the high variability checkerboards. That is, the 
probability of a sizeable chunk of the low variability board remaining constant is 
much greater than for a chunk of equivalent size in a high variability board. This 
would lead to the creation of fewer and larger functional features for the low 
variability category than the high variability category. If this were the case, then a 
stimulus equally distant between the two categories may indeed be more similar to 
the high variability category. This is because the probability of the presence of larger 
chunks used to represent the low variability category is much lower than the 
probability of the presence of the smaller high variability chunks. In summary, 
categorization of a stimulus with an equal number of squares in common with the 
two category standards as a member of the high variability category is not 
I There is evidence that people do have memory for (at least fragments of) individual 
examples with similar stimuli (Homa et aI., 1981). 
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necessarily inconsistent with similarity based categorization. The closer proximity in 
psychological space of examples of the high variability category to the equidistant 
checkerboard, and / or the more likely presence of high variability category features 
in the equidistant checkerboard allows similarity based categorization to account for 
these results. In any case, without deriving a multidimensional scaling solution from 
pair wise similarity judgments or identification confusions, one cannot be sure of the 
structure of the psychological space, and therefore that these results cannot be 
accounted for by similarity based categorization. 
What is needed a category structure that allows similarity and likelihood 
based categorization to be distinguished, even when memory for individual 
exemplars is allowed (as it is in the hugely successful exemplar models of 
categorization). A simple one-dimensional case of such a structure is illustrated in 
Figure 4. The exemplars from the high variability category are more spread out than 
the exemplars from the low variability category. Consider a critical item exactly half 
way between the nearest exemplars of each category. Formal modeling of the 
classification of this item is given in the next section, but for now simple argument 
will suffice. 
If, as in exemplar models, (a) categorization is based on the comparison of 
the summed similarity between the critical stimulus and each stored stimulus for 
each category, and (b) similarity is some monotonically decreasing function of the 
distance between a pair of exemplars on the dimension, then the critical stimulus 
should be categorized as a member of the low variability category more often than 
the high variability category. This is because the summed distance between the 
critical stimulus and each example of the low variability category is smaller than the 
sum for the high variability category. which means the summed similarity must be 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 38 
greater for the low variability category. Because the nearest examples of each 
category are equally distant from the critical stimulus categorization will in fact be 
based on the next nearest examples - which are more likely to come from the low 
variance category (see Figure 4), because low variance stimuli are more closely 
bunched near the critical stimulus. 
In a distributional model, categorization will be based on the likelihood of the 
data, given the induced probability distribution for each category. If the presumed 
distribution is Gaussian (see Figure 4), then the intermediate example will typically, 
though not definitely, be classified as a member of the high variance category, 
because the tight bunching of the low variance items means that the intermediate test 
item would be more standard deviations from the mean of the low variance category 
(we assume here that the frequencies of each category are equal, or appropriately 
equal - in the experiments below, there is indeed no bias in favor of one category or 
the other). The reason why it is not certain that the critical stimulus should be 
categorized as a member of the high variability category more often than as a 
member of the low variability category is because the critical stimulus is not 
equidistant between the means of the two categories, (when this would always be the 
case). (It is worth pointing out here that if this were the case then an exemplar model 
would be able to predict classification of the critical example into the high variability 
category as this category is more likely to have the nearest neighbor, as in Fried and 
Holyoak's design.) Rather the critical stimulus is equidistant between the nearest 
neighbors of the two categories, and is therefore nearer the mean of the lower 
variability category. Thus the difference in variability between the two categories 
need be sufficiently large to counter the fact that the low variability category has the 
nearer mean. 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 39 
This argument then predicts that, provided two categories differ sufficiently 
in variability, the exemplar and distributional models make different predictions 
about the classification of a critical example midway between the nearest examples 
from each category. Participants' performance on such a critical example is 
evaluated in Experiments 1 and 2. This idea is extended in Experiments 3 and 4 
where the effect of changing the relative variability of the two categories is 
investigated. 
Modeling Sensitivity to Category Variability 
To confirm the intuitive argument that exemplar and distributional models of 
categorization make opposite predictions two existing models of categorization, one 
where categorization is based on likelihood of belonging to representative 
distributions (general recognition theory, GRT, Ashby & Townsend, 1986), and the 
other where categorization is based on similarity to stored examples (the generalized 
context model, GCM, Nosofsky, 1986), are examined in this section. The ability of 
each to account for sensitivity to differences in the variability of approximately 
normally distributed categories is investigated. 
Sensitivity of Exemplar and Distributional Models to Category Variability 
The one dimensional category structure used in Experiments 1 and 2, is of the 
sort described in the intuitive argument above, where a critical test stimulus lies 
exactly half way between the nearest neighbors of two categories differing in 
variability. For each participant, for each category, eight examples were generated 
from a normally distributed category. The low variability category distribution had a 
standard deviation of 5.5 units, and the high variability category had a standard 
deviation of 14 units. There was a gap of 28 units between the nearest stimuli of each 
category, with the critical stimulus lying exactly in the center of this gap. To ensure 
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the gap between the nearest neighbors of each category was constant for all 
participants, for each participant the means of the categories needed to be adjusted 
slightly. Thus, for each participant, the low variability categories had the same 
population standard deviation, but slightly different means. The same is true of the 
high variability category for each participant. The result of this procedure is a set of 
categories with examples that are not evenly spaced, but are approximately normally 
distributed, and that meet the requirements that one category is more variable than 
the other, and that the critical stimulus lies between the nearest examples of each 
category. 
The GCM and GRT will now be used to predict classification performance 
for the critical stimulus after training on the two categories. The modeling described 
here is for one participant's structure, although every structure used in the 
experiment was modeled and the results for each structure differed only very 
slightly, and did not alter the qualitative pattern of predictions for the GCM and 
GRT. 
First consider the predictions of normal GRT. In normal GRT, the category 
examples are used to infer a population mean and variance for the normal 
distribution used to represent each category in perceptual space. A decision bound is 
then calculated that divides the perceptual space into regions for each category, so 
that all the stimuli represented by points in the same region are more likely to belong 
to the same category. The decision bound therefore corresponds to the line of stimuli 
that are equally likely to belong in either category. For two normally distributed 
categories the decision bound is a quadratic. In the one dimensional case the decision 
bound will be a single point. Perception is assumed to be noisy in GRT, and 
therefore each presentation of the same stimulus will not necessarily result in the 
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same percept. Thus a stimulus near the decision bound may sometimes be perceived 
to fall on one side of the bound, and sometimes on the other. To apply GRT to the 
category structure for Experiment 1 and 2 the eight examples for each category were 
used to generate an estimate of the population mean and a variance of the normal 
distribution for which the examples were drawn. (In fact, because perception is 
assumed to be noisy this method only provides the best estimate of a participant's 
hypothesized decision bound.) Then the point of equally likely classification was 
calculated, giving the decision bound (which in one dimension is a single point). The 
critical example was found to always fall on the high variability side of the decision 
bound, corresponding with the fact that this point was always more likely to have 
been generated by the high variability distribution. (Although the mean of the high 
variability category is further from the critical stimulus than the mean of the low 
variability category, the difference in variability between the two categories is 
sufficiently large that the critical stimulus is classified into the high variability 
category more often than the low variability category.) The exact predictions for 
classification of examples near the decision bound depend on the level of perceptual 
noise. Figure 5 illustrates this, showing the probability of classifying a stimulus in 
the high variability category as a function of the stimulus's value on the dimension. 
This function will be referred to as the generalization gradient. Throughout this 
paper the term generalization gradient will be the probability of classification of a 
stimulus as a member of the high variability category (and not the low variability 
category) as a function of the location of the stimulus. The exact shape of the 
generalization gradient depends of the perceptual noise associated with each 
stimulus. Figure 5 shows three gradients for three levels of perceptual noise. (After 
Ashby (1986) the noise is assumed to be Gaussian, with spherical covariance 
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Figure 5. The probability of a high variability category response plotted as a 
function of the position of the stimulus on the dimension for normal GRT. The 
category structure is illustrated along the top of the figure, with one category 
more variable than the other. The three lines correspond to different levels of 
perceptual noise, which is assumed to be normally distributed with standard 
deviation all' 
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matrix.) The less noise, the steeper the generalization gradient. In the case of perfect 
noiseless perception the GRT would have an infinitely steep generalization gradient 
(mathematically, the Gaussian would collapse into a delta function). In other words, 
the model would be completely deterministic, with the same stimulus always being 
classified the same way. Crucially though, the level of perceptual noise changes the 
slope of the generalization gradient, but does not alter the location of the decision 
bound. The perceptual noise never biases the decision bound one way or the other, 
and thus the critical stimulus is always more likely to be classified as a member of 
the high variability category. 
Application of the GCM is more straightforward. To classify a new stimulus, 
the similarity between the new stimulus and each stored training stimulus is 
calculated. Luce's (1959) choice rule is then used to calculate probability that the 
stimulus is classified into either category from the stimulus's summed similarity to 
each category. Figure 6 presents generalization gradients, giving the probability that 
the stimulus is classified into the high variability category as a function of the 
stimulus's value on the dimension. The different gradients correspond to predictions 
of the GCM with different values of the generalization parameter, ~. As the amount 
of generalization increases, examples more distant from the to be classified stimulus 
are weighted more heavily. Thus for small values of the generalization parameter, 
when generalization is high, the generalization gradient is steeper. When the amount 
of generalization is large, the critical stimulus is always predicted to be classified 
into the low variability category. As the amount of generalization is reduced (and the 
GCM approximately tends towards a nearest neighbor model), the critical stimulus 
becomes less likely to be classified in the low variability category. Crucially though, 
the lTIodel is never able to predict that the critical stimulus is more likely to be 
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Figure 6. The probability of a high variability category response plotted as a 
function of the position of the stimulus on the dimension for GCM (90=2). The 
category structure is illustrated along the top of the figure, with one category 
more variable than the other. The three lines correspond to different values of 
the generalization parameter, £. 
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classified into the high variability category. The predictions here are for the GCM 
with a Gaussian function relating similarity to distance (g=2). The predictions of the 
GCM with an exponential similarity function (g= 1), which is used when stimuli 
considered easily discriminable, do not differ qualitatively from the Gaussian 
similarity function GCM. 
In summary, for a critical stimulus that lies exactly between the nearest 
neighbors of two categories that differ in variability, provided the difference is 
variability is sufficiently great, the GCM predicts the critical stimulus is more likely 
to be classified into the low variability category (independent of the amount of 
generalization), and GRT predicts the critical stimulus more likely to be classified 
into the high variability category (independent of the amount of perceptual noise). 
Sensitivity of Exemplar and Distributional Models to Changes in the Relative 
Variability of Categories 
Experiment 3 uses two new two dimensional pairs of categories to investigate 
how changing the relative variability of two categories should affect the 
classification intermediate stimuli, according to the GCM and GRT. Both category 
structures have two categories, one with a mean of (200, 200) and the other with a 
mean of (300, 300). In fact 10 examples of each category are arranged in a circle 
around each mean (Figures 7 and 8). The diameter of one circle is larger than the 
other, such that one category is more variable than the other. In the 1:2 pair of 
categories the low variability category is half as variable than the high variability 
category (standard deviation of 20 vs. 40), and in the 1:4 pair of categories the 10\,,; 
variability structure is four times less variable than the high variability category 
(standard deviation of 12.7 vs. 50.2). The transfer examples are used to measure 
participants' generalization bet\\"een the two categories in Experiments 3 and 4. 
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training examples from the 1:2 pair of categories are shown for comparison. 
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Given the category representation of the normal GRT, it seems likely that this 
model will be sensitive to differences in the relative variability of two categories. 
This is indeed the case. All the categories are represented using simple co-variance 
matrices (~=dD due to the symmetrical nature of the categories. For the 1:2 pair, 
three generalization gradients (the probability of a high variability response for 
stimuli on the line y=x as a function of the stimulus's ~ value) were calculated for 
the different levels of perceptual noise, and are shown in Figure 9. As in modeling 
for the one dimensional category structure used in Experiments 1 and 2, the 
perceptual noise changes the slope of the generalization gradient, but does not bias 
the decision bound one way or the other. Of interest here is the comparison of 
gradients for the 1:2 and 1:4 pairs. The one generalization gradient for each category 
structure is shown in Figure 10. (The level of perceptual noise is assumed constant 
across both structures, ~ 10.) As the difference in variability between the two 
categories is increased the decision bound moves nearer the low variability category. 
The particular values of variability for each category were chosen to keep the 
distance between the nearest two examples of each category constant across the 1:2 
and 1:4 pair. This allows comparison of the classification of items that are either the 
same distance from the means of each category (i.e., with the same absolute co-
ordinates), or comparison of the classification of items that are the same distance 
either from the nearest neighbor of the low variability category, or the nearest 
neighbor of the high variability category (i.e., with the same co-ordinates, relative to 
the nearest neighbors). For comparison of items with either the same absolute co-
ordinates (Figure 7), or the same co-ordinates relative to the nearest neighbors 
(Figure 11), the iten1 is always more likely to be classified into the high variability 
category in the 1:4 pair compared to the 1:2 pair. This is always true, provided the 
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Figure 9. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line y=x plotted against the X value of the absolute position 
of the example for normal GRT for two categories (pair 1 :2), one twice as 
variable than the other. 
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Figure 10. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line Y=K plotted against the K value of the absolute 
position of the example for normal GRT (012= 10) for two pairs of categories, 
pair 1:2 and pair 1 :4. 
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Figure 11. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line y=x plotted against the K value of the example relative 
to the nearest neighbor of the low variability category for normal GRT 
(012= 10) for the 1:2 and 1:4 pairs of categories. This figure is equivalent to 
Figure 10 with the 1:4 pair line shifted 12 units closer to the 1:2 pair line. 
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difference in the relative variability of the two categories is great enough across the 
two category pairs. 
In summary, the slope of the generalization gradient is given by the amount 
of perceptual noise, and the location (the points of equal classification into either 
category) is determined by the relative variability of the two categories - the greater 
the difference, the closer the decision bound is to the low variability category. 
The generalization gradients predicted by the GCM for the two category 
structures are shown in Figure 12, with the generalization parameter, ~, held constant 
across the two structures. The predictions here are for the GCM with a Euclidean 
distance metric and a Gaussian similarity function (g=2, r=2), however the pattern of 
the predications is the same for a city block distance metric and exponential 
similarity function (g= 1, r= 1). Traditionally, the city block exponential GCM is used 
to model categorizations where the stimulus dimensions are considered separable, 
and the Euclidean Gaussian GCM is used when dimensions are integral (Gamer, 
1974; Nosofsky, 1987). The predictions of the GCM are very similar to those of 
GRT, with intermediate items being more likely to be classified as members of the 
high variability in the 1:4 pair than the 1:2 pair. This is because in the 1:4 pair of 
categories, the high variability category's items are nearer, and the low variability 
category's items are further away from a given intermediate item, compared to the 
1:2 pair. However, when the generalization gradients are measured relative to the 
two nearest neighbors, rather than relative to the category means, this is no longer 
true (Figure 13). Now in the two category structures, for a given intermediate item, 
the nearest neighbor items of each category are equally distant. However, in the 1:4 
pair, because the low variability category items are less spread out, the second 
nearest itenl in the low variability category will be nearer than the corresponding 
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Figure 12. The probability of a high variability category response for 
an example on the line y=x plotted against the X value of the absolute 
position of the example for the GCM (g=2, r=2, £=0.05) for two category 
pairs 1:2 and 1 :4. 
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---1:2 
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Figure 13. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line y=x plotted against the x value of the the example relative 
the the nearest neighbour of the low variability category for the GCM (g=2, 
r=2, £=0.05) for category pairs 1:2 and 1 :4. This figure is equivalent to 
Figure 12 with the 1:4 pair line shifted 12 units to the right. 
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item in the low variability category of the 1:2 pair. Similarly, in the 1:4 pair, because 
the high variability category items are more spread out, the second nearest item in 
the high variability category will be further away than the corresponding item in the 
high variability category of the 1:2 pair. Thus, when items equally distant from the 
nearest examples in the two category structures are compared, the item is more likely 
to be classified as a member of the high variability category in the 1:2 pair compared 
to the 1:4 pair - the opposite prediction to GRT. 
Experiment 4 uses the 1:2 pair described above and a new pair of categories. 
This new pair, 1:2 expanded, differs only slightly from the 1:2 pair - in the 1:2 
expanded pair the 5 items of the high variability category that are furthest from the 
low variability category are moved to even more extreme points (Figure 14). This 
pair is designed to allow the exemplar model to be further tested. Figure 15 shows 
the generalization gradients predicted by the GCM (g=2, r=2, ~=0.05) for the two 
conditions. The gradients almost exactly coincide. This is true for the range of £ 
parameters that produces acceptable accuracy for the training examples (i.e., greater 
than 800/0 accuracy - participants in fact performed at about 900/0 accuracy). This can 
be intuitively explained as follows. When the amount of generalization is small (i.e., 
£ is large), old training items will be will be accurately classified, as their 
classification is determined mainly by the category label stored for the exemplar 
representing the old training item. As the amount of generalization is increased, other 
exemplars have more and more influence on the classification of the old training 
item. If the amount of generalization is too high (i.e., £ is too small), then exemplars 
fro111 the other category will influence the classification of the training item, reducing 
the predicted accuracy with which the item will be classified. When classifying items 
from one category the amount of generalization must be small enough to pre\'ent 
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Figure 14. The arrangement of examples for the 1:2 expanded pair of 
categories. The training examples from the 1:2 pair of categories are 
shown for comparison. 
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Figure 15. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line Y=K plotted against the K value of the absolute position of 
the example for the GCM (g=2, r=2, £=0.05) for two pairs of categories 1:2 and 
1:2 expanded. Notice that the two gradients exactly coincide. 
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Figure 16. The probability of a high variability category response for an 
example on the line y x plotted against the K value of the absolute position of 
the example for the GRT (01).=10) for two pairs of categories 1:2 and 1:2 
expanded. Notice that the two gradients exactly coincide. 
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Experiment 1 
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to discriminate between exemplar-based 
classification and distribution-based classification using a category structure as 
described above. Some participants in the experiment were given a hint telling them 
that the two categories differed in variability. Smith and Sloman's (1994) 
replications of Rips' (1989) study suggest that participants only categorize stimuli 
into the high variability category when their verbal protocols show awareness of a 
difference in variability between the two categories. The hint here was included to 
see what effect knowledge of the variability might have on participants' 
classification of these perceptual stimuli. The stimuli used in this experiment are 
circles with a dot on the circumference, where the position of the dot on the 
circumference varies between stimuli. Pilot studies used the position of the dot on a 
straight line, but the performance of many participants was consistent with their 
reports of using a rule, such as whether the dot was more or less than half way along 
the line, to make their decision. The stimuli here were chosen so that use of rules like 
this should not be possible. 
Method 
Participants. 32 undergraduate students from the University of Warwick 
participated for course credit. Participants were alternately assigned to one of two 
conditions, labeled the "hint" or "no hint" conditions. 
Design. Participants successively performed three binary categorization 
tasks, between high and low variability categories defined on a single underlying 
stimulus din1ension. After categorizing 16 'training' examples, participants classified 
a critical stimulus that fell half way between the nearest example of the low 
variability category and the nearest example of the high variability category. They 
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then classified two further examples, one from each category, before moving on to 
the next classification. Half of the participants were given a hint, described below, 
during the instructions at the begiIming of the experiment pointing out that one 
category was more variable than the other. 
Stimuli. The stimuli used in this experiment were black outline circles each 
with a single solid black dot, somewhere on its circumference. The stimulus was 
presented on a white background. The diameter of the circle subtended 
approximately 2 degrees of visual angle. The dot was 1/6th the diameter of the circle. 
The stimuli varied only in the position of the dot around the circumference and this 
position was diagnostic of category membership. Three stimulus sets were 
constructed for each participant. A stimulus set met the following criteria. There 
were eight examples for each of the two categories. The examples of one category, 
the low category, had a standard deviation of 5.5 degrees variation in the position of 
the dot on the circumference. The examples of the other category, the high category, 
had a standard deviation of 14 degrees. The two categories did not overlap, and 
always had a fixed distance of 28 degrees between the nearest examples of the two 
categories. The critical stimulus was always exactly half way between the nearest 
example of the low category and the nearest example of the high category. The 
position of the critical stimulus in each participant's three stimulus sets varied. The 
critical stimulus was in the 45 degree position for the first task, the 135 degree 
position for the second task, and the 225 degree position for the third task (with 0 
degrees being at the 12 0' clock position, and angle increasing clockwise). This 
ensured that a horizontal, vertical, or diagonal diameter could not be used to classify 
the critical stimulus. The relative mean position of the low and high variability 
categories was counterbalanced across participants. That is, for half the participants 
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the category clockwise of the critical stimulus was the low variability category, and 
for the other half the category was the high variability category. 
F or each participant the stimulus set was modeled to check that the critical 
stimulus was indeed more similar to the low variability category, but more likely to 
belong to the high variability category. 
Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 14" Apple Macintosh Color Display. 
Responses were collected using labeled keys on a standard qwerty keyboard. The 
keys A to J inclusive were labeled A, B, C, yes, D, E, F from left to right. 
Procedure. Participants were alternately assigned to either the hint or no hint 
condition. They were seated comfortably in front of the computer, and the keyboard 
and monitor were adjusted as necessary. The experiment began with instructions 
displayed on the computer screen. Participants were told they would do three 
categorization tasks, one after the other. They were told that they would discriminate 
types A and F, then types Band E and finally types C and D. The structure of a trial 
was described, and participants were asked to respond as quickly as they could 
without making mistakes. Participants in the hint condition received further 
instructions: 
"IMPORTANT HINT: For each pair of types that you learn about, one 
type is allowed a greater spread of dots than the other. During the experiment 
try to work out which type this is. For example, when learning about types A 
and F, try to decide whether it is type A or type F that is allowed a greater 
spread of dots. Do not forget your hint. It is very important." 
When the experimenter had checked that a participant understood the 
instructions, and if applicable, that they understood the hint, the experiment began 
with the first trial. A ready prompt appeared on the screen. When a participant 
pressed yes, there was a 1.5 s blank screen before a circle with a dot appeared on the 
screen for 1 s. The participant responded as quickly as they could from stimulus 
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onset. The assignment of category labels to the high and low variability categories 
was counterbalanced across participants. After one second the screen was cleared , 
whether the participant had responded or not. After the participant responded the 
correct answer was displayed on the screen for 1.5 s, followed by a 1.5 s blank 
screen before the next trial began. The first 19 trials used examples from the first 
stimulus set, the second 19 the second set and the third 19 the third set. Within each 
block of 19 trials the first 16 were the 8 examples from each of the two categories, in 
a random order. The 1 t h trial was the critical stimulus. The feedback given on this 
trial was random. The final two trials were re-presentations of an example from the 
center of each category, and were used to provide an accuracy measure that allowed 
performance in this experiment to be compared to performance in Experiment 2. The 
order of stimuli on trials 18 and 19 was counterbalanced across participants. After 
the 19th trial on a given stimulus set participants moved on to the next set. 
Results 
Table 1 displays the mean proportion of training trials correct, the mean 
proportion of verification trials correct and the proportion of high variability 
category responses for the critical stimuli. Average training accuracy was 
consistently high, despite the small number of training trials. There was no effect of 
hint on the mean proportion of training trials correct across all blocks, 1(31)=0.88. 
}2>0.05. Knowledge that the two categories differ in variability did not facilitate 
category learning. This was confirmed by performance on the two verification trials 
that followed each critical stimulus trial. Verification accuracy was high and was not 
affected by hint, 1(31 )=0.85, }2>0.05. 
Of n10st interest was the result that in both conditions the mean proportion of 
high variability responses was significantly below chance level of 0.5: 1( 15)= 13 .17, 
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Table 1 
Means across all three blocks for Experiment 1. (Numbers in brackets are standard 
errors of the means.) 
Hint 
No hint 
Mean training 
proportion correct 
0.79 (0.02) 
0.81 (0.02) 
Mean verification Mean proportion of 
proportion correct high variability 
0.90 (0.04) 
0.94 (0.03) 
category responses 
to critical stimuli 
0.38 (0.09) 
0.25 (0.06) 
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Q<O.05 for the no hint condition; 1(15)=7.31, Q<O.05 for the hint condition. 
Participants favored categorizing the critical stimulus into the low variability 
category. The mean proportion of high variability responses to critical stimuli does 
not differ significantly between the hint / no hint conditions, 1(31)=1.22, Q>O.OS. 
Participants were not significantly influenced by explicit instructions informing them 
the two categories differed in variability. The numerical difference between the 
conditions is however in the direction expected if the hint increases participants' 
sensitivity to categorical variability. Individual participants were not always 
consistent in their responding to the critical stimulus (i.e., always responding with 
the low variability category, or always responding with the high variability 
category), although as there were only three trials for each participant there is not 
enough data to further explore this hypothesis. 
Discussion 
In this experiment a stimulus lying midway between the nearest examples of 
two categories differing in their variability was more likely to be classified as 
belonging to the lower variability category, in line with the prediction of the 
exemplar view. Telling participants that one category was more variable than the 
other did not have a significant effect on their performance. This raises the question 
of whether highlighting the difference in variability more strongly would encourage 
participants to change their classification strategy. This was the motivation for 
Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to make the difference in variability of the t\\O 
categories n10re salient. Experiment 2 uses the same stimulus set as Experiment 1. 
The prilnary difference between the experiments is that in this experiment the entire 
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set of training examples are presented simultaneously. 
Method 
Participants. 32 undergraduate students from the University of Warwick 
participated for course credit. Participants were alternately assigned to either the hint 
or no hint conditions. Participants had not taken part in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli. The stimulus structure used in this experiment is identical to the 
structure used in Experiment 1. In fact, the first participant in this experiment saw 
the same stimuli as the first participant in Experiment 1, and so on. The only 
difference is that now stimuli are presented simultaneously, on paper. Each circle 
had a diameter of25 mm. 
Procedure. Participants were given written instructions telling them they 
would learn three categorization tasks, one after the other. They were told that for 
each categorization task they would see a sheet of examples that they should study 
for one minute. They were told that they should pay attention to the position of the 
dot, and the category labels, because this information is what would help them 
classify three test examples presented afterwards. Participants in the hint condition 
were given the further instructions, informing them that the two categories would 
differ in variability, and they should try to work out which category was the more 
variable for each categorization. 
After the experimenter had checked that the participant had understood the 
instructions the examples of the first stimulus set were displayed. The 16 examples 
were arranged on the same piece of paper. Each set of eight examples belonging to 
the same category was arranged in a row, inside a rectangle, together with the 
category label. The two sets were placed one above the other. The placement of the 
low and high variability categories at the top and bottom of the page was 
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counterbalanced across participants, as was the assignment of labels to categories. 
Within a set, for all participants, the examples were arranged in the same rank order. 
This was to ensure that if the order of the examples on the page affected the salience 
of the variability, then it would be held constant across the hint no hint conditions. 
Participants studied the sheet of examples for 1 minute, before it was removed from 
sight. The critical stimulus was then presented in the center of a new piece of paper, 
together with the instruction, "Is this circle with dot a bip or a bap. Please circle your 
answer." Participants circled the category label they felt the example belonged to. 
This was repeated with two old examples, one from the center of each category. This 
was to check that participants had some memory of the categories and corresponding 
labels, and had not simply guessed. Participants then moved onto the next stimulus 
set. 
Results 
The analysis of results here is similar to the analysis for Experiment 1. The 
only difference is that because results for training accuracy could not be gathered, 
they cannot be analyzed here. 
Table 2 displays the mean proportion of verification trials correct and the 
proportion of high variability category responses for the critical stimuli. Verification 
accuracy was high and was not affected by hint, 1(31)=0.88, WO.05. The level of 
accuracy on the verification stimuli was similar to the accuracy on the same stimuli 
in Experiment 1. 
The categorization of the critical stimulus is of greatest interest. The mean 
proportion of high variability responses to critical stimuli does differ between the 
hint/no hint conditions, t(31 )=2.23, p<0.05. In the no hint condition performance on 
the critical stimuli is not different from chance, t(15)=0.13, p>0.05. In the hint 
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Table 2 
Means across all three blocks for Experiment 2. (Numbers in brackets are standard 
errors of the means.) 
Hint 
No hint 
Mean verification Mean proportion of 
proportion correct high variability 
0.92 (0.04) 
0.96 (0.02) 
category responses 
to critical stimuli 
0.74 (0.07) 
0.51 (0.08) 
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condition, the proportion of high variability responses was significantly above 
chance, t(15)=3.61, p<O.05. Participants favored categorizing the critical stimulus in 
the high variability category when given the variability hint. As in Experiment 1, 
participants were not always consistent in their responding. 
Discussion 
In the variability hint condition, participants classified a stimulus midway 
between the nearest examples of two categories differing in variability as belonging 
to the higher variability category significantly more often than chance. With no hint, 
their performance on this critical stimulus was almost exactly at chance. By 
comparing these results with the results from Experiment 1 it can be seen that 
increasing the salience of the difference in the variability of the two categories 
increased the proportion of times was classified as belonging to the high variability 
category. The combination of increased salience and hint has changed participants' 
strategy from classification on the basis of similarity to classification on the basis of 
likelihood. 
It is possible that if the difference in variability is made even more salient, 
then the hint may in fact have no effect. If the hint acts to draw participants' 
attention to the difference, then if the difference is already very obvious the hint may 
have little effect. 
Experiment 3 
The results in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that there may be considerable 
individual differences in relation to the impact of category variability on 
categorization. However, because each participant produced just one • critical' 
response, on each three tasks, there was insufficient data to obtain a clear picture of 
any such individual variation. We therefore switched to an experimental paradigm 
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from which a richer picture of an individual's categorization behavior could be 
obtained. A further motivation for this paradigm was to generalize our previous 
findings to a category with more than one dimension. Categories defined by two 
stimulus dimensions are used. The dimensions were the height and width of simple 
geometric shapes. Two pairs of categories described in the modeling section of this 
paper were used: pair 1:2 and pair 1 :4. The category structure was carefully designed 
to allow two comparison of the classification of the examples intermediate between 
the two categories of each pair across the two types of pair, 1:2 and 1 :4. Either 
examples equally distant from the mean of the low variability category (and 
therefore also equally distant from the mean of the high variability category) could 
be compared, as in Fried and Holyoak's (1984) experiments, or examples equally 
distant from the nearest example of the low variability category (and therefore also 
equally distant from the nearest example of the high variability category) could be 
compared. This second comparison was possible because the distance between the 
nearest examples of each category was kept constant across the two conditions. A 
small number of examples were used so that a MDS solution could be obtained for 
each set of items, to examine whether the assumption that one category was more 
variable than the other was true in the participants' psychological spaces. To allow 
category variability to be easily manipulated without requiring many examples in 
each category, the category structure was hollow, with the examples distributed in a 
circle around the category mean. Pilot work showed that very similar generalization 
gradients are obtained for these circular category structures as are obtained for 
categories of truly normally distributed examples. Attempting to obtain judgments 
that can serve as the basis for an MDS analysis using the san1e participants as in the 
present study would lead to potential interference between MDS judgments and task 
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performance. Hence we ran a separate study to conduct this MDS analysis, 
Experiment 5, reported below. 
In this experiment each participant was trained on a pair of categories, and 
then given transfer examples intermediate between the two categories to allow a 
generalization gradient to be determined for that structure. The participant will then 
repeat this process for the other pair of categories. Thus for each participant, there 
are two generalization gradients, one for each of the two pairs of categories. As 
described in the modeling section of this paper, the difference in variability between 
the two categories in each pair is greater for the 1:4 pair than the 1:2 pair. Modeling 
with the GCM and GRT demonstrated that exemplar and distributional models make 
different predictions about the proportion of high variability responses to stimuli 
intermediate between the categories for the 1:2 and 1:4 pairs of categories, when 
stimuli equally distant from the nearest neighbors of a category are compared across 
the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. The exemplar model predicts that the proportion of high 
variability responses to intermediate stimuli will be lower in the 1:4 condition than 
the 1:2 condition. The distributional model predicts the opposite - that the proportion 
of high variability responses to intermediate stimuli will be higher in the 1:4 
condition than the 1:2 condition. (Equivalently, the GRT predicts that an example 
that is equally likely to be classified into either category will be nearer the low 
variability in the 1:4 condition compared to the 1:2 condition, when the distance is 
measured relative to the nearest example of each category. The GCM makes the 
opposi te prediction.) 
Experiment 3 sets out to find which model describes the behavior of human 
participants. both at the level of across participant averages, and for indiyidual 
participants. It is important to consider performance at the level of indiyidual 
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participants as Maddox (1999) demonstrated that data averaged across participants 
may not reflect individual participant data, especially when large individual 
differences exist. Using Monte Carlo simulation, Maddox generated data sets from 
either GRT or from the GCM. When the GCM was the correct model, averaging has 
little effect. However, when GRT was the correct model and therefore perfectly 
describes the generated data, averaging lead to a better fit for the GCM than GRT. 
Method 
Participants. 32 undergraduates from the University of Warwick participated 
for course credit, or payment of £5. 
Design. The design is fully within participants. Each participant completed 
two categorization training and transfer tasks. In a training stage participants learned 
to categorize shapes that varied in height or width into one of two categories on the 
basis of trial by trial feedback. The shapes of one category were smaller than the 
shapes of the other category. In the transfer stage participants classified old training 
examples and new transfer items without feedback. In each categorization task the 
variability of the two categories differed. In one task the ratio of variability was 1 :2, 
and in the other task the ratio of variability was 1 :4. The transfer items in each task 
were intermediate in height and width between the two categories, and were 
designed to measure the generalization gradient between the two categories. The 
order of learning the 1:2 and 1:4 tasks was counterbalanced across participants. To 
minimize carryover effects, each participant did one task with rectangles of varying 
height and width, and one task with ellipses of varying height and width. The 
assignment of shape to variability condition was counterbalanced across participants. 
The assignn1ent of labels to categories was also counterbalanced. Finally. the 
assiglID1ent of variability to the category of either small or large shapes was also 
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counterbalanced. That is, for half the participants the small shapes category was 
more variable than the large shapes category, and for the other half the large shapes 
category was more variable than the small shapes category. The predictions for 
classification of the transfer stimuli are outlined in detail in the introduction of this 
experiment. Briefly, participants classifying on the basis of similarity were expected 
to classify more transfer items into the low variability category in the 1:4 condition 
compared to the 1:2 condition. Participants classifying on the basis of likelihood 
were expected to demonstrate the opposite result. 
Stimuli. The heights and widths of stimuli used in the 1:2 condition are given 
in Figure 7 and stimuli used in the 1:4 condition are illustrated in Figure 8. One unit 
of height or width corresponds to approximately 1I50th of a degree of visual angle. 
In Figure 7 the low variability category is also the category of shapes with smaller 
heights and widths. The heights of each example used with the reverse assignment of 
category mean and variance may be generated by subtracting the height from 500. 
Similarly for the widths. That is, each category structure is a mirror image of the 
other in the line ~+y=500. The same is true of the assignment of variability to 
location in space in the 1:4 condition. 
Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 14" Macintosh Color Display. 
Responses were collected using labeled keys on a normal qwerty keyboard. The keys 
Z and X were labeled A and B respectively. 
Procedure. The experiment began with some general instructions on the 
screen of the computer informing participants that they would learn to categorize 
some shapes into two categories, be tested on those shapes, and then learn to 
categorize a new set of shapes, and be tested on those. The first stage of the 
experin1ent began with specific instructions for the first training phase. Participants 
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were told that shapes would come up on the screen one after the other, and that they 
should press one of the labeled keys "A" or "B" depending on which category they 
though the shape belonged to. They were told that by paying attention to the correct 
answer displayed on the screen after each response that they could learn the 
categorization, and that they should try to do this because they would be tested on it 
later. Each trial started with presentation of a stimulus until the participant 
responded. Feedback was given on the screen for 1500 ms. The feedback was the 
correct category label, presented as a letter (A or B) 50 pixels high below the 
stimulus. The stimulus remained on the screen until the end of the feedback. There 
was a blank screen pause of 500 ms before the next trial began automatically. The 
sequence of 100 trials comprised 5 repetition of the 20 training examples. In each 
repetition the trials were in a random order. At the end of the training session 
instructions for the transfer session were displayed, telling participants to continue 
categorizing the shapes as they appeared, despite the absence of feedback. There 
were 328 transfer trials comprising 8 repetitions of 41 examples. 20 of the 41 
examples were the old training examples. The remaining 21 transfer examples were 
novel examples located in-between the two categories in height width space. Within 
each repetition the 41 examples were displayed in a random order. The order was 
different for each repetition. The structure of a trial was the same as in training, 
except the feedback was omitted. After a participant had responded, the screen was 
cleared, and the next trial began after a 500 ms pause. When participants had 
completed the first categorization task they moved on to a second task, which was 
the same as the first except the category structure was swapped, as was the type of 
shape. 
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Results 
A verage Results. The mean proportion of correct responses in training was 
0.93 for both the 1:2 condition and the 1:4 condition. Participants were very accurate 
in their training classifications. A five way ANOVA (category mean and variance 
assignment x category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse x condition) was run 
to check that none of the counterbalanced factors, or the category structure affected 
training performance. There was a significant main effect of category mean and 
variability assignment, F(1, 16)=6.83, }2<0.05, corresponding to a slight increase in 
the proportion of correct responses for participants assigned to the condition where 
the category of larger shapes were more variable (0.95 verses 0.91). This effect was 
not shown in performance on old training items in transfer. There were no other 
significant main effects (largest F(1, 16)=4.13, }2>0.05). Performance on old training 
items was also excellent during transfer. The proportion of high variability category 
responses to old training items is shown in Table 3. A six way ANOVA (category 
mean and variance assignment x category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse x 
condition x category) revealed a main effect of category, F(1, 16)=6.54, }2<0.05. 
Although performance was high on training examples in test, examples of the low 
variability category were classified slightly less accurately than examples of the high 
variability (mean proportion correct 0.89 verses 0.96) category. There were no other 
significant main effects (largest F(1, 16)=2.32, }2>0.05). This indicates that no 
counterbalanced factor had a significant effect on old training item classification in 
transfer. In summary, performance on training items was high, and not greatly 
influenced by any counterbalanced factor. Further, accuracy was about equal for the 
low and high variability categories, and also about equal for the 1:2 and 1:-+ 
conditions. 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 
Table 3 
Mean proportion of high variability responses across all participants for Experiment 3 
split by variability condition category. (Numbers in brackets are standard errors of the 
means.) 
Category 
Low variability 
High variability 
Variability condition 
1 :2 
0.11 (0.03) 
0.95 (0.01) 
1 :4 
0.12 (0.03) 
0.96 (0.01) 
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It is the performance on the new transfer items that is of interest. Two 
analyses of these data are reported here. The responses given to each of the 21 new 
transfer items are collapsed into 7 sets, so that responses to stimuli whose projections 
onto the line y-x coincide are in the same set. Figure 17 shows a plot of the 
proportion of high variability responses given to stimuli in each of the 7 sets as a 
function of their position relative to the means of the two categories. Figure 17 can 
therefore be thought of as a generalization gradient for the two categories. In both 
the 1:2 condition and the 1:4 condition, the proportion of high variability responses 
to test stimuli increased as the test stimuli moved towards the high variability 
category and away from the low variability category. In the 1:4 condition the 
proportion of high variability responses was higher than for the 1:2 condition for 
every set of test stimuli. This description of the results was confirmed by a six way 
ANOV A (condition x stimulus set x category mean category variance assignment x 
category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse). The proportion of high variability 
responses increased as the test stimulus gets closer to the high variability category, 
F(6, 96)=185.77,12<0.0005 (Huynh-Feldt ~=0.82). There were more high variability 
responses in the 1:4 condition than in the 1:2 condition, F(l, 16)=10.52,12<0.01. The 
interaction between stimulus set and condition did not reach significance, F( 6, 
96)=1.67,12>0.05 (Huynh-Feldt ~=1.00). There were no other significant main 
effects (largest F(l, 16)=1.06,12>0.05), showing that none of the factors 
counterbalanced across participants affected responding significantly. 
By analyzing the results as above, we compared classification of examples 
that are equally distant from either the mean of the low variability category (or the 
mean of the high variability category - the two comparisons are equivalent) across 
the 1:2 and 1:4 condition. However, an example that is equally distant from the low 
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Figure 17. The generalization gradients obtained from Experiment 3 for the 
pairs of categories 1:2 and 1 :4. The absolute position is measured relative to 
the two category means. (Error bars are standard error of the mean.) 
7 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 63 
variability category mean in the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions was not equally distant from 
the nearest example of the low variability category. The following analysis compares 
examples that are equally distant from the nearest example of the low variability 
category (or equivalently, examples equally distant from the nearest example of the 
high variability category) across the two conditions. Numbering the sets of new 
training stimuli from the one nearest the low variability to the one nearest the high 
variability category for both conditions, if one compares set !l in condition 1:4 with 
set n+ 1 in the 1:2 condition, then the comparison is between sets equally distant from 
the nearest low variability example, or the nearest high variability example. Such 
comparisons are shown in Figure 18. (If one shifts the 1:2 data in Figure 17 one unit 
to the left one obtains Figure 18.) Figure 18 can be though of as the generalization 
gradient between the two categories measured relative to the nearest neighbor of 
either the low variability category, or the high variability category. (As the distance 
between the nearest neighbors was the same for both category pairs, it does not 
matter which nearest example position is measured relative to.) Unsurprisingly we 
see that, as before, as the test stimulus gets nearer the examples of the high 
variability category the proportion of high variability responses increases. However 
now the position of the test set is measured relative to the nearest neighbors of the 
two categories, rather than relative to the categories' means, there is no difference 
between the generalization gradients for the two conditions. A further six way 
ANOVA (condition x stimulus set x category mean category variance assignment x 
category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse) confirms this description. There 
was a main effect of stimulus set, F(5, 80)=170.01,12<0.0005 (Huynh-Feldt ~=0.87), 
but now no main effect of condition, F(l, 16)=0.23, 12>0.05, and no stimulus set x 
condition interaction, F(5, 80)=0.41,12>0.05 (Huynh-Feldt ~=1.00). There were no 
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Figure 18. The generalization gradients obtained from Experiment 3 for the 
pairs of categories 1:2 and 1 :4. The relative position is measured relative to the 
nearest exemplar of the low variability category. (Error bars are standard error 
of the mean.) 
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other significant main effects (largest F(l, 16)=1.19, Q>O.05), showing that none of 
the factors counterbalanced across participants affected responding significantly. It 
appears that it can be concluded that the difference in generalization gradients 
between the two conditions is completely explained by the nearest neighbors of each 
category. 
This conclusion would be premature, however, because, as Maddox (1999) 
has pointed out, averaging across participants does not always produce an accurate 
account of individual participants' behavior. 
Individual Participant Results. When generalization gradients are calculated 
for individual participants they show many participants show very different gradients 
for the two conditions. The results averaged across participants do not represent 
individual performance well. Even when the effect of nearest neighbors is controlled, 
when the difference in the variability of the two categories is increased from 1:2 to 
1 :4, 14 participants show an increase in their proportion of high variability 
responses, and 18 show a decrease. Further, for many of these participants the 
change is larger than would be expected by chance. A X2 analysis was performed for 
each participant, with the trial as the unit of analysis. A 2x2 (variability condition x 
response) contingency table was constructed for each participant, and a X2 statistic 
was calculated on the basis of the hypothesis that there should be no difference in the 
proportion of high variability responses between the two conditions. Yates continuity 
correction was not used, as there is no reason to expect constant marginal totals, and 
the expected frequencies were large (Howell, 1997, p. 146). As the assumption that 
the response on each trial is independent of the response on any other trial is unlikely 
to be true, the statistic was deflated to account for trials being non-independent 
(Altham, 1979~ see also Tavare & Altham, 1983). 12 of the 32 participants showed a 
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significant difference between their responding in the two conditions, 7 increasing 
and 6 decreasing their proportion of high variability responses as the difference in 
variability between the two conditions increased. The probability of obtaining 13 or 
more significant differences (i.e., 12<0.05) by chance is 1.72xlO·9, assuming that the 
number of significant results is binomially distributed (n=32, 12 0.05). 
Discussion 
Accuracy on the training examples of each category in each condition was 
high. Averaged across participants, when the difference in variability between two 
categories is increased, the proportion of high variability responses to intermediate 
stimuli increases. This result is consistent with the predictions of the GCM and GRT. 
Of interest here is the result when the presence of nearest neighbors is taken into 
account. This was done by comparing examples that are equally distant from the 
nearest neighbor of the low variability category (or equivalently, equally distant from 
the nearest neighbor of the high variability category) across the two conditions. 
A veraged across participants, the generalization gradients for the two conditions 
were virtually identical. This is inconsistent with the predictions of GRT, but is 
consistent with GCM (when the amount of generalization is small). However, the 
individual participant data are not well described by the average results. Some 
participants showed a higher proportion of high variability responses in the condition 
with greater difference in responding between the two categories. Other participants 
showed the opposite result. For participants where there was a significant difference 
between the proportion of high variability responses in the two conditions, half 
showed higher proportions in the condition where the difference in variability was 
larger, and half showed higher proportions in the condition where the difference in 
variability was lower. Neither the GCM nor GRT can explain this result, as each 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 66 
theory either makes one prediction, or the other. The category structure alone does 
not determine the strategy used. 
There are two possible explanations of the great difference in performance 
across individual participants. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants 
can change their strategy for classification of intermediate stimuli. It is possible 
therefore, that participants were each using one of two different strategies. One 
strategy would be well modeled by the GCM, and the other would be well modeled 
by normal GRT. The second possibility is that participants' classification of the 
intermediate stimuli is simply not influenced directly by the training stimuli, as both 
the GCM and normal GRT predict. Instead, performance on this intermediate region 
is determined by factors outside of the control of the experiment, perhaps factors 
investigated in Experiments 1 and 2 - the salience and participants' knowledge of 
the difference in variability. Participants have no training examples for the region of 
space between the two categories. It could be, for example, that they make an 
arbitrary decision that determines performance in this region. 
Experiment 4 
Both the exemplar and distributional approaches are unable to predict that 
large variation between individuals demonstrated in Experiment 3. However, if some 
participants are assumed to apply an exemplar approach, and some a distributional 
approach this variation may explained. Alternatively, it could be that neither an 
exemplar approach, nor a' distribution approach is a good model of individual 
participant's data. Experiment 4 aims to discriminate between these two possibilities. 
Experiment 4 differs from Experiment 3 only in that the 1:4 pair of categories 
is replaced with a new pair of categories, 1:2 expanded. All other aspects of the 
design and procedure are the same. The 1:2 expanded pair of categories differs only 
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slightly from the 1:2 structure - in the 1:2 expanded pair of categories, the 5 
examples of the high variability category that are further from the low variability 
category are moved to even more extreme points (Figure 14). As demonstrated in the 
modeling section of this paper, the GCM and normal GRT predict no difference 
between the generalization gradients for the two pairs of categories. The reason for 
the lack of difference between the 1:2 condition and the 1:2 expanded pairs of 
categories, according to the GCM, is that for the model to predict accurate 
classification of training examples the amount of generalization is so small that 
distant examples of the high variability category have negligible effect on the 
classification of the transfer items. Thus moving these examples to more distant 
locations has no effect. Normal GRT predicts no difference, because the increase in 
the variability of the high variability category in the 1:2 expanded pair of categories 
is offset by the category mean moving slightly further away. Therefore, the decision 
bound for each pair of categories is almost exactly the same, and hence the 
generalization gradients hardly differ. In summary, both models predict no difference 
in the classification of the examples intermediate between the two categories for the 
two pairs of categories. However, the category structures used here are very similar 
to those used in Experiment 3, so there is good reason to expect replication of the 
large individual differences. 
Method 
This experiment only differs in the category structure used. In all other 
respects it is identical to Experiment 3. 
Participants. 32 undergraduates from the University of Warwick participated 
for course credit, or payment of £5. No participant had taken part in any other 
experiment in this paper. 
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Stimuli. The stimuli in the 1:2 condition are the same as in Experiment 3, as 
shown in Figure 7. The stimuli in Experiment 3 's 1:4 condition have been replaced 
by new stimuli in this experiment. The new stimuli are as for category pair 1 :2, 
except that five stimuli of the high variability category (those most distant from the 
low variability category) have been moved to more extreme regions of height width 
space (Figure 14). The transfer stimuli remain unaltered. 
Results 
A verage Results. The mean proportion of correct responses in training was 
0.91 for both the 1:2 condition and the 1:2 expanded. Participants were very accurate 
in their training classifications. A five way ANOVA (category mean category 
variance assignment x category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse x condition) 
was run to check that none of the counterbalanced factors, or the category structure 
affected training performance. There were no significant main effects and no 
significant interactions (largest F(1, 16)=4.18, )2>0.05). Performance on old training 
items was also excellent during transfer. The proportion of high variability category 
responses to old training items in transfer is shown in Table 4. A six way ANOVA 
(category mean category variance assignment x category label x stage order x 
rectangle or ellipse x condition x category) was conducted to examine whether any 
of the control factors had an effect on performance, and to check that performance 
on old training items was equal for each category. There was a main effect of 
learning order, F(1, 16)=5.84,12<0.05, that corresponds to a 3% accuracy advantage 
for the group learning the 1:2 condition before the 1:2 expanded condition. 
Compared to the size of the effect for the new test stimuli, this effect is tiny. Further, 
an increase in accuracy should sharpen a generalization gradient, but it should not 
lead to a increase in the proportion of responses to one category, which is what is of 
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Table 4 
Mean proportion of high variability responses across all participants for Experiment 4 
split by variability condition category. (Numbers in brackets are standard errors of the 
means.) 
Category 
Low variability 
High variability 
Variability condition 
1:2 
0.07 (0.01) 
0.93 (0.01) 
1 :2 Expanded 
0.10 (0.02) 
0.93 (0.01) 
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interest here. There were no other significant main effects (largest F(l, 16)=1.84. 
12>0.05). This means no other counterbalanced factor had a significant effect on old 
training item classification in transfer. 
It is the performance on the new transfer items that is of interest. The only 
difference between the 1:2 and the 1:2 expanded conditions was that some distant 
examples of the more variable category have been changed to even more extreme 
locations of stimulus space. Thus each new test example is of equal distance from 
the nearest example of the low variability category between the two conditions. 
(That is, the effect of nearest neighbors is controlled across the two conditions 
without the adjustment required in Experiment 3.) As in the previous experiment's 
analysis the responses given to each of the 21 new transfer items are collapsed into 7 
sets, so that responses to stimuli whose projections onto the line y=~ are averaged 
together. Figure 19 shows a plot of the proportion of high variability responses given 
to stimuli in each of the 7 sets as a function of their position relative to the means of 
the two categories. For both the 1:2 pair and the 1:2 expanded pair, the proportion of 
high variability responses to test stimuli increases as the test stimuli moves towards 
the high variability category and away from the low variability category. There is 
almost no difference between the proportion of high variability responses in the 1:2 
condition and the 1:2 expanded condition. This description of the results is 
confirmed by a six way ANOV A (condition x stimulus set x category mean category 
variance assignment x category label x stage order x rectangle or ellipse). The 
proportion of high variability responses increases as the test stimulus gets closer to 
the high variability category, F(6, 96)=277.20,12<0.0005 (Huynh-Feldt ~=1.00). 
There is no significant difference between the proportion of high yariability 
responses in the 1:2 expanded condition and in the 1:2 condition. F( 1. 16)=0.25. 
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Figure 19. The generalization gradients obtained from Experiment 4 for the 
pairs of categories 1:2 and 1:2 expanded. The absolute position is measured 
relative to the two category means, and is equivalent to the position measured 
7 
relative to the nearest exemplar of each category. (Error bars are standard error 
of the mean.) 
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12>0.05. The interaction between stimulus set and condition did not reach 
significance, F(6, 96)=0.61,12>0.05 (Huynh-Feldt g=0.74). None of the 
counterbalanced factors had a significant effect (largest F(l, 16)=3.88,12>0.05), 
showing that none of the factors counterbalanced across participants affected 
responding significantly. 
Individual Participant Results. The results averaged across participants do not 
represent individual performance well. As for Experiment 3, when generalization 
gradients are calculated for individual participants they show many participants have 
very different gradients for the two conditions. When the distant examples of the 
more variable category are moved to be more extreme points 8 participants show an 
increase in their proportion of high variability responses, whereas the remaining 24 
show a decrease. Further, for many of these participants the change was larger than 
would be expected by chance. As before a X2 analysis was performed for each 
participant, with the trial as the unit of analysis. 19 participants showed a significant 
difference between their responding in the two conditions, 4 increasing and 15 
decreasing their proportion of high variability responses as the difference in 
variability between the two conditions increased. The probability of obtaining 19 or 
more significant differences (i.e., 12<0.05) by chance, if one assumes there is no 
difference between the proportion of high variability response in the two conditions, 
is 12=3.52xl0-17, assuming that the number of significant results is binomially 
distributed (n=32, 12=0.05). 
Discussion 
Moving the distant examples of the high variability category to even more 
distant locations did not alter the generalization gradient obtained from averaged 
participants' data. This result is consistent with the predictions of the GCM and 
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normal GRT. As in the previous experiment, individual participant data is not well 
described by the average data. Out of the 32 participants tested, 19 showed a 
significant difference in the proportion of high variability responses in the two 
conditions. The remaining participants showed differences that failed to reach 
significance. For more than half of the participants, moving the distant examples had 
an effect on their performance on the transfer items. Both the GCM and normal GRT 
are unable to account for this result. 
These results suggest that the second account of the results of Experiment 3 
should be preferred - that the location of the generalization gradient (either near the 
low variability category or near the high variability category) is not determined by 
the category structure in the way that exemplar and distributional account predict it 
should be. The first possibility - that some participants use a GCM strategy, and 
others a GRT strategy - can be rejected, as at the level of individual participants 
neither strategy can account for the majority of participants' results in this 
experiment. 
Experiment 5 
It is not always the case that a category structure in psychological space 
reflects the structure of the category in the experimenter's choice of physical space 
(e.g., Palmeri & Nosofsky, in press). If the category structure of stimulus sets used in 
Experiments 3 and 4 in psychological space of the did not reflect the category 
structure in physical space, then the conclusions drawn from Experiments 3 and 4 
may be incorrect. To investigate this possibility multidimensional scaling solutions 
were obtained for the three category structures used in Experiments 3 and 4 
(Nosofsky, 1986). 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 72 
Method 
Participants. 12 University of Warwick Undergraduates participated for 
payment of £5. None of the participants had participated in any of the previous 
experiments in this chapter. 
Design. The 12 participants were randomly assigned to one of three stimulus 
sets, with the constraint that there were 4 participants assigned to each set. The 
stimuli are described in detail in Experiment 3 (1:2 and 1:4 category pairs) and 
Experiment 4 (pair 1:2 expanded). Within each group of 4 participants assignment of 
category mean to the more and less variable categories was counterbalanced, as was 
the instantiation of the stimuli as either ellipses or re,ctangles. 22 stimuli from each 
set were used. The first 20 were the 10 training examples from each of the two 
categories. The MDS solutions obtained for these examples would allow the 
assumption that the variability of the categories in physical space was also true in 
psychological space. The last two were the two new central transfer examples. These 
examples were included to check that the transfer examples occupied a point 
intermediate between the two categories in psychological space. Ever possible pair 
of the 22 stimuli (484 pairs) was presented to participants. 
Procedure. Participants were seated in front of the computer, and the position 
of the screen and keyboard adjusted as necessary. The experiment began with 
instructions informing participants that they would see a number of pairs of stimuli 
on the screen, and that for each pair they should make a judgement as to how similar 
the pair were, and response using the scale provided. The experimenter checked the 
participant understood the instructions, and the experiment began. On each trial a 
pair of stimuli from the stimulus set the participant was assigned to appeared next to 
one another on the screen. One stimulus was on the left side of the screen, and the 
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other on the right side of the screen. The shapes remained on the screen until the 
participant pressed one of the number keys 1-9 along the top of the keyboard. The 
screen was then cleared, and there was a 500 ms blank before the next trial began. 
Each pair was displayed once, and the pairs were displayed in a random order for 
each participant. 
Results 
The INDSCAL multidimensional scaling model (Carroll & Wish, 1974a; 
Shepard, 1980) was used to derive solutions for the three stimulus sets. The 
INDSCAL model takes as its input an average similarity matrix for each participant 
and produces an MDS solution common to all participants, together with a weight 
set for each participant. In other words, the procedure produces a configuration of 
stimuli common to all participants that best describes each participants similarity 
matrix, under the assumptions that the relative contribution of each dimension of the 
solution may vary across participants, and that each participant may use the response 
scale differently. For each stimulus set a 6 dimensional solution was produced. A 
large number of dimensions was chosen to preserve the information in the confusion 
data that would be lost with a smaller number of dimensions. The overall fit of the 
INDSCAL model was quite good for each of the stimulus sets, as reflected by the 
low Stress values and the high r.2 values in Table 5. The solutions themselves are 
given in the Appendix for the stimulus sets 1 :2, 1:4 and 1:2 expanded. 
In Experiments 3 and 4, a crucial assumption is that the difference in 
variability between the two categories is bigger in the 1:4 and 1:2 expanded category 
pairs than the 1:2 category pair. To test this assumption the within category distance 
was calculated from the MDS solution for each category (Table 6). First. the co-
ordinates of each stimulus in the MDS space were used to calculate a matrix of inter-
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Table 5 
Stress and £2 values for the INDSCAL MDS solutions obtained for the three different 
category structures. 
Stress 
£2 
1 :2 
0.105 
0.840 
1:4 
0.133 
0.674 
1 :2 Expanded 
0.105 
0.836 
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Table 6 
The mean inter-stimulus distance within a category derived from the MDS solution. 
(Comparisons across rows are meaningless, as the value of one unit is arbitrary and 
different in each solution.) 
Low variability category 
High variability category 
1:2 
2.42 
3.03 
1:4 
2.44 
3.29 
1:2 
Expanded 
2.36 
3.32 
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stimulus distances. Second, the inter-stimulus distances between items of the same 
category were averaged together for each category. In line with the assumption, the 
ratio of the mean within category distances is larger for the 1:4 pair than the 1:2 pair, 
and approximately equal to the ratio for the 1:2 expanded pair. (The reader should 
note that as the units of the MDS space are arbitrary for each solution, comparisons 
across the rows of Table 6 are meaningless. One can only compared distances within 
a single solution.) 
A further assumption in Experiment 4 was that, according to the GCM, the 
more distant examples of the high variability category did not contribute 
significantly to the summed similarity of the transfer examples to the examples of 
the high variability. That is, only the five examples of the high variability category 
that are nearest the transfer items significantly affect the GCM's classification of the 
transfer examples. Table 7 shows these summed similarities of the transfer examples 
for a range of values of the .Q parameter. The summed similarities were calculated 
using the MDS co-ordinates for both the 1:2 and 1:2 expanded pairs. When the .Q 
parameter is large enough that the accuracy on the training items is equivalent to that 
achieved by participants in Experiments 3 and 4, the contribution of the distant 
examples of the high variability category to the total summed similarity of the 
transfer examples to the high variability category is very small compared to the 
contribution of the near examples of the high variability category. This is true for 
both the 1:2 and 1:2 expanded pairs. The results in Table 7 are generated from the 
GCM with a Euclidean distance metric and a Gaussian similarity function. but the 
same pattern is obtained if a city block distance metric and an exponential similarity 
function are used. 
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Table 7 
The GCM's predictions for summed similarity for different ~ parameters. (These results 
are for a Euclidean Gaussian model, but a similar pattern is obtained for a city block 
exponential model.) 
Mean accuracy Summed similarity to 
~ low variability high low high high high 
variability variability variability variability variability 
category category near far 
exemplars exemplars 
1 :2 
0.3 0.69 0.64 3.95 4.01 2.62 1.39 
0.4 0.82 0.76 2.04 2.30 1.78 0.52 
0.5 0.92 0.88 0.96 1.35 1.20 0.15 
0.6 0.97 0.96 0.43 0.85 0.82 0.03 
0.7 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.57 0.57 0.01 
1 :2 expanded 
0.4 0.70 0.61 2.54 1.87 1.40 0.47 
0.5 0.77 0.67 1.44 1.02 0.88 0.13 
0.6 0.82 0.73 0.84 0.64 0.61 0.03 
0.7 0.84 0.77 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.01 
0.8 0.85 0.80 0.32 0.39 0.39 
0.00 
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Discussion 
In Experiments 3 and 4 it was assumed that participants' representation of the 
category structure would reflect the physical category structure. Experiment 5 used a 
MDS procedure to recover participants' representation from pair wise similarity 
judgments. Two assumptions were tested. The first assumption was crucial to 
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 - that the high variability category was more 
variable than the low variability category. The average between example distance 
was higher for conditions 1:4 and 1:2 expanded, than it was for condition 1 :2, 
confirming this first assumption. The second assumption was crucial to Experiment 
4 - that the distant examples of the high variability category in the 1:2 and 1:2 
expanded conditions made negligible contribution to the summed similarity of each 
transfer example to that category. Modeling with the GCM confirmed this to be true 
for the range of ~ parameters that would produce accuracy on training examples 
approximating that obtained by participants in Experiments 3 and 4. In summary, the 
MDS solutions obtained for each stimulus set confirm that the assumptions made 
about the representation of the sets in Experiment 3 and 4 were true. 
The GCM and GRT were not fitted to the individual participant data from 
Experiments 3 and 4 because fitting the models would provide no useful 
information. The models were used to generate qualitative predictions about how 
altering the relative variability of two categories should alter performance. Simply 
seeing which model fits the data best therefore seems inappropriate. 
General Discussion 
The experiments presented in this paper investigate whether performance in 
simple perceptual categorizations is based on similarity to stored category examples 
or likelihood in relation to a probability distribution inferred from the data. ~lodeling 
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using an exemplar model (the GCM, Nosofsky, 1986) and a distributional model 
(GRT, Ashby & Townsend, 1986) demonstrated that the two accounts differ in their 
predictions for the classification of an example exactly intermediate between the 
nearest examples of two categories that differ in variability. The exemplar model 
predicted classification of the intermediate example into the more similar, lower 
variability category, but the distributional model predicted classification into the 
more' likely, higher variability category. Further, it was demonstrated that the 
exemplar and distributional models make opposite predictions about the effect of 
increasing the relative variability of the two categories on classification of 
intermediate examples. The exemplar model predicted that the probability of 
classifying an intermediate example into the high variability category would 
decrease as the difference in variability increased. At odds with this prediction, the 
distributional model predicted that the probability of classifying an intermediate 
example into the high variability category would be increased as the difference in 
variability increased. ' 
Experiment 1 showed that on average participants classified a stimulus half 
way between the nearest neighbor from each category into the lower variability 
category, whose examples are more similar to the critical stimulus. This is only 
consistent with similarity based classification. Experiments 2 demonstrate that 
increasing the salience of the difference in variability between two categories, by 
presenting examples simultaneously rather than sequentially, encourages participants 
use of a likelihood strategy rather than a similarity strategy. Further, when the 
variability is more salient, drawing participants' attention to the difference in 
variability between the two categories further encourages use of a likelihood 
strategy. Experiment 3 demonstrated that individual participants varied greatly in the 
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change in the categorization of stimuli intermediate between the two categories as 
the relative variability of the pair of categories was increased. Some participants 
showed an increase in high variability responses, consistent with the predictions of 
normal GRT, and others showed a decrease, consistent with the predictions of the 
GCM. This result suggests that it is possible that people's behavior may be strategic 
- in the sense that it is determined by their understanding of the nature and demands 
of the task, rather than tapping into some basic aspect of cognition. The best 
construal for GCM and normal GRT would be that both kinds of mechanism are 
available to people, and they can choose between them. However this seems to 
involve the cognitive system in unnecessary duplication, given that the two 
approaches produce extremely similar answers under almost all circumstances. This 
possibility is eliminated by the results of Experiment 4. Experiment 4 replicated the 
results of Experiment 3 using two pairs of categories where both exemplar and 
distributional models were constrained to predict no change in the proportion of high 
variability responses to intermediate stimuli as the relative variability of the two 
categories was increased. The majority of participants showed a significant change in 
the proportion of high variability responses to intermediate stimuli as the relative 
variability of the two categories was increased, at odds with the predictions of both 
the GCM and normal GRT. At the level of data averaged across participants these 
differences between the two differing variability conditions disappear. That the true 
form of individual participant data is obscured by averaging further illustrates the 
dangers of averaging across participants (Maddox, 1999). 
Exemplar and distributional models can be though of as lying at opposite 
ends of a continuun1 of finite mixture models, where the number of distributions 
used to represent a category varies from one, as in GRT, to the number of examples 
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of that category, as in the GCM (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Rosseel, 1996). 
Also contained in this continuum are back propagation networks with sigmoidal 
activation functions (Rumelhart et aI., 1986) and radial basis functions (Moody & 
Darken, 1989). With small numbers of hidden units (and hence small numbers of 
free parameters in relation to the size of the data to be modeled), neural networks are 
analogous to distributional models, because they can only learn data with a particular 
distributional structure. But if the number of hidden units is large in relation to the 
amount of data to be learned, then the neural network becomes analogous to an 
exemplar model, in that any data set can be modeled, whatever its structure, simply 
learning each piece of data (each example) by rote. The results of Experiment 4 
present a serious challenge to unitary accounts of this kind that assume that 
categorization is achieved by a mechanism at some point along the continuum 
between distributional and exemplar models, and that this point on the continuum is 
invariant within and between individuals. Thus, these findings challenge standard 
formulations of both exemplar and distributional accounts of categorization. 
In this paper the issue of category biases has been neglected. There is no 
doubt that the findings in this paper can all be explained by either the GCM or GRT, 
if the biases for each category are used as a free parameter in the models. However, 
allowing the bias to vary as a free parameter provides no predictive power as to how 
or why there is sensitivity to variability. 
As Ashby and Waldron (1999) note, a number of models in the 
categorization literature assume a low resolution map of perceptual space where 
regions are mapped onto category labels, for example; the grid model (Ashby & 
Maddox, 1989); the covering version of ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992); Anderson's 
(1991) rational model; the striatal pattern classifier (Ashby & Waldron, 1999). These 
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models of categorization may leave regions of perceptual space unlabelled. Thus, 
unlike exemplar and distributional models, these models make no prediction about 
the classification of stimuli in this region of space. It would seem that this is more 
appropriate as Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that performance in regions of space 
where participants have no training examples is not specified directly by the other 
training examples. Both the GCM and normal GRT predict that performance should 
be specified by those examples. Further, Experiment 4 demonstrates performance in 
this region that cannot be accounted for by either model. Instead, participants may 
have to make a conscious decision about the classification of these intermediate 
examples, that may be influenced by a number of factors. Two such factors were 
investigated in Experiments 1 and 2 - knowledge about the difference in variability, 
and the salience of that variability difference during category learning. The point is 
that these mapping models of categorization are not challenged by the results in this 
paper because they make no claims about the categorization of new stimuli from 
regions of perceptual space where participants have no prior examples. 
Similarly decision bound models of categorization may be adapted to offer a 
potential account of these results. Decision bound models are closely related to 
normal GRT, except participants are assumed to estimate the parameters of the 
decision bound directly, rather than calculating the bound from the inferred normal 
distributions used to represent each category. In these experiments, there is a large, 
empty region between the two categories, where participants have no training data. 
Therefore, there is a large set of possible decision bounds that participants could use, 
if they are estimating the bound directly. Decision bound theory could account for 
the results of Experiments 3 and 4, where participants are shown to vary greatly in 
their classification of stimuli in this region between the categories, if it is assumed 
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that some participants have a bound near the low variability category, and some haye 
a bound near the high variability category. However, decision bound theory does not 
provide a mechanism for explaining how the location of this bound might be 
influenced by knowledge and salience of the differences in variability, as 
demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2. 
In conclusion, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that participants' strategy for 
classifying an ambiguous stimulus can be shifted from classification into the most 
similar category to classification into the most likely category by increasing the 
salience of the difference in variability of two categories, and instructing participants 
of this difference. At the level of individual participants, Experiment 3 shows that 
participants responding to examples intermediate between the two categories is 
altered when the relative variability of the two categories is manipulated. Experiment 
4 replicates this finding and demonstrates that the sensitivity of the majority of 
participants cannot be explained either by the GeM or normal GRT. This presents a 
serious challenge to both exemplar and distributional models of classification as 
unitary models of categorization behavior. 
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Appendix 
INDSCAL MDS Solutions for the Stimulus Sets Used in Experiments 3 and -+ 
Table Al 
Six-dimensional INDSCAL MDS solution for the 1:2 stimulus set. 
Dimension 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
low var 1 1.1313 -0.0519 1.0703 -0.4901 1.4448 -0.1 055 
low var 2 1.2324 -0.325 0.5961 -1.1343 -0.0373 0.7989 
low var 3 0.8673 0.3734 0.8467 -1.1412 -0.6675 1.192 
low var 4 0.323 1.007 0.6303 -1.5127 -1.1217 0.5717 
low var 5 0.3124 1.54 0.9577 -0.909 -0.2145 1.0218 
low var 6 0.17 1.6015 0.8589 -0.721 1.1729 -0.1855 
low var 7 1.0339 1.0387 -0.4511 1.5906 1.0489 -0.4567 
low var 8 0.7209 1.3503 -0.2525 1.4459 1.2334 -0.7492 
low var 9 0.6251 1.5449 -0.658 0.9391 0.7165 -1.1978 
low var 10 0.7913 1.1688 0.0176 0.1922 0.5765 -1.8355 
high var 1 -1.384 -0.7604 0.8537 -0.3103 -0.4839 -2.0779 
high var 2 -0.7239 -1.1937 1.9486 1.4877 -0.8957 0.0073 
high var 3 -1.273 -0.7435 1.1998 1.7908 -1.1482 0.5684 
high var 4 -1.4027 -0.8062 0.785 1.5769 -0.2478 1.0618 
high var 5 -1.3788 -0.6126 -0.4704 -0.092 1.9039 1.5562 
high var 6 -0.963 -1.1319 -0.7192 -0.8739 1.7024 -0.295 
(table continues) 
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dimension 
stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
high var 7 0.527 -1.5224 -1.1487 -0.8232 -0.4401 -0.3111 
high var 8 -0.3393 -0.3309 -1.9335 -0.6681 -1.1066 0.4218 
high var 9 -1.1125 -0.0414 -1.5244 -0.0142 -0.9323 0.9834 
high var 10 -1.5223 -0.2948 -0.7577 -0.0445 -0.8724 -1.7244 
transfer 1 1.2603 -0.6492 -0.7758 0.0202 -0.8028 0.6715 
transfer 2 1.1048 -1.1606 -1.0731 -0.3088 -0.8285 0.0839 
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Table A2 
Six-dimensional INDSCAL MDS solution for the 1:4 stimulus set. 
Dimension 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
low var 1 -0.9074 -0.2336 -l.0138 -l.3008 0.7656 0.3594 
low var 2 -0.9023 l.1771 l.1679 -0.4735 0.3761 0.01 
low var 3 -0.714 -0.0803 1.4536 -0.5601 0.2836 1.6829 
low var 4 -0.8272 -0.7567 1.6985 -0.312 0.7208 0.501 
low var 5 -l.0707 -l.126 l.1007 0.3895 -0.l905 0.0941 
low var 6 -l.0211 -0.4755 0.l353 1.2848 -l.3167 -0.581 
low var 7 -1.1404 -0.3238 -1.0869 0.7412 -1.3613 -0.l367 
low var 8 -0.9403 -1.2698 -1.3359 0.0869 0.429 0.2425 
low var 9 -0.9764 -l.055 -1.1969 -0.5871 0.5838 -0.7721 
low var 10 -0.8659 -1.0688 -1.0136 0.l762 0.2822 -1.4406 
high var 1 1.0748 0.3405 -0.8869 0.7739 1.4883 2.0804 
high var 2 0.602 1.2915 -0.5218 l.6711 1.9011 0.488 
high var 3 l.1597 0.2779 -0.098 2.47 0.3868 0.0673 
high var 4 l.1755 0.2617 0.9886 0.929 0.9103 -2.0204 
high var 5 1.4831 -l.1161 l.6175 0.0695 -0.5963 -0.l139 
high var 6 0.9885 -0.5835 0.5763 0.2473 -1.8632 1.4598 
high var 7 0.0053 1.862 -0.3559 -0.013 -1.5228 
-0.8713 
high var 8 0.8593 -0.1194 -l.4714 -1.1879 -1.4901 
0.8369 
(table continues) 
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Dimension 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
high var 9 1.3894 -0.4844 0.4899 -1.4865 -0.0108 -1.3433 
high var 10 1.5772 -0.3089 -0.589 -0.8029 0.9651 -1.1916 
transfer 1 -0.653 1.8694 0.0638 -1.1381 -0.5507 0.3002 
transfer 2 -0.2961 1.9216 0.278 -0.9775 -0.1902 0.3486 
Chapter 2 Categorical Variability 
Table A3 
Six-dimensional INDSCAL MDS solution for the 1:2 expanded stimulus set. 
Dimension 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
low var 1 1.0074 0.0907 -0.3944 -1.4681 0.3764 0.3003 
low var 2 1.0761 -0.1072 -1.2638 -0.1858 0.3137 0.3984 
low var 3 0.886 0.6738 -0.1884 1.4572 0.7736 0.6412 
low var 4 0.5997 0.6961 0.8727 1.324 -1.3753 -0.6273 
low var 5 0.6477 0.8309 1.2937 1.6252 -0.5674 -0.0665 
low var 6 0.8634 0.8297 1.1831 1.0043 0.4278 0.8136 
low var 7 0.8881 0.0688 1.5574 -0.1599 0.122 1.1974 
low var 8 0.7363 -0.5876 1.4625 -1.178 -0.4369 0.5288 
low var 9 0.8136 -0.2835 1.3898 -1.3947 -0.4881 -0.326 
low var 10 0.8324 -0.4044 0.7372 -1.9298 -0.2202 0.0372 
high var 1 -1.2549 0.0201 0.4873 -0.3183 1.4426 -2.3872 
high var 2 -0.4826 1.0958 -0.5699 -0.7499 2.8288 -0.5581 
high var 3 -1.3992 2.2358 -0.2281 -0.784 0.0347 -0.5271 
high var 4 -1.661 0.9282 -0.4387 -0.2043 -0.419 1.8261 
high var 5 -1.486 0.2069 -0.5905 -0.477 -0.8744 1.9551 
high var 6 -0.8982 0.5871 -0.8073 0.0948 -2.1842 -1.1851 
high var 7 0.5299 -0.6377 -1.7302 0.5358 -0.9913 -0.6917 
high var 8 -0.5235 -2.0711 -0.2904 -0.2917 0.2603 -1.5317 
(table continues) 
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Dimension 
Stimulus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
high var 9 -1.2497 -2.0093 -0.1608 0.2023 0.0369 0.5543 
high var 10 -1.4281 -1.6479 0.5011 0.9449 1.0164 0.0069 
transfer 1 0.8117 -0.396 -1.1002 1.4412 0.4031 0.2753 
transfer 2 0.6909 -0.1192 -1.722 0.5117 -0.4793 -0.634 
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Chapter 3 
Identification and Categorization of Simple Perceptual Stimuli: A Memory and 
Contrast Model 
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Abstract 
Categorization research typically assumes that the cognitive system has access to an 
accurate representation of the absolute magnitudes of the properties of stimuli. and 
that this information is used in reaching a categorization decision. However, research 
on identification of simple perceptual stimuli suggests people have very poor 
representations of absolute magnitude information, and shows that judgments about 
absolute magnitude are strongly influenced by preceding material. The experiments 
presented here investigate such sequence effects in categorization tasks. Strong 
sequence effects were found. Classification of a borderline stimulus was more 
accurate when preceded by a distant member of the opposite category than by a 
distant member of the same category. It is shown that category contrast cannot be 
accounted for by modified exemplar or modified decision bound models of 
categorization. An alternative memory and contrast model is presented, and is shown 
to account for the results. 
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Identification and Categorization of Simple Perceptual Stimuli: A ~femory 
and Contrast Model 
Categorization models are often divided into two general classes, each 
including a wide range of specific accounts: parametric Thurstonian decision-bound 
models (e.g., Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Perrin, 1988), and non-parametric exemplar 
models (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). However, all extant models 
of categorization assume that items can be represented in terms of their (more or less 
noisy) absolute location in a multidimensional space. This absolute location 
information is then assumed to be used in the decision process (either directly, as in 
exemplar models, or indirectly, in relation to decision bounds). Thus two key 
• 
assumptions are (a) that the absolute location of a stimulus in multidimensional 
space is available when a categorization or identification decision is made, and (b) 
that absolute location information provides the sole basis for categorization 
decisions. Formal models of categorization and identification based on these 
assumptions have a long history of successful application to a wide range of 
experimental paradigms (e.g., see Estes, 1994 for a review). Here we question both 
of the assumptions. 
Difficulty in Determining Absolute Magnitudes 
Regarding the first assumption above, participants often have difficulty 
making accurate estimates of the absolute values of stimuli along simple perceptual 
dimensions, particularly in the absence of contextual information. For example. in a 
series of classic experiments by Garner (1954) participants were completely unable 
to determine which of three tones was half as loud as a reference loudness. Instead. 
participants' judgments were entirely influenced by the range of the three tones (see 
also Helson, 1964). Absolute magnitude judgments are very coarse - people are only 
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able to divide items reliably into about five 'bins' on a single dimension, however 
broad those bins are made (cf. Miller, 1956). Laming (1997) provided extensiye 
discussion of these and other similar findings. Of course, more or less accurate 
determination of absolute magnitude is often possible; the information may be 
deduced from perception of the relative magnitude of the stimulus in comparison to 
an amalgam of reference or context stimuli. If this is the case, then absence of 
appropriate reference stimuli will pose difficulty. To consider an extreme example, 
suppose one is listening to tones over headphones and is required to make a simple 
binary loud/quiet categorization. To the extent that one is unable, in the absence of 
feedback or a reference loudness, accurately to judge absolute loudness the task will 
be impossible. Some absolute magnitude information will be available when 
different stimuli are used and contextual magnitudes are available, but this simply 
points to the importance of context and feedback as the basis for decision making. 
Note that the success of current models of categorization can not be taken as 
reason to ignore this problem: The use of random or controlled trial orders in almost 
all categorization experiments, followed by averaging over all stimuli of the same 
type, discards the very information about sequential context that may provide the 
true basis for categorization. Thus a primary aim of the research presented here is to 
examine sequence effects in categorization. 
What Information is Used in Categorization? 
The second key assumption embodied in many current categorization models 
is that categorization decisions are based on the (perceived or inferred) location of 
items in nlultidimensional space. Note that this issue of information use can be 
exan1ined separately from the related issue of information availability discussed 
above; even if accurate information about absolute magnitude is available, \vhether 
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directly or indirectly, that information need not be used in identification and 
categorization decisions. 
Much research demonstrates that the absolute identification of stimuli is 
heavily context dependent in that the response on trial n is influenced by the stimulus 
and response on trial n-1. In an absolute identification paradigm, participants are 
presented with stimuli that vary along a (normally uni-dimensional) psychological 
continuum (e.g., sounds that vary in amplitude, or lines of different lengths). Each 
stimulus is associated with a unique response. Normally the responses are arranged 
such that their order corresponds to the order of the stimuli in the psychological 
space. For example, if 10 lines lengths are used, of 1 cm, 2 cm, ... , and 10 cm, and 
10 numbers for the responses, 1, 2, ... , and 10, each line length would be associated 
with a single number. The 1 cm line could be associated with response 1, the 2cm 
line with response 2, and so on. On presentation of a stimulus, a participant is 
required to identify the unique response for that stimulus. One crucial finding is that 
the response given to the current stimulus is assimilated to the immediately 
preceding stimulus (Lacouture, 1997; Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Ward & Lockhead, 
1971). In other words, participants are systematically biased to respond as if the 
current stimulus is nearer the previous stimulus than it actually is. For example, if 
participants get item 1 followed by item 6, they will show a tendency to respond 5 
instead of 6. The effect of stimuli further back in the sequence is the opposite - a 
contrast effect (Lacouture, 1997; Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Ward & Lockhead, 
1971). Thus identification decisions depend on recent previous trials. Of course 
categorization decisions are not thought to be independent of previous trials, as it is 
precisely these trials that provide the information the categorization is based on. But 
exemplar models do typically assunle this information is not biased by the local 
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sequential context provided by recent trials (for an account in terms of criterion-
shifting within a Thurstonian framework, see Treisman, 1985; Treisman & Williams, 
1984). 
Mori (1989) demonstrated that in absolute identification of uni-dimensional 
stimuli (e.g., frequencies or amplitudes), the information used by the decision 
process was limited to about 2.5 bits, and that this information was predicted almost 
completely by the current stimulus, the previous stimulus, and the previous response. 
This suggests the intriguing possibility that the relation between recent successive 
trials and the current trial may solely determine the decision making process. For 
example, in a binary categorization task an extreme possibility would be that each 
decision is made entirely on the basis of the perceived difference between the current 
and the previous stimulus, i.e., with no reference to the absolute magnitude of the 
stimulus. Note that this is a stronger claim than simply that decisions on successive 
trials are not independent. The claim is that the difference between stimulus on trial 
n-l and the stimulus on trial n determines the response given to stimulus on trial n· 
Participants would respond with the same category label as on the previous trial if 
there is a small difference between the two stimuli, and a different label if the 
difference is large. Indeed such a strategy would be the only one available to 
participants in the absence of absolute magnitude information. In more realistic 
situations, where partial absolute magnitude information is likely to be available, 
such a strategy is not likely to be used exclusively. However for purposes of 
explication we consider the extreme possibility that subjects use only this memory 
and contrast (MAC) strategy. (A related concept is the "Bypass Rule": Krueger & 
Shapiro, 1981.) 
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The Memory and Contrast Strategy 
Although intuition suggests that a MAC strategy will lead to very poor 
performance, preliminary modeling work indicates that strategies of this type can be 
surprisingly successful. For example, consider a binary categorization for uni-
dimensional stimuli, where it is assumed that participants only have access to the 
magnitude and the direction of the difference between the current trial and the 
previous trial. By optimizing the size of the difference needed to give a switch in 
categorization response participants can achieve an accuracy of 85% in categorizing 
examples in a randomly ordered sequence of trials (independent of the number of 
items). Such a model works by taking advantage of the correlation that exists 
between magnitude differences and category shifts when uni-dimensionally varying 
stimuli are involved. Consider the case depicted in Figure 20 of ten stimuli, 
equidistant from one another along a single dimension (such as loudness or pitch), 
divided into two categories. If a correct category A response is given to stimulus 1 
on trial n-l, and there is a large positive dimensional shift up the scale to the 
stimulus on trial !l, the large positive shift will be accompanied by a shift to a 
category B response. A small shift, in contrast, is more likely to represent a within-
category shift. An adaptive system could select the optimal shift size over which a 
change in responding should ensue. Although surprisingly successful, at least in the 
uni-dimensional case, this strategy will clearly lead to characteristic errors under 
particular circumstances. For example, if item 1 is followed by item 5 the large inter-
trial difference will lead to an erroneous shift in response from category A to 
category B. In other words, large within category shifts will induce errors. Compare 
this to a large between category shift, for example item 10 preceding item 5. The 
large shift will again cause a switch in response, this time correctly. 
category A 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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category B 
7 8 9 10 
Figure 20. Ten stimuli distributed evenly along a single psychological dimension 
divided into two categories. 
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Traditional exemplar models make opposite predictions. Exemplar models 
can be adapted to predict sequence effects by assuming that more recent exemplars 
are more available in memory and/or weighted more heavily in the subsequent 
decision process (e.g., via the M parameter of Nos of sky & Palmeri, 1997; see also 
Elliott & Anderson, 1995). In exemplar models the probability of responding with a 
given category label is given by the ratio of the summed similarity to that category, 
divided by the summed similarity to all contending categories (i.e., in terms of 
Luce's (1959) choice model). Therefore the probability of responding with a given 
category can only be increased if exemplars of the same category are weighted more 
heavily in decision making, as when they have occurred very recently. The 
consequence of this is that when the item on the preceding trial is from the same 
category this must always lead to a greater tendency to respond with that category 
label, relative to the case where the previous stimulus was from the other category. 
This is the opposite prediction to that made by the MAC model described above. 
Modeling 
To support the intuitive argument above, categorization performance in a 
simple uni-dimensional random sequence was modeled using a MAC model and an 
exemplar model, the generalized context model (GCM, Nosofsky, 1986). 
In this simple implementation of the MAC model, participants are assumed 
to base their categorization decision for the stimulus on trial n on the difference, g, 
between the current stimulus, and the stimulus on the preceding trial, trial n-1. 
Equation 23 uses Gaussian decay to relate the distance d to the probability of 
responding on trial n with the category label from trial n- 1. 
P( same category) = e -cd 2 
The free parameter,~, determines the size of the distance required to giYe a 
(23) 
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change in category label. The Gaussian decay function was chosen because it was a 
smooth, monotonically decreasing function of g - many other functions would giye 
similar performance. Using Equation 23, the probability of a given response for the 
last stimulus in any pair of stimuli can be predicted. Note that for some pairs (e.g., 5 
followed by 1) the sign of the difference completely determines the categorization. 
There is no need to rely of the magnitude of the difference. For example, ifit is 
known that category A members take low values on the dimension, and the stimulus 
on trial n-l is an A, any stimulus on trial !1 with a lower value, as indicated by the 
sign of the difference, must also be a member of category A. 
In a truly random sequence every pair of stimuli is equally likely. Therefore 
by calculating the probability of a correct response for every possible pair, and 
weighting all these probabilities equally, an average accuracy score can be obtained. 
The ~ parameter can then be fit to maximize accuracy. Figure 21 illustrates the 
predicted probabilities for each stimulus as a function of the preceding stimulus for 
the category structure illustrated in Figure 20. The predictions shown are for the 
optimal ~ parameter which gives an accuracy of 85.20/0. For the optimal ~ parameter 
the jump size that corresponds to an equal probability of responding with either 
category is 1.85 tones. However, overall accuracy remains very close to the 
maximum accuracy for a wide range of ~ parameters (see Myung & Pitt, 1997). 
Predictions for stimuli 6 through 10 have been omitted, because, by the symmetry of 
the category structure, they are the same as the predictions for stimuli 5 through 1. 
Of interest is categorization accuracy of stimulus 5, which is high when preceded by 
stimulus 10, but low when preceded by stimulus 1. An exemplar model is unable to 
predict this pattern of results, as we now show. 
The GCM is presented elsewhere (Nosofsky, 1986) but will be described 
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briefly here. Each stimulus is represented by a vector in multidimensional space (i.e., 
the stimulus is represented using absolute magnitude information). Each stimulus 
encountered is stored, together with its category label. The probability by which a 
stimulus ~ is classified into category i4, P(~I~), is given by the ratio of its summed 
similarity to examples of that category, hk(~, divided by the summed similarity to all 
contending categories: 
p( Cklx) = !khk(X) 
LfJihi(X) 
i=l 
Similarity is monotonically decreasing function of distance, and is typically 
either an exponential decay or a Gaussian. Thus, 
Nk 
hk(x) = Le-Cd(x,x;)" 
i=l 
where d(~, ~0 is the distance between stimulus ~ and stimulus ~i in psychological 
space, g specifies the form of the similarity function, and ~ is a free parameter for the 
discriminability of the stimuli. 
The GCM can be adapted to predict sequence effects by weighting the 
stimulus on the previous trial more heavily in the summed similarity calculations. In 
intuitive terms this corresponds to the stimulus either being more available in 
memory, or being weighted more heavily in the decision process. This means the 
current stimulus will always be more similar to the category of the preceding 
stimulus than it would be with no weighting. To demonstrate clear sequence effects, 
the stimulus on the previous trial was arbitrarily weighted 10 times more heavily 
than other stimuli. The GCM was used to predict classification accuracies for the 
category structure described in Figure 20. Figure 22 shows the categorization 
accuracy for the stimulus on trial n as a function of the preceding stimulus on trial n-
(24) 
(25) 
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1 for the GCM (g=2, ~=0.25, no category bias). Whilst the exact predictions depend 
on the generalization parameter, ~, and the choice of similarity function, g, the 
qualitative pattern of results is independent of these choices. The optimal value of 
the ~ parameter is infinite, as then there will be no generalization between stimuli, 
and performance will be 100% accurate, with no effect of the previous stimulus. The 
size of the weighting for the stimulus on trial n-I also does not affect the pattern 
qualitatively - a larger weighting simply makes the pattern more extreme. The GCM, 
unlike the MAC model, is always constrained to predict more accurate classification 
in the case when the preceding stimulus is from the same category rather than the 
opposite category. 
Overview of Experiments 
In the experiments in this paper these opposing predictions for the relative 
accuracy of classification of a borderline stimulus, preceded by either a distant 
member of the same category or a distant member of the other category, are tested. 
All of the experiments use the category structure in Figure 20. The aim was to 
demonstrate a category contrast effect, whereby classification of borderline stimuli is 
more accurate when preceded by a distant stimulus from the other category than by a 
distant stimulus from the same category. A MAC strategy would be able to offer an 
account of this intuitive potential result, but existing models of categorization would 
not. The existence of a category contrast effect would therefore provide evidence 
that categorization is based, at least in part, on relative location information. 
Experiment 6 uses the frequency of a tone as the dimension of variability in a simple 
binary classification. Experiment 7 uses simple geometric figures used in 
categorization experiments where participants have typically been hypothesized to 
categorize on the basis of absolute magnitude information alone. Experiment 8 is a 
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replication of Experiment 6, and in addition has blocks of identification, rather than 
categorization, to allow sequence effects in identification to be measured along with 
sequence effects in categorization. 
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 aims to demonstrate a simple category contrast effect using the 
category structure in Figure 20. As the concern is with the effect of distant stimuli on 
the classification of stimuli on the borderline between the two categories, these pairs 
of stimuli (1 before 5, 10 before 5, 1 before 6 and 10 before 6) are over represented 
in pseudo random sequences, so that enough data could be gathered in a short 
experiment. The pseudo random sequences are controlled so that the runs of 
consecutive categorization responses, the relative frequencies of each tone, and the 
relative frequencies of each sized jump between tones would be as found in a truly 
random sequence. 
Method 
Participants. Ten University of Warwick undergraduates participated in this 
10-minute experiment. 
Stimuli. Ten 500 ms sine wave tones of differing frequency were used as 
stimuli in this experiment. Each tone was I % higher in frequency than the tone 
immediately lower in frequency, and thus the tones were equally spaced on a log 
frequency scale. The first tone had a frequency of 600.00 Hz, and the last tone had a 
frequency of 656.21 Hz. The intention was that adjacent tones anywhere along the 
scale would be equally discriminable. 
Design. The 10 tones were divided into two categories, with the 5 lo\\est 
frequency tones in one category, and the 5 highest frequency tones in the other 
category. Tones were presented sequentially for categorization. Of interest in this 
Chapter 3 Identification and Categorization 93 
experiment are the effects of the immediately preceding tone (trial n-1) on the 
categorization of the current tone (trial n). Numbering the tones from 1 (lowest 
frequency) to 10 (highest frequency), the four critical pairs of tones are 1 before 5, 
10 before 5, 10 before 6 and 1 before 6. The pairs 1--75 and 10--76 contain a tone 
distant in frequency space followed by a borderline member of the same category. 
The pairs 10--75 and 1--76 contain a distant tone followed by a borderline member of 
the other category. A simple comparison of the proportion correct on the last trial of 
each pair for the two pair types (either within category or between category) will 
allow exemplar and MAC accounts to be distinguished. 
Each critical pair was presented once in each block of 20 trials. The four 
critical pairs were assigned at random to the 4th and 5th, 9th and 10th, 14th and 15th, 
and 19th and 20th trials in a block. The remaining tones - 2, 3,4, 7, 8 and 9 - were 
placed in the unfilled trials at random, subject to the following constraints: (a) each 
tone occurs equally frequently, (b) the number of occurrences of each size jump in 
tone reflects the natural distribution of these jumps for a random stream of ten tones, 
(c) the lengths of runs of tones of the same category is fixed to mimic a random 
sequence. With these constraints only 42 possible sequences can be generated. For 
each block a sequence was selected at random from one of the possible sequences. 
The constraints were designed to allow the critical pairs to be over represented in a 
sequence without the sequence seeming non-random. 
Procedure. Participants were tested one at a time in a quiet room. Participants 
were instructed that they would hear a number of tones, one after then other. They 
were told that after each tone they would be asked to respond \vith one of two 
labeled keys depending on which category they thought the tone came from. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible \vithout making mistakes. 
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Although at first participants would have to guess, they were informed that by 
attending to the correct answer displayed on the screen after each response, they 
could learn which tones belonged to which category. They were given an 
opportunity to ask the experimenter questions before the experiment began. 
Ten blocks of 20 trials were presented to each participant. For each block a 
different pseudo random sequence, as described in the design, was randomly chosen. 
Each trial began with a tone, presented for 500 ms, over Sony DR-S3 closed back 
headphones. Tones were generated by, and response were gathered, using an Apple 
Macintosh Performa 475. A "?" prompt appeared on the screen with the onset of the 
tone. From the onset of the tone participants were able to respond with either z or x 
on a normal qwerty keyboard, labeled "A" and "B" respectively. The assignment of 
labels to categories was counterbalanced across participants. The "?" prompt 
disappeared immediately participants responded. After the participants had 
responded or 1500 ms after the offset of the tone, whichever was later, the correct 
answer was displayed on the screen for 1000 ms. There was a 500 ms pause before 
the next trial began. Participants completed all blocks with no breaks between 
blocks. The experiment took about 10 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Categorization accuracy reached an asymptote of about 900/0 correct after the 
first block of 20 trials. Performance on the last tone in a critical pair is shown as a 
function of whether the first tone of the pair came from the same category, or the 
other category (Figure 23). There was a large difference is performance in the two 
pair types, with participants classifying a borderline tone significantly more 
accurately after a distant tone from the other category, compared to a distant tone 
from the same category, 1(9)=3.67, 12<0.00l. This pattern is the same for both pairs 
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Figure 23. The proportion of correct responses for same category 
tone pairs (1 ~ 5 and 1 O~6) and different category pairs (1 ~6 and 
lO~5) for Experiment 6. (Error bars are standard error of the mean.) 
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1 ~5 and 1 0~5, and for 1 0~6 and 5~6, and is consistent with a MAC hypothesis. 
An alternate explanation of these results needs to be ruled out. The different 
between the two types of critical pairs is that to get both tones in a within category 
pair correct participants must make the same category response twice in a row, but to 
get both tones correct for the between category pair type participants must switch 
responses. Thus if participants are biased against making two identical response in a 
row, participants would show poorer accuracy on the final tone of the within 
category pair than on the final tone of the between category pair. To eliminate this 
possibility, responses to filler items were examined to measure possible bias. 
Participants were more likely to persevere with a response than they should be, given 
the sequence they were presented with. This deviation was not significant, 1(9)=0.47, 
12-0.65, and is in the wrong direction to explain the pattern of responding on the last 
item in the critical stimuli pairs. 
Discussion 
In categorizing a sequence of tones categorization of a tone is influenced by 
the immediately preceding tone. This finding is consistent with evidence from 
absolute identification, where there are also strong sequence effects (Lacouture, 
1997; Mori, 1989; Mori & Ward, 1995; Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Ward & 
Lockhead, 1971). When cate gorizing a tone on the borderline between the two 
categories, a preceding large within category shift induced significantly more errors 
than a between category shift (i.e., a category contrast effect is demonstrated). This 
effect is consistent with a MAC strategy, but not with an exemplar based strategy. 
Although these effects could potentially be explained by a simple alternation bias 
(Dember & Richman, 1985) analysis of filler trials in the pilot experiment reveals no 
evidence of such bias. The category contrast effect is strong evidence that 
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participants' categorizations are not based on absolute frequency information, but 
rather on the frequency of a tone relative to the preceding tone(s). 
Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 is very similar to Experiment 6. The main difference is that the 
tones were replaced with simple visual stimuli. The stimuli are those used by 
Nosofsky (1985; 1986) - semicircles that vary in radius, with radial lines that vary in 
orientation. These stimuli were selected because they are typical of stimuli used in 
categorization experiments (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Waldron, 1999; 
Maddox & Ashby, 1993; Nosofsky, 1985; Nosofsky, 1986). Models of 
categorization applied to data from research with such stimuli assume participants 
represent the stimuli in a multidimensional space, and therefore make the implicit 
assumption that participants have access to absolute magnitude information for these 
stimuli (e.g., the GCM, Nosofsky, 1986; and general recognition theory or decision 
bound theory, Ashby & Townsend, 1986). If a contrast effect can be demonstrated 
with these stimuli, then this would challenge this assumption. 
Although for the purposes of explication of the MAC strategy we have been 
assuming that participants do not have absolute magnitude information available to 
them, we certainly do not claim that this information is completely unavailable. With 
the simple visual stimuli used in this experiment, it is possible that participants have 
some absolute magnitude information. Whether this information is directly perceived 
or deduced from the context the stimuli are presented in is not at issue. However the 
fact that that the information may be available means that it may be used to inform 
categorization decisions. If this is the case the category contrast effect is expected to 
be smaller. Accordingly more participants \vere tested than in Experiment 6 to detect 
a potentially smaller effect. 
Chapter 3 Identification and Categorization 97 
Method 
Participants. 26 Warwick University undergraduates and postgraduates 
participated. 
Stimuli. The stimuli used in this experiment were semicircles of varying 
radius, with radii of varying angle, as used by Nosofsky (1985; 1986). In Nosofsky's 
experiment, four possible semicircle radii were crossed with four possible radius 
orientations, to create a 16 possible stimuli, arranged in a four by four grid in 
diameter-orientation space. In this experiment ten different stimuli were created, 
arranged in a straight line in diameter-orientation space. Thus both semicircle radius 
and radius orientation were diagnostic of category. Two alternative spacings of the 
10 stimuli were considered. Whilst 10 stimuli spaced equally across a diagonal of 
Nosofsky's square of stimuli would equate the overall area of stimulus space used by 
the stimuli, this solution was rejected because the 10 stimuli would be less 
discriminable from one another than Nosofsky's stimuli, as they fill the stimulus 
space more densely. It was felt that this would hinder participants in the possible 
application of an exemplar strategy, as the stimuli would be more confusable. An 
alternative arrangement (Figure 24) where the 10 stimuli extend outside the region of 
space occupied by Nosofsky's stimuli was used. Each adjacent pair of stimuli was 
then spaced as in Nosofsky's experiment. Note that this choice of stimuli is the 
conservative choice, favoring exemplar models. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure are the same as Experiment 
6, except tones were replaced with a 150 ms presentation of a semicircle with line 
stimulus in green pixels on a black background. 
Results 
This analysis is identical to that performed for Experiment 6. As in 
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Experiment 6 participants quickly reached asymptotic performance of over 90% of 
filler stimuli correct after one block of trials. Two participants were eliminated from 
the study for spontaneously reporting that they realized that certain pairs were 
designed to trick them, and responding to counter this effect. A further participant 
was eliminated for failing to performance above chance on filler items throughout 
the experiment. (Note that the filler items were categorized almost perfectly by all 
other participants.) For the remaining participants, performance on the last semicircle 
in a critical pair is shown as a function of whether the first semicircle of the pair 
came from the same category, or the other category (Figure 25). There was a smaller 
difference in performance in the two pair types than in Experiment 6. The difference 
however was significant, with participants classifying a borderline stimulus 
significantly more accurately after a distant semicircle from the other category, 
compared to a distant semicircle from the same category, 1(22)=3.66, 12<0.005. This 
pattern is the same for both pairs 1 ~ 5 and 1 O~ 5, and for 1 0~6 and 5 ~6, and is 
consistent with the MAC strategy. 
As in Experiment 6, responses to filler items were examined to measure 
possible bias. Participants were slightly more likely to persevere with a response 
than they should be. This difference was not significant, 1(22)=1.39, 12=0.17, and 
such a perseverance bias could not explain participants' worse performance in the 
same condition. (A bias towards giving the same response would reduce errors for 
these critical pairs, and increase errors for the different category critical pairs.) 
Discussion 
The category contrast effect demonstrated in Experiment 6 has been 
replicated in this experiment using different stimuli. The effect was approximately 
half the size of the effect observed in Experiment 6, consistent with the hypothesis 
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that participants have increased access to absolute magnitude information (but see 
the General Discussion for an alternative explanation consistent with the MAC 
explanation). However, the effect is still large, and constitutes a demonstration of a 
sequence effect in categorization that cannot be accounted for by models of 
categorization that assume that categorization is based only on absolute magnitude 
information. 
Experiment 8 
It is possible that an exemplar model may be able to predict successfully the 
category contrast effect observed in the first two experiments when sequence effects 
in absolute magnitude estimation are taken into consideration. The modeling using 
the exemplar model in the introduction did not take identification assimilation or 
contrast effects into account. Consideration is given here to the predictions of an 
exemplar models when assimilation in identification is used as a potential 
explanation of the sequence effect in categorization demonstrated in Experiments 6 
and 7. 
In an absolute identification of loudness task the response given to the current 
stimulus is assimilated to (i.e., correlated with) the immediately preceding stimulus 
(Lacouture, 1997; Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Ward & Lockhead, 1971). How would 
identification assimilation affect an exemplar model's predictions for the two types 
of critical pair of interest? When the distant tone is from the same category, 
assimilation should cause participants to perceive the tone as more similar to the 
exemplar of the correct category, and less similar to the exemplar of the incorrect 
category, than it really is. Identification assimilation will therefore increase 
categorization accuracy when the preceding tone is from the same category. 
Assimilation when the distant tone is from the other category will cause participants 
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to perceive the current tone as more similar the category of the preceding tone, and 
therefore more similar to the other category, and therefore participants will be more 
likely to categorize it incorrectly. Therefore identification assimilation causes the 
exemplar model predicts participants to be even more likely to be correct on a 
borderline tone when it is preceded by a distant member of the same category, and 
even less accurate when it is preceded by a distant member of the other category. 
This effect is in the opposite direction to that needed to allow an exemplar model to 
explain the pattern of performance observed in Experiments 6 and 7. 
However, if with identification of frequency there is an identification contrast 
effect then an exemplar model would be able to account for the results. There is no 
evidence for identification contrast with the immediately preceding item in absolute 
identification of frequency, and indeed such an effect would be at odds with the 
assimilation observed for other dimensions in previous research. However, such a 
bias in identification could explain the category contrast effect, without assuming a 
MAC strategy, as follows. For the within category pair, participants would perceive 
the borderline tone was further from the distant tone, making it less similar to the 
correct category that it really should be, and more similar to the incorrect category. 
For the between category pairs participants would perceive the borderline tone as 
more similar to the correct category than it really should be, and less similar to the 
incorrect category. Thus the exemplar model could predict performance to be higher 
for the different category critical pairs than same category pairs, as observed in 
Experiments 6 and 7. 
Although there is no evidence of contrast to an immediately preceding item 
in absolute identification, this remains a potential explanation of the results of the 
first t\VO experiments. Experiment 8 has blocks of identification trials amongst the 
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categorization trials to simultaneously measure the effect of preceding items in both 
the categorization and identification tasks. The stimuli are the tone sequences from 
Experiment 6. 
Method 
Participants. 10 University of Warwick undergraduates took part. 
Stimuli and Design. The tones and sequences are the same as those used in 
Experiment 6. The experiment differs in the addition of identification blocks 
between categorization blocks. Every two blocks of categorization were followed by 
two blocks of identification. Identification blocks differed from categorization blocks 
only in the possible responses available to participants, and the feedback given. 
Procedure. The procedure differed from that of Experiment 6 in two ways. 
First, the initial instructions were changed, to tell participants that sometimes they 
would do a categorization task, and sometimes they would do an identification task. 
The instructions for the categorization task were the same as Experiment 6. 
Participants were told that in the identification task that they should respond with 
one of ten labels for each tone. They were told that each tone had a unique number 
label, and that tones were either numbered from highest to lowest (or vice versa, as 
the assignment of labels was counterbalanced across participants). Participants were 
told the identification task was quite difficult, and that they should try to get their 
response number as close as possible to the correct answers. 
There were 20 blocks of 20 tones. The first two blocks were categorization, 
the second two were identification, and so on, alternating every two blocks. Two 
block runs on each task were chosen to be long enough to allow participants to get a 
reasonably long run of trials before switching tasks, but short enough to allow 
several task alternations, to measure categorization and identification sequential 
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biases as near simultaneously as possible. Before each task switch, brief instructions 
appeared telling participants to switch tasks. The categorization task trials were the 
same as in Experiment 6. Identification trials differed only in that participants could 
make one of ten possible responses using the number keys along the top of a normal 
qwerty keyboard (with 0 relabeled 10). Feedback was one of the ten labels, displayed 
in the same way as the feedback category letters in the categorization condition. 
Results 
Categorization Results. The analysis here follows that used in Experiments 6 
and 7. As in Experiments 6 and 7 participants quickly reached asymptotic 
performance of over 85% of filler stimuli correct after one block of trials. 
Performance on the last tone in a critical pair is shown as a function of whether the 
first tone of the pair came from the same category, or the other category (Figure 26). 
The difference was significant, with participants classifying significantly more 
accurately after a distant tone from the other category, compared to a distant tone 
from the same category, 1(9)=3.57, 12<0.01. This pattern is the same for both pairs 
1~5 and 10~5, and for 10~6 and 5~6, and is consistent with the MAC strategy. 
The contrast effect is almost identical to that shown in Experiment 6 (Figure 23) 
demonstrating that the interspersed identification task does not disrupt the effect. 
As in Experiments 6 and 7, responses to filler items were examined to 
measure possible response alternation bias. Participants were slightly less likely to 
persevere with a response than they should be, showing a very small alternation bias. 
However, participants did not give significantly more alternation responses than 
were required for correct performance, 1(9)=1.18, 12=0.27. Although an alternation 
bias could potentially explain participants' performance, the size of the bias here is 
much too small to explain the large contrast effect. 
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Identification Results. The degree of assimilation was calculated for each of 
the critical pairs for each participant. For pairs where both tones were from the same 
category there was an average contrast effect of 0.11 tones across all participants, 
which does not differ reliably from zero, 1(9)=0.40, 12>0.05. For the pairs where the 
tones were from different categories there was an average assimilation of 0.07 tones, 
which again does not differ reliably from zero, 1(9)=0.70, 12>0.05. The degree of 
assimilation did not differ between pair types, 1(9)=0.77, 12>0.05. The effect of the 
previous tone on identification of the last tone in a critical pair is very small. Such a 
small effect is not sufficient to allow an exemplar model to explain the large contrast 
effect obtained - there would need to be a contrast effect for both pair types 
approximately one order of magnitude larger. There was reasonable between 
participants variation in the degree of assimilation averaged across all critical pairs 
(standard deviation = 0.71 tones), with some participants showing contrast, and 
others assimilation. The degree of assimilation predicts the size of a participants' 
category contrast effect, r2=0.49, and this correlation is significant, 1(8)=3.83, 
12<0.01. Participants showing identification assimilation have a smaller category 
contrast effect than those showing identification contrast, consistent with the 
predictions of an exemplar model. However, all participants show a category 
contrast effect. According to an exemplar model, participants with identification 
assimilation should show better performance on in categorization on the same 
category critical pairs than different category pairs, and this is never the case. In 
summary, whilst the assimilation scores in the identification task are related to the 
size of the category contrast effect, the assimilation scores do not allow an exemplar 
model to account for the contrast effect. 
Figure 27 shows the average identification error on for a stimulus on trial n 
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of the preceding stimulus for Experiment 8. Adjacent stimuli have 
been grouped. 
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as a function of the stimulus on trial n-l, for data from the entire sequence (filler 
trials and critical trials). This analysis follows Ward and Lockhead (1970). (Tones 5 
and 6 only appeared in critical pairs, and were always preceded by either tone 1 or 
tone 10, and therefore there is no data for tones 5 or 6 preceded by tones 2 through 
9.) Data has been collapsed across adjacent pairs of tones to give more trials per data 
point. Negative error scores correspond to participants underestimating the tones 
frequency, and positive scores correspond to participants overestimating the tones 
frequency. Thus the positive slopes of the lines in Figure 27 demonstrates an 
assimilation effect. 
Discussion 
The basic category contrast effect from Experiment 6 and 7 has been 
replicated. Measurement of contrast and assimilation sequence effects in 
identification in alternate blocks revealed only very small, non-significant effects for 
the last tones in each critical pair. Thus the possibility that sequence effects in 
identification may allow an exemplar model to explain the category contrast effect is 
eliminated. It is worth noting that the category bias parameters in the exemplar 
model (the ~'s in Equation 24) do not allow the model to account for the results. 
Separate bias parameters would be needed for each possible combination of pairs of 
trials to explain the effect, and thus this explanation offers no explanatory power. 
Further, in modeling identification, the biases used to predict the categorization data 
could not predict the identification data. 
A relationship between identification bias and the size of the contrast effect 
was demonstrated. Participants who showed assimilation in identification of the 
second tone of a critical pair to the first tone showed a smaller category contrast 
effect than those who showed contrast in identification. Examining the sequence 
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effects in identification over all identification trials, the standard absolute 
identification assimilation effect was observed of the current response to the 
immediately preceding stimulus (Lacouture, 1997; Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Ward 
& Lockhead, 1971). This the first demonstration of assimilation in identification of 
frequency of a tone. 
General Discussion 
A category contrast effect has been demonstrated whereby categorization 
accuracy of a stimulus near the boundary between two categories is higher when 
preceded by a distant stimulus from the opposite category than by a distant stimulus 
form the same category. This large effect persisted throughout each experiment, even 
after average accuracy reached over 85%. Experiments 6 and 8 demonstrated this 
effect in a binary classification of tones varying in frequency. Experiment 7 
replicated this effect using simple visual stimuli thought by categorization 
researchers to allow perception of absolute magnitude. We have also found the effect 
in a meta-analysis of data from other categorization experiments where similar 
simple geometric figures were used as stimuli (Stewart & Chater, submitted). In 
these experiments random trial ordering was used, and thus the category contrast 
effect is not an artifact of the pseudo-random sequences used here. Although the 
category contrast effects cannot be explained by a simple response alternation bias 
(Dember & Richman, 1985) as analysis of the responses to filler trials shows no such 
bias. 
The existence of this category contrast effect provides two serious challenges 
to existing models of categorization. First, the assumption that categorization is 
based only on absolute nlagnitude information is challenged, by demonstrating a 
pattern of errors that can only be accounted for by participants' reliance upon 
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relative magnitude information. Second, the category contrast effect proyides 
evidence that the local sequential context biases categorization decisions. The 
category contrast effect is consistent with the MAC account presented here, where in 
the absence of absolute magnitude information, classification of a stimulus is based 
on comparison with the preceding stimulus. Experiment 8 explored the possibility 
that categorization sequence effects may be predicted from identification sequence 
effects. The tiny non-significant biases in identification were too small to allow an 
exemplar model to account for the category contrast effect. 
The modeling presented demonstrates that exemplar models cannot account 
for the results. Decision bound models are unable to account for the results when 
they are adapted to assume the location of the decision bound is altered by preceding 
material. (Further, the movement of the decision bound seems to relax a major 
assumption of the model- that absolute magnitude information is available.) To 
model the category contrast effect, the decision bound would need to move towards 
the preceding stimulus, so that a borderline stimulus from the same category would 
fall inside the other category (see, e.g., Treisman, 1985; Treisman & Williams, 
1984). This movement of the decision bound would also therefore predict contrast 
effects in identification, inconsistent with the observed assimilation effects. 
Other Sequence Effects in Categorization 
Other researchers have investigated sequence effects in categorization. Medin 
and Bettger (1994) demonstrated that the sequence of training exemplars altered later 
recognition performance - when training exemplars were sequenced to maximize 
similarity between adjacent items old/new recognition was improved. Elliott and 
Anderson (1995) manipulated the order of presentation training exemplars, showing 
that more distant itenls were less ayailable for use in a categorization decision, with 
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the decay following a power law, by item. The number of intervening items was 
shown to be more important than the intervening time. The concern of these 
researchers was with the longer term effects of the sequence manipulations, and not 
with the local sequence effects investigated here. 
The Magnitude of the Category Contrast Effect 
The sizes of the category contrast effects demonstrated here are smaller than 
that predicted by the simple MAC strategy outlined here. There are two potential 
reasons for this: First, participants may be using an improved MAC strategy where 
comparisons with tones further back in the sequence also inform the categorization 
decision. Use of this additional information would improve classification accuracy, 
therefore reducing the size of the category contrast effect. In fact formal modeling 
has shown inclusion of information from trial n-2 halves the size of the effect. Thus 
the smaller category contrast effect observed in Experiment 7 may be explained if 
participants are better able to use information from preceding trials when stimuli are 
simple geometric figures, rather than tones. 
The second possibility is that participants have partial access to absolute 
magnitude information. In making an absolute identification of length decision, 
reducing the luminance of lines (with the intention of reducing the amount of 
absolute magnitude information available) increased the relative contribution 
information from previous trials compared to information from the current stimulus 
(Mori, 1989). The idea that reduced availability of absolute magnitude information 
increases the reliance upon a MAC strategy is consistent with the pattern of the size 
of effects observed in the experiments presented here. The category contrast effect 
was larger in Experiments 6 and 8, where tones varying in frequency were used, than 
in Experiment 7, where simple \'isual stimuli were used. This is consistent \\'ith the 
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assumption that these simple visual stimuli allow participants more access to 
absolute magnitude information (either perceived directly, or deduced from 
comparison with the presentation context). 
MAC and Feedback 
Many, if not most, perceptual categorization experiments contain blocks 
where participants are not given trial by trial feedback. (In the experiments presented 
here participants were given trial by trial feedback.) It would be surprising is 
category contrast effects were not found in such conditions. Indeed in the absence of 
feedback very similar absolute identification sequence effects are obtained (Ward & 
Lockhead, 1970; Ward & Lockhead, 1971). The MAC strategy described here 
assumes participants have knowledge of the correct categorization of previous 
stimuli. However adaptation of the strategy to the no feedback conditions is straight 
forward because of the correlation between the correct answer and the predicted 
answer. (Even in the simple MAC model presented here, where only information 
from trial n-l was used, accuracy was 85%.) A simple solution therefore would be to 
take the "correct" answer to be that predicted by the model, i.e., A ifP(A»0.5, 
otherwise B. Alternatively, the response on trial n could be a weighted mixture of the 
responses calculated for both possible categories of the stimulus on trial n-l, i.e., 
P(An) = P(An- 1 )e-cd2 + [1- P(An- 1)][ 1- e-
cd2 
] 
where P(AJ is the probability of an A response on trial n, P(Arr-l ) is the probability 
of an A response on trial n-l, g is the difference between the stimulus on trial nand 
trial n-l, and ~ is a free parameter determining the size of the distance required to 
give a change in category label, as in Equation 23. 
Conclusions 
A sequence effect in categorization has been demonstrated that challenges the 
(26) 
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assumption, implicit in existing models of categorization, that categorization is based 
on absolute magnitude information. An alternate model has been presented that 
accounts for this effect by assuming participants instead rely on comparison of a 
stimulus to immediately preceding stimuli to make a categorization decision. 
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Chapter 4 
Feature Creation in Perceptual Categorization 
Chapter 4 Feature Creation III 
Abstract 
This chapter addresses the claim that features created during experience with novel 
stimuli qualitatively alter subsequent perception. Schyns and Rodet (1997) provided 
evidence that categorization creates features, and that these then alter perception. By 
varying the order of category learning between participants, they were able to induce 
orthogonal categorizations of identical test exemplars, consistent with the hypothesis 
that participants learned different sets of features. Experiment 9 provides a 
replication of this feature creation effect. Experiment 10 manipulates the 
presentation context of the test exemplars. The absence of a feature creation effect in 
this experiment suggests that the categorization of the exemplars is dependent on 
participants' beliefs that a compound stimulus is made from a conjunction of other 
stimuli. Using simple, random line drawings, Experiment 11 shows variable 
categorization of test stimuli analogous to those of Schyns and Rodet that is not 
driven by either order of category learning or beliefs that a compound stimulus is 
made from a conjunction of stimuli. A new feature creation paradigm is developed 
using black and white checkerboard stimuli. Invariant patches of squares embedded 
in random checkerboards are diagnostic of the checkerboard category. Experiments 
12 and 13 use a design similar to that of Schyns and Rodet, and together provide 
evidence for feature creation. Experiments 14 to 16 provide solutions to three 
methodological problems in using Schyns and Rodet's design with checkerboard 
stimuli: (a) the avoidance of sequential presentation of parts of the exemplars on test 
allows reaction time measurement; (b) the need for participants to remember features 
over long blocks of intermediate trials is eliminated; (c) a confound between possible 
feature location and feature creation effects is eliminated. A feature creation effect is 
demonstrated that is consistent with participants learning the largest invariant part of 
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a checkerboard as a single feature (Experiment 16). Further, it is shown that learning 
of a large configuration of squares can be blocked by prior experience with parts of 
the configuration. 
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Feature Creation in Perceptual Categorization 
A feature refers to "any elementary property of a distal stimulus that is an 
element of cognition", or "an atom of psychological processing'~ (Schyns, Goldstone, 
& Thibaut, 1998). This chapter investigates the possibility that new features may be 
created to serve new categorizations, and further that these features may qualitatively 
change the perception of stimuli. Features are identified by their role in cognition: 
for example, they allow new categorizations and perceptions to occur. (Throughout 
this chapter the word feature is reserved for the representation of part of a stimulus. 
The word element describes a physical part of a stimulus, and the word ~ 
describes an entire category of stimuli.) Why might the creation of new features be 
important? The amount of data needed to specify a mapping between possible 
stimuli (input vectors) and categories (output vectors) increases exponentially with 
the number of dimensions of the input vector (the curse of dimensionality, Bellman, 
1961). Everyday stimuli typically exist in a space with a large number of 
dimensions, e.g., approximately 35 dimensions for faces (Hinton, 2000). Two 
helpful observations can be made: (a) Often the assignment of each output vector to 
each input vector is not arbitrarily. Thus if data are absent for a region of input space 
it is possible to interpolate between near by data points. (b) Most real data sets do not 
fill the entire possible input space, but instead occupy some lower dimensional 
subspace. Recoding the data in a lower dimensional space allows training data to fill 
better the input space. Often a recoding allows a category learning mechanism 
(supervised or otherwise) to learn better the relevant mapping (Bishop, 1995), 
provided, that is, the improvement in learning caused by the reduced dimensional 
space is not offset by information loss in the reduction. The task is to find the 
dimensions of this subspace. Features, then, allow a high dimensional space, sparsely 
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filled by a data set, to be reduced in dimensionality, so that the set now better fills a 
lower dimensional space. (Note that the recoding of space using the new features, 
causing a reduction in dimensionality, is different to the features simply augmenting 
the perceptual space, when dimensionality would be increased.) 
Evidence for the Creation of New Features 
Empirical work supporting the hypothesis that features can be created is 
found in both the categorization and the attention literatures, and is briefly reviewed 
here. The idea that experience can create new features is certainly consistent with the 
large body of evidence showing that such experience alters perception (perceptual 
learning - for an extensive review see Goldstone, 1998). 
Shiffrin and Lightfoot (1997) have demonstrated feature learning effects 
during visual search of alphanumeric-like characters. Participants were given the 
task of finding a target that differs from distractors by a unique combination of line 
orientations at particular locations. With practice the decision latency cost of 
additional distractor stimuli in a search for conjunctions of features was hugely 
reduced from hundreds of milliseconds per stimulus to only tens. (Although a small 
slope still remained after practice, it is possible for a parallel search process to 
predict such a small slope, if the time taken for a detector in each location to report 
in parallel is noisy.) When participants were transferred to a new search with new 
characters that did share individual line segments with the old characters, but that did 
not contain any of the same combinations of line segments with the old character set 
(i.e., there were no common configural features), there was no transfer of the 
reduction in search slopes. Therefore, reduced search slopes could not be explained 
by general experience with the class of stimuli. When targets and distractors were re-
paired, the reduction in search slopes remained. Whatever was responsible for the 
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reduction in search slope, it was not specific to particular target-distractor pairings in 
particular displays. Experimentally reducing the within-character set similarity did 
not lead to a further reduction in search slopes, suggesting that it was not a general 
reduction in stimulus similarity with experience that was important. Whatever was 
learned in visual search, it was specific to particular targets, and specific to particular 
distractors - the results are certainly consistent with a feature creation hypothesis, 
whereby line segments of the characters are unitized to form a single feature. This 
result stands in contrast to Triesman and Gelade' s (1980) demonstration that 
extensive practice on a conjunction of color and shape search task did not 
significantly reduce search slopes. 
Further experiments suggest that although Shiffrin and Lightfoot did not 
manage completely to eliminate the effect of additional distractor stimuli with 
practice, new features can be processed in parallel across the visual field - which is 
traditionally taken as evidence for the existence of a feature (Duncan & Humphreys, 
1992; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Sato, 
1990; Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989). Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) 
trained participants to asymptote on a varied mapping (VM) visual search, where the 
target was selected at random from the stimulus set on each trial. The remaining 
characters in the set were used as distractors. Thus a target on one trial may have 
been a distractor on the next, and a distractor on another trial may have been a target 
on the next. A further reduction in search latency was observed when participants 
were switched to a consistent mapping (CM) search. (In a eM search the stimulus 
set is split into targets and distractors. Target stimuli always appear as targets, and 
distractor stimuli always appear as distractors.) Shiffrin and Schneider suggest that 
this was because of the development of automatic attraction of attention to the eM 
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stimulus. Such a finding is further supported by the fact that an old CM target will 
draw attention away from the current target in a visual search, even though 
participants are actively told to ignore the stimulus in the location the old target 
appears in (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). It seems then that single features may be 
formed for targets in visual search, by unitizing the elements of the stimuli. If CM 
targets do indeed come to attract attention to themselves, search for a CM target 
should not interfere with search for a VM target, provided that the two targets do not 
occur on the same trial. Schneider and Fisk (1982) gave participants two 
simultaneous visual search tasks. One search was a CM search, and the other was a 
VM search. In both tasks participants searched for target digits amongst distractor 
letters. In an initial experiment, the two were found to interfere with one another, 
suggesting that even after extensive practice, CM search was not automatic. 
However, when participants were instructed to concentrate on the VM search only, 
and only to respond to a CM target if they happened to notice it, participants 
performed as well on both tasks simultaneously as they did on either singly. There 
was no evidence of dual task decrement at all. It seems that a CM search can become 
automatic even if search slopes will not become flat (although search slopes were not 
measured in this study). 
There is also evidence that distractors in visual search may also be unitized, 
as they are demonstrated to develop attentional properties of their own. After CM 
visual search training Dumais (1979; Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981) transferred 
participants to several transfer conditions. Targets were left unaltered and retrained 
with new distractors, either from a VM search, or novel stimuli. Alternatively. 
distractors were retrained and targets replaced by either stimuli from VM search or 
novel stimuli. Almost complete transfer was observed in all conditions. Of interest 
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here is the large transfer when target stimuli were replaced with familiar stimuli from 
a VM search, and distractors remain the same. That transfer occurred cannot be 
explained by familiarity differences. The finding is consistent with the explanation 
that distractors in the eM search have reduced ability to attract attention. Conditions 
with novel stimuli differed little from conditions with VM stimuli, suggesting VM 
training does not significantly alter stimulus's ability to attract attention. 
The evidence reviewed thus far suggests that features may be created in 
visual search. The similarity between categorization tasks, where participants see a 
stimulus, and respond on the basis of the diagnostic features amongst non-diagnostic 
features, and visual search, where participants respond to the presence or absence of 
a target amongst distractors, suggests that categorization experience will also lead to 
the creation of features. 
Goldstone (2000) provided evidence of unitization of diagnostic features in a 
categorization task. In the task participants classified a stimulus made from five 
complex, curved line segments. The classification could only be made by attending 
to all of the five segments, no single segment or two, three or four way conjunction 
was sufficient. Goldstone hypothesized that participants were able to unitize their 
representations of the five line segments to create a new, single diagnostic feature, 
when the segments always appeared in the same order. Compared to a task where the 
segments did not appear in the same order, removing the possibility of creating a 
single unitized feature, there was a larger reduction in categorization latency with 
practice for the stimulus with consistently ordered parts. In a categorization where 
one segment alone was diagnostic, the practice effect was much smaller. Using data 
from this single segnlent diagnostic task, latency predictions were generated for 
classification models where the decision is based on integrated evidence from the 
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detection of the five line segments separately. Some classifications of the 
consistently ordered stimulus when only the conjunction of all five segments was 
diagnostic were shown to be reliably faster than could be predicted by these models~ 
even when they were granted with unlimited, parallel processing of each of the five 
segments. A model where the detection of segments interacts, so that the detection of 
one facilitates another, could account for these data, but allowing such interaction is 
surely equivalent to at least partial unitization of segments. This is because the 
facilitation would have to be specific to particular orders of line segments to explain 
the difference between the consistent and randomly ordered conditions. A number of 
boundary conditions provide useful information on the limits of the unitization 
observed. Goldstone showed that even when the line segments were physically 
disconnected, slightly smaller but still substantial practice effects were obtained, 
suggesting that non-connected segments may still be unitized. If the stimuli were 
made so large that they could not be viewed clearly without a saccade, the practice 
effect was greatly diminished. 
It is also possible that non-diagnostic features in a categorization task could 
be unitized. Preliminary support for this idea comes from a checkerboard 
categorization experiment by Graham and McLaren (1998). They demonstrated that 
pre-exposure to non-diagnostic features in a categorization task retarded subsequent 
discrimination between those features. In order for subsequent discrimination 
learning to be impaired, relative to unexposed control checkerboards, something 
specific to the non-diagnostic exposed stimuli must have been learned. Graham and 
McLaren account for their results in terms of negative priming (Tipper, 1985) of the 
learned representations of the distractor stimuli. 
Further suggestive evidence that features may be formed during experience 
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with complex stimuli comes from the face inversion effect (Yin, 1969). The face 
inversion effect is that faces are recognized worse when upside down, and further 
that the deficit caused by inversion is larger than for other control stimuli such as 
houses (Yin, 1969) or landscapes (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Diamond and Carey 
(1986) suggest the face inversion effect is caused by familiarity or experience with 
the stimuli, and demonstrated that gun dog experts show a larger inversion deficit in 
gun dog recognition than do non-experts. These effects are also seen with novel 
stimuli exposed in an experimental setting. McLaren (1997) investigated a 
checkerboard analogue of the face inversion (see Gauthier & Tarr, 1998 for a similar 
experiment). He trained participants on checkerboards, and showed that the inversion 
hindered subsequent discrimination learning and recognition of the familiar 
checkerboards compared to novel checkerboard controls. Further, the effect was 
contingent upon the learned categories having a prototypical structure, as 
demonstrated by the absence of an inversion effect when the learned exemplars were 
generated in such a way that the central tendency of each category was not a 
checkerboard, but a set of gray columns. Thus it seems that during categorization 
what is learned, and what is subsequently destroyed on inversion, is the prototypical 
structure of each category. Palmeri and Nosofsky (in press) show that after 
experience with checkerboard categories very similar to those used by McLaren, the 
prototypes of the categories are in fact extreme points in psychological space, rather 
than the central tendency of the category. If the checkerboards are indeed classified 
using new learned representations of the prototypes, i.e., new features, then this is 
exactly the rearrangement of perceptual space that would be expected. 
Evidence that New Features Qualitatively Change Perception 
The evidence reviewed thus far suggests that categorization experience 
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creates features. This conclusion is certainly consistent with the changes in 
perception that occur after categorization experience. A pair of stimuli that falls 
across a category boundary may become more discriminable than an equivalent pair 
that falls within a category, when both pairs were equally discriminable before 
learning of the categorization (Goldstone, 1994), although learning that stimuli 
belong in the same category does not reduce their discriminability (McLaren, 
Leevers, & Mackintosh, 1994). This chapter is concerned with a further question. 
Can new features qualitatively change the perception of stimuli, rather than simply 
facilitating the processing of stimuli? Indirect evidence that this may be the case is 
provided by Goldstone (1995). Participants were asked to adjust the color of an 
initially black simple shape to match the color of another, simultaneously displayed 
reference copy of that simple shape. The reference copy of each shape always 
appeared in the same color. Each shape belonged to one of two shape categories. 
Although the shapes of the objects were irrelevant to the participants' task, 
Goldstone found that color matching was influenced by the shape category of the 
object. For shapes of the same reference color, but different shape category, the color 
of the adjusted shape was systematically set nearer to the average color of the 
shape's own category. A second, similar experiment provided data consistent with 
interpreting this bias as the cumulative result of with-in category assimilation and 
between category contrast. Thus the perception of a feature has been shown to be 
altered by categorization experience. However, this effect can be explained without 
hypothesizing the creation of new features, for example, by assuming that 
participants are sensitive to the correlation between two features. 
More direct evidence that new function features create a change in the 
perception of the stimuli is provided by Schyns and his colleagues (see Schyns et ai., 
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1998 for a review). Their studies may be divided on the basis of the dependent 
measure used. Some studies used participants ~ categorization responses, but first 
studies based on delineation of parts of stimuli will be discussed. 
Schyns and Murphy (1991, and see also Schyns & Rodet, 1997 for a related 
experiment) taught participants about novel "Martian rock" stimuli. The rocks were 
3D gray shaded objects displayed and rotated on a computer screen. The rocks had 
protrusions and dents all over their surface, making them look very irregular. In the 
first phase of the experiment participants saw examples of type A rocks. The rocks 
all had a common protrusion, element a, and after experience with the rocks 
participants circled or delineated element a as the important invariant part of the 
rock. (NaIve participants showed little consistency in their decompositions, and did 
not delineate element a - initially the random protrusions were more salient than the 
target features.) In a second phase of the experiment, participants learned a new type 
of rock, type AB, with a new invariant protrusion, element b, adjacent to the 
previous element, element a, forming a new invariant protrusion, element abo After 
experience with the new rocks, participants delineated both element a and element b 
separately. Relevant here is the contrast with naIve participants, who were not 
exposed to the type A rocks. They also learned to delineate the invariant part of the 
new rock, but delineated it as a single part, (i.e., delineated element a and element b 
as a single feature). Participants' delineations were altered by experience with a 
category. Their segmentations of rocks differed from that before training despite a 
strong bottom up constraint - the minima rule (Hoffman & Richards, 1984). Further. 
the features learned for one category of Martian rock affect the features for 
subsequently learned categories. 
Schyns and Murphy (1994) demonstrated that after participants had learned a 
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rock feature, the feature could be broken down to allow separate delineation of parts 
with further categorization experience. In phase one of the experiment, participants 
learned type AB boulders, and delineated element a and element b together as a 
single part. In phase two participants learned either type A or type B boulders, and 
delineated either element a or element b alone accordingly. In phase three 
participants were given more type AB boulders to parse. They now delineated 
element a and element b separately. They divided into two parts that which previous 
delineations indicated was perceived before as a coherent whole. 
The extent to which these experiments may be taken to support a feature 
creation hypothesis depends on the assumption that parts delineated correspond to 
the features participants gain from exposure. Participants may have been circling 
parts they felt were diagnostic, rather than parts they had previously seen as they 
were instructed to do. Certainly delineation of parts is not free from cognitive 
influence (Schyns & Murphy, 1994). The use of delineation implies that participants 
have conscious access to the parts they are using, and that their choice of 
delineations is not influenced by biases or preconceptions of what kind of responses 
the experimenter desires. The use of categorization as an alternate measure of the 
hypothesized learned feature set goes some way towards addressing these criticisms. 
In experiments by Schyns and Rodet (1997) participants learned to categorize 
different types of stimuli one type after the other. The learning of features for the 
early types is designed to alter the features learned for later types, creating different 
feature sets for different category learning orders. If different feature sets are indeed 
learned then it should be possible to get mutually exclusive categorizations of 
identical test stimuli as a function of training category learning order. In other words, 
identical test stimuli are classified into different categories, suggesting that different 
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participants perceive the same stimulus differently. 
The following experiments are described in some detail as the design and 
stimuli used provided the basis for the experiments in this chapter. In Schyns and 
Rodet's (1997) Experiment 1, two categories of "Martian cells" were learned. 
Martian cells are stimuli that look like normal cells viewed under a microscope. Each 
cell consisted of a series of random, dark cell bodies inside a gray circular cell. Type 
A cells contained a particular shaped cell body element a and other random cell 
bodies. Type AB were cells containing an element made from the conjunction of 
element a and element b, a different shaped cell body, as well as other random cell 
bodies. (In fact, the features were counterbalanced, so that some participants learned 
type B in place of type A.) Half of the participants learned the types in the order 
A--7AB and the other half learned the types in the reverse order, AB--7A. The 
A --7 AB group should learn the feature set {a, b}, and the AB--7 A group should learn 
the feature {ab, a}. In the test phase of the experiment four types of cells were 
presented. Instead of seeing the entire cell, participants were told they would see two 
close-up images of parts of the same cell, one after the other. They were instructed to 
respond only after seeing both close-ups. For type A snapshots, one snapshot was of 
element a, and the other was a distractor feature. For type AB snapshots, one 
snapshot was element a and element b together, and the other was a distractor. For 
type A-B snapshots, one snapshot was element a, and the other snapshot was element 
b. For distractor cells, both snapshots were distractor features. Participants were 
asked to classify these snapshots as belonging to either the first or second category 
they learned. The result of interest is the classification of the A-B snapshots. 
Although snapshot A-B contains element a and element b, the elements do not 
appear together. Thus group A--7AB, who identify type AB by the co-occurrence of 
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two features, a and b, should classify snapshot A-B as type AB, as both feature a and 
feature b will be present. However, group AB~A, who identify type AB by the 
presence of a single feature, ab, should not classify snapshot A-B as type AB, as 
feature ab is not present. Group AB~A classified the snapshot as type A the 
majority of the time, but group A~AB classified the snapshot as type A 
significantly less often. The group AB~A classification of type A-B snapshot as 
type A was consistent with the hypothesis that they do not have feature b, that is, 
they do not have a cognitive representation element b. Was group AB~A really 
blind to element b? In a final stage participants delineated type A, type Band 
distractor cells. Unlike group A~AB, participants in group ab~b did not delineate 
element b. 
As Schyns and Rodet (1997) pointed out, there is an alternate attention based 
explanation of the results. Assume all participants use the fixed feature set {a, b}. 
Group A~AB participants may assign more attention to feature b, as it is 
particularly important in discriminating between type A and type AB cells. Less 
attention may have been assigned to feature b in the group AB~A, as without prior 
knowledge of the discrimination it is not obvious that feature b is the critical 
discriminating feature. Thus the differing categorization of the type A-B snapshot 
pair could just be due to changes in selective attention. A second experiment rules 
out this possibility. Here two groups of participants learned three categories, one 
after the other: group A~B~AB, and group AB~A~B. This ensures that both 
feature a and feature b are equally diagnostic, and therefore equal attention should be 
paid to each, eliminating the possible selective attention account of the orthogonal 
categorization of the critical snapshot A-B. Categorization of the type A-B snapshot 
was consistent with group A~B~AB haying feature set {a, b}, and group 
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AB--.,A--.,B using {ab, a, b}. Group A--.,B--.,AB almost always categorized the 
snapshot as type AB, and group AB--., A --., B categorized the snapshot as type A or 
type B, but only rarely as type AB. In summary, Schyns and Rodet's (1997) 
experiments provide evidence that features are created, and that these features alter 
qualitatively the perception of a stimulus, so that participants with different feature 
sets give different classifications of this stimulus. 
Overview of Experiments 
The experiments described thus far provide compelling evidence that new 
features may be created. The experiments in this chapter are concerned with a further 
claim that learning these features qualitatively changes the perception of stimuli, 
rather than simply speeding the processing stimuli. That is, if participants learn new 
features, they will not only process the stimuli more efficiently, but the perceptual 
space in which they represent the stimuli will be reorganized. To investigate this, 
categorization is used as the dependent measure in all of the experiments in this 
chapter, as in the studies of Schyns and Rodet (1997). If participants' perceptual 
spaces have been reorganized, then it should be possible to get participants with 
different feature sets to classify identical stimuli differently. The first two 
experiments in this chapter are replications of Schyns and Rodet's (1997) 
Experiment 2. Experiment 9 replicates their feature creation effect, but Experiment 
10 shows the effect can be eliminated by adding a background context to the snap-
shots presented in transfer. This result suggests that the categorization of the 
snapshots depends on participants' beliefs about whether the elements shown in 
snapshots may be joined onto other elements. Experiment 11 represents an attempt to 
establish a feature creation effect in a new line drawing stimuli paradigm. and to see 
whether participants' awareness that the compound element is made up of the two 
Chapter 4 Feature Creation 126 
other elements is a good predictor of their performance on snapshot stimuli. 
Experiments 12 and 13 have a similar design to Schyns and Rodet' s experiment, but 
use black and white checkerboard stimuli. By using these new stimuli, the need for 
sequential presentation of parts in the test phase is eliminated. However, participants 
struggle to maintain the memory of the features learned at the beginning of the 
experiment throughout the experiment. Experiment 14 demonstrates a feature 
creation effect using a new paradigm that avoids the need for participants to maintain 
features in memory. Experiment 15 demonstrates a possible feature location 
confound may be available as an alternate explanation in Experiment 14, but 
Experiment 16 demonstrates a feature creation effect that cannot be explained by 
such a confound. 
Experiment 9 
This first experiment is a replication of Schyns and Rodet's (1997) 
Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants. 32 undergraduates from the University of Warwick participated, 
either to receive course credit or monetary payment. The experiment was run in a 
one hour session with other unrelated experiments involving checkerboard stimuli 
(not those experiments presented in this chapter). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. 
Stimuli. The stimuli used were the same as those used by Schyns and Rodet 
(1997). Two kinds of stimuli were used in this experiment. During the learning and 
verification stages entire Martian cells were presented for 3 s (Figure 28). (In Schyns 
and Rodet's (1997) original Experiment 2, cells were presented for only 2 s. The 
increase in presentation time here was designed to facilitate learning of the cells.) 
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Type A Type S 
Type AS Distractor 
Figure 28. The Martian cell stimuli used in the learning and verification phases 
of Experiment 9. 
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Each cell consists of a series of random cell bodies. There are four types of Martian 
cell: type A, type B, type AB and distractor cells. Type A cells contain element a as 
one of the cell bodies. Type B cells contain element b. Type AB cells contain a 
compound element made from joining elements a and b together. Distractor cells 
contain only random cell bodies. 
During the final test phase, two close-up snapshots from a Martian cell were 
presented, each snapshot lasting two seconds (Figure 29). There were four kinds of 
snapshot pairs: A, B, AB and A-B. Snapshot pair A was a close-up of element a and 
a close-up of a distractor body. Pair B was a close-up of element b and a close-up of 
a distractor body. Snapshot pair AB contained a close-up of compound element ab 
and a close-up of a distractor body. Snapshot pair A-B contained a close-up of 
element a and a close-up of element b (where the - denotes stimuli appearing 
separately). 
Design. There were three phases in this experiment, a learning phase, a 
verification phase and a test phase. The order in which participants learn about the 
three types of Martian cell is a between participants factor with two levels. 
Participants learn type A, then type B and finally type AB (A---tB---tAB) or type AB, 
then type A, then type B (AB---tA---tB). The order ofleaming types a and b was 
counterbalanced. It was hypothesized that participants in condition A---tB---tAB 
would have feature set {a, b}, but that those in condition AB---tA---tB would have an 
additional feature in their set {ab, a, b}. This is because in condition AB---tA---tB a 
feature (feature ab) must be created to represent the ab element encountered first, but 
that in condition A---tB---tAB features a and b can be used together to represent the 
element abo 
Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet room. Participants \\'ere 
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Snapshot of Element a Snapshot of Element b 
Snapshot of Element ab Snapshot of Distractor Part 
Figure 29. The Martian cell snapshot stimuli used in the transfer phase of 
Experiment 9. 
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seated in front of the computer and the keyboard and monitor were adjusted as 
necessary. Participants read the instructions on the computer screen and were given 
an opportunity to ask the experimenter questions. They were instructed that they 
would learn about types of Martian Cell. They were told that cells belonging to the 
same type had the same diagnostic cell body in them, and that to learn the types they 
should search for cell bodies common between cells of the same type. The 
experiment then started with the learning phase. Participants were instructed that 
they would see ten cells from the same type, and that they should try to spot the cell 
body common to that type. There were ten learning trials. Each trial was preceded by 
2 s of blank screen, followed by a 3 s presentation of an example of a '"type 1" cell. 
After the last trial the learning verification stage began. Four cells were displayed in 
a random order, two new examples of '"type 1" cells and two distractor cells. There 
was a 2 s blank before each cell, a 3 s presentation of the cell, a 0.5 s blank and then 
response prompt text (e.g., '"type 1 or other") which remained on screen until the 
participant had responded. Participants were instructed to categorize the cells as 
'"type 1" or to press '"other" if they thought the cell was not type 1. Participants then 
responded by pressing keys labeled '"type 1" or '"other". Keys z, x, c and v on a 
normal qwerty keyboard were labeled '"type 1", '"type 2", "type 3" and "other" 
respectively. After the response the next cell was displayed. 
After the 4th response the next learning block began, followed by its 
verification phase, followed by the last learning block, and its verification phase. 
Which kind of cell was displayed as the ten learning cells and two verification cells 
for each learning block and learning verification phase depended on which level of 
the learning order factor participants were in. The first type of cell the participants 
saw was always labeled "type I", the second '"type T' and so on. Participants never 
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saw the names type A, type B and type AB. 
After the learning verification stage of the last learning block participants 
entered one final verification phase, to check their memory of each category. After 
pressing SPACE six cells were displayed for responding as before. Two were type A 
cells, two were type B cells and two were type AB cells displayed in a random order. 
The response prompt offered participants a choice between "type 1, type 2 or type 
3". 
On completing the final verification phase participants entered the test phase. 
They were instructed that they would see 32 cells. For each cell they were told they 
would see two close-up shots of that cell. They were asked to wait until they had 
seen both snapshots before making a decision. Each trial began with a 2 s blank. The 
first snapshot was then displayed for 3 s, followed by 2 s blank, followed by the 
second snapshot for 3 s, followed by 0.5 s blank followed by the response prompt 
"type 1, type 2 or type 3". The order of presentation of each snapshot within a pair 
was random. Responses were not recorded until the response prompt appeared. 
There were two blocks of 16 trials. There was no interlude between the two blocks. 
A block consisted of four presentations of each of the snapshot pairs A, B, AB and 
A-B in a random order. (In Schyns and Rodet's (1997) original experiment there was 
only one block of snapshots. A second block was added here to increase the 
sensitivity of the experiment. As this difference occurred at the end of the 
experiment, it can make no difference to the results in the rest of the experiment.) 
After the final response, the experiment ended and participants were thanked for 
their participation. 
Results 
The nlean proportion of trials correct in the learning \'\;~rification stage \\"as 
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high in both conditions: 0.96 and 0.91 for the A~B~AB and AB~A~B 
conditions respectively. The difference between the two conditions was significant, 
1(31)=2.19,12<0.05. The learning was easier in the A~B~AB condition. The mean 
proportion of final verification trials correct was also high, 0.99 and 0.92 for the 
A~B~AB and AB~A~B conditions respectively. Again the small difference 
between the conditions was significant, 1(31 )=2.60, 12<0.05, with the performance in 
the elements first condition being more accurate. 
Table 8 shows the mean classification of each of the transfer stimuli, for each 
condition. Data averaged across both transfer blocks is presented (although the 
pattern remains the same if only the first transfer block is considered, as in the 
original experiment). Performance on snapshot pairs A, Band AB was high in both 
conditions. It is performance on the A-B snapshot that is of interest. In the 
A~B~AB condition the A-B snapshot pair was classified as type AB about half the 
time, but in the AB~A~B condition, this pair was rarely classified as type AB. 
This difference in the proportion of type AB responses to snapshot A-B is shown to 
be significant by a planned t-test, 1(31 )=2.78,12<0.01. However, in condition 
AB~A~B, performance on snapshot AB is poorer than in the A~B~AB 
condition. Ifparticipants remember type AB less well in the AB~A~B condition, 
then maybe this is why they are reluctant to classify the critical snapshot A-B as type 
AB. 
To rule out this possibility, participants who did not perform significantly 
above chance in classification of the snapshot pairs A, Band AB in transfer were 
removed, and the analysis rerun. 1 participant was removed from the A~B~AB 
condition, and 3 were removed from the AB~A~B condition. Table 9 sho\\s the 
n1ean classifications of the transfer stimuli for participants perfonning above chance 
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Table 8 
Mean proportion of responses for the transfer block of Experiment 9. 
Elements first Compound first 
(A-7B-7AB) (AB-7A-7B) 
Response Response 
A B AB A B AB 
Stimulus A 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.91 0.02 0.06 
B 0.07 0.86 0.06 0.02 0.96 0.02 
AB 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.05 0.l9 0.77 
A-B 0.l3 0.38 0.49 0.23 0.65 0.l3 
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Table 9 
Mean proportion of responses for the transfer block of Experiment 9 for those 
participants performing significantly above chance on types A, Band AB in the transfer 
phase. 
Elements first Compound first 
(A--7B--7AB, n=15) (AB--7A--7B, n=13) 
Response Response 
A B AB A B AB 
Stimulus A 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.03 0.03 
B 0.01 0.93 0.06 0.02 0.95 0.03 
AB 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.01 0.07 0.92 
A-B 0.l0 0.38 0.53 0.24 0.62 0.14 
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on the control snapshot pairs. The pattern described above is maintained. Now 
performance on the AB snapshot is excellent and about equal in both conditions. The 
difference between the proportion of A-B snapshots classified as type AB between 
the two conditions remains significant, 1(27)=2.60, 12<0.05. 
Discussion 
This experiment replicates Schyns and Rodet's (1997) Experiment 2. After 
training of the same categories, in different orders, two groups of participants gave 
mutually exclusive categorizations of the same stimulus. This different 
categorization is attributed to the different groups of participants developing 
different feature sets. 
Experiment 10 
Experiment 10 differs from Experiment 9 only in that different Martian Cell 
stimuli were used. In general the Martian Cell stimuli are slightly smaller, and with 
less Gaussian blurring. (Gaussian blurring produces an effect similar to an out of 
focus projector.) The snap shots had a background context added, so the elements 
were presented on a blank, gray cell background, rather than in isolation on a white 
screen. 
Method 
The method for Experiment lOis the same as for Experiment 9, except for 
the reduction in blurring of the stimuli and the addition of a blank, gray cell 
background for the snapshot stimuli. The new stimuli are shown in Figures 30 and 
31. New participants took part who had not participated in Experiment 9. 
Results 
The proportion of correct trials in the learning verification stage \\as high 
(0.90 and 0.87 for the A-7B-7AB and AB-7A-7B conditions respectively), and 
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Type A Type B 
Type AB Distractor 
Figure 30. The Martian cell stimuli used in the learning and verification phases of 
Experiment 10. 
Chapter 4 Feature Creation 
Snapshot of Element a Snapshot of Element b 
Snapshot of Element ab Snapshot of Distractor Part 
Figure 31. The Martian cell snapshot stimuli used in the transfer phase of 
Experi men t 1 O. 
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there was no effect of learning order, 1(31)=0.44, 1l>0.05. Similarly, the proportion of 
correct responses on final verification trials was high, 0.91, in both conditions. 
Results for performance in transfer are shown in Table 10. For the snapshot 
pairs A, Band AB, performance is high in both conditions. Snapshot pair A-B is 
almost never classified as type AB in either condition. In fact, out of all the 256 
responses to pair A-B, only 4 type AB responses were made. Eliminating 
participants who did not perform significantly above chance on snapshot pairs A, B 
and AB (as in Experiment 9) therefore did not alter the pattern of the proportion of 
type AB responses to snapshot A-B in either condition. 
Discussion 
The blurring of stimuli and the introduction of a background to the snapshots 
has completely removed the feature creation effect demonstrated by Schyns and 
Rodet (1997) and replicated in Experiment 9. Participants who learn in the order 
A~B~AB no longer categorize the snapshot pair A-B as type AB. The only 
difference between Schyns and Rodet's (1997) Experiment 2 and this experiment 
was the stimulus set used. The stimulus sets are, however, very similar, and it is 
surprising that the feature creation effect is eliminated. The reduction in the blurring 
of the stimuli should serve to make the relationship between the three types more 
obvious to participants, as the noise in the stimuli is reduced. The addition of the 
background context in the snapshots makes it clear that the elements in the snapshots 
are not joined to other elements. (In the original stimuli, the close-up view could be 
part of the configural feature.) According to the Schyns and Rodet account, this 
should not make a difference, as a participant's representation of element ab in the 
A~B~AB condition is just feature a in the same cell as feature b (as is made clear 
from their flexible feature encoding simulation, Schyns & Rodet, 1997, p. 691). In 
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Table 10 
Mean proportion of responses for the transfer block of Experiment 10. 
Elements first Compound first 
(A~B~AB) (AB~A~B) 
Response Response 
A B AB A B AB 
Stimulus A 0.89 0.06 0.05 0.91 0.08 0.02 
B 0.08 0.88 0.04 0.13 0.81 0.06 
AB 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.00 0.08 0.92 
A-B 0.31 0.68 0.02 0.45 0.53 0.02 
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both experiments participants were told they were seeing close-ups and not isolated 
parts. Thus in Experiment 9 participants may have believed the A-B snapshots to be 
separate views of elements a and b joined together. Thus the absence of a feature 
creation effect here suggests that participants' representations of element ab after 
A~B~AB training also involves beliefs about the relative location of the two 
elements. 
In fact a stronger claim may be made. Suppose the A~B~AB group and the 
AB~A~B group have the same fixed feature set {a, b, ab}. Assume that the groups 
differ instead on their knowledge that element ab is made by joining element a and 
element b, with the A~B~AB group being more aware that the AB~A~B group. 
This is a plausible assumption, given that the A~B~AB group can notice 
previously learned elements being contained in latter elements, but that the 
AB~A~B group cannot. In Schyns and Rodet's (1997) original Experiment 2, and 
in Experiment 9, the A~B~AB group can believe snapshot A-B to be two different 
views of element ab, and classify the snapshot as type AB accordingly. However, the 
AB~A~B group, being unaware that elements a and b together make element ab, 
cannot make the same classification. In this experiment the introduction of the 
background context prevents the A ~ B~ AB group believing that the elements in the 
snapshot A-B are joined to one another, and therefore they cannot classify the 
snapshot as type AB. They are prevented from believing that the two elements in the 
snapshots are joined, because the background context completely surrounds each 
element, showing the element must be an isolated part of the cell. Thus the feature 
creation effect observed in Schyns and Rodet's (1997) original Experiment 2, and in 
Experiment 9, and the lack of the effect in this experiment may be explained using a 
fixed feature set account. 
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Partial evidence that this interpretation may be correct is provided by Schyns 
and Murphy (1994). They trained participants on Martian boulders that contain both 
element a and element b. In the joined group, these elements were always adjacent. 
In the separated group, element a and element b were not adjacent. In the joined 
group, element a and element b were delineated as a single part, but in the separate 
group they were delineated separately. Participants were then asked to categorize 
new boulders as either members of the training category or not, and rate them for 
typicality. Performance on boulders with element a and element b adjacent was the 
same in both groups, with the examples being categorized as, and rated typical of, 
the training category. When both elements a and b occurred in the same boulder, but 
were not adjacent, the joined group was less likely to classify them as and rate them 
as typical of their training items, even though, to some extent, they could recognize 
the parts when they occurred alone in a boulder. It seems that although the joined 
group could recognize the elements a and b alone they required the elements to be 
joined to make a successful classification. 
That the results taken as evidence for feature creation may be explained by an 
alternative explanation casts potential doubt on the feature creation hypothesis. 
Experiment 11 was designed to assess whether a feature creation effect may occur 
with a new type of stimuli, and also to investigate whether participants' knowledge 
that the compound element is made from a conjunction of the other two elements is 
predictive of the feature creation effect. 
Experiment 11 
In Experiment 11 participants learned the features of the three types of line 
drawings. The elements in these drawings could appear in one of two ways. Half the 
time the element appeared normally, and half the time the element appeared as a 
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mirror image. As in previous experiments, one of the elements was the conjunction 
of the other two elements. The order of learning varied between participants, with 
half learning the conjunction element, followed by the two part elements, and the 
other half learning the parts first followed by the conjunction. 
In transfer participants saw a stimulus made from a conjunction of one 
normal part and one mirror image part. This stimulus contains all of the features of 
the two elements, but none of the features unique to the compound. (This is true if it 
is assumed that participants learn one feature for both normal and mirror image 
elements. If alternately, participants learn two separate features for each element. one 
for normal and one for mirror image presentations, it is still true that the normal-
mirror conjunction stimulus does not contain any features unique to the original 
compound stimulus.) Thus, according to a feature creation hypothesis, participants 
who learn the elements first represent the compound with two features, one for each 
element, should classify this new stimulus in the same category as the compound 
stimulus. However participants who learn the compound first, who may form some 
features unique to the compound, should be less likely to categorize this new 
stimulus in the same class as the compound, as the new stimulus does not contain 
these unique features. 
The last part of Experiment 11 is designed to measure participants' 
awareness that the compound contains the two elements. Of interest is the possibility 
that the awareness measure might predict participants' classification of the normal 
element-mirror element conjunction stimulus. The task used to measure awareness 
was designed to be highly similar to the categorization task where participants were 
hypothesized to be utilizing this awareness (cf. the information criterion, Shanks & 
St. John. 1994). 
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Method 
Participants. 32 University of Warwick undergraduates participated for 
payment. 
Stimuli and Design. Two elements were used to construct the stimuli in this 
experiment, element a and element b (Figure 32A). The elements either appeared 
normally, or in mirror image. The notation a' is used to represent the mirror image of 
a. The elements were used to construct three types of training stimuli, A, Band AB 
(Figure 32B). Stimuli were black lines drawn inside a black outline square. Type A 
training stimuli contained element a inside themselves. Half contained the element in 
mirror image. Additional random lines were drawn, by selecting ~ and yeo-ordinates 
for each end of the line at random, with the constraint that each end of the line was 
within the outline square. Similarly for type B. Type AB stimuli contained both 
elements a and b. Sometimes both elements appeared as normal, and sometimes both 
appeared as in mirror image (denoted using '). Participants never saw one mirror 
image and one normal element in the same type AB stimulus. Thus the configuration 
of the elements, either a and b or a' and b', always had the same configural features. 
Three kinds of transfer stimulus sets were constructed, a single set, a paired 
set, and a sequential pairs set (Table 11 and Figure 33). The single set stimuli 
included the training stimuli. In addition, a new stimulus was included made from 
elements a and b, but this time so that one element was normal and the other was 
mirror image, i.e., either a'b or ab'. If participants represented type AB with features 
a and b, then participants should classify this new stimulus as AB. However, if 
participants were using a configural feature to represent type AB, then this feature 
does not appear in this new type, and so participants should classify it as either type 
A or type B. 
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A Elements Used 
Element a Element b Element ab 
B Exam pies of Type AB Training Stimuli 
Figure 32. The lines stimuli used in the training phase of Experiment 11. (a) The 
two elements. (b) Examples of training stimuli. 
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Table 11 
Transfer stimuli from Experiment 11. (a represents element a, b represents element b, a' 
represents the mirror image of element a, b' represented the mirror image of element b. 
n shows that addition random lines, or noise, was added to the stimulus. - is used to 
represent two stimuli being displayed simultaneously, ~ is used to represent two 
stimuli, the first displayed before the second.) 
Single set (5 of each) Pairs set (5 of each) 
an 
a'n 
bn 
b'n 
abn 
a'b'n 
ab'n 
a'bn 
a-n 
a'-n 
b-n 
b'-n 
ab-n 
a'b' -n 
a-b 
a'-b' 
a' -b 
a-b' 
Sequential pairs set (3 of each) 
a'~a 
a~a' 
ab~a'b' 
a'b'~ab 
a~b' 
a'~b 
b~a' 
n~a 
n~a' 
n~b 
n~b~ 
(table continues) 
Single set (5 of each) Pairs set (5 of each) 
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Sequential pairs set (3 of each) 
n-tab 
n-ta'b' 
ab-ta' 
a'b' -ta 
ab-tb' 
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A Single Example Transfer Stimuli 
l2l B 8J ~ 
B Paired Transfer Stimuli 
l2lD BD 8JD 
l2lB l2lE] 
C Sequential Paired Transfer Stimuli 
8Jw l2lw Dw 
8JEJ BE] DE] 
8J~ D~ 
l2lE] Bw 
Figure 33. The lines stimuli used in the transfer phases of Experiment 1l. 
Additional random lines have been omitted for clarity, but were seen by 
partici pants. 
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In the paired set, two stimuli were presented on each trial. For each pair 
stimuli were randomly assigned to a location on the screen on each trial. Five pairs 
were used. Participants were asked to imagine both stimuli laid one over the other. 
and to classify the resulting imagined stimulus. The first three pairs were the training 
examples. The fourth pair, contained element a in one stimulus, and element b in the 
other, such that when the two stimuli were laid on top of one another the two 
elements overlapped and formed the conjunction participants had seen in training. 
The fifth pair was like the fourth, except one element was normal and one was a 
mirror image. When the two stimuli from this pair were laid one on top of the other, 
the two elements would not form the conjunction that participants were familiar 
with. It was hypothesized that participants who learned the parts first, who 
represented the conjunction stimulus using feature a and feature b, would classify 
this fifth stimulus pair as type AB. However, participants who learned the 
conjunction stimulus first, who represent the conjunction stimulus using one feature, 
feature ab, would not classify this fifth part as type AB, as it does not contain the 
configural feature abo 
The sequential pairs set was included to measure participants' awareness that 
one type was made from the parts of the other two. Participants saw the first 
stimulus, followed by the second. They had to make a binary response indicating 
whether the second stimulus appeared in mirror image in the first. Of interest are 
responses to pairs where one of the parts followed the compound stimulus. 
Procedure. The first part of the experiment was a pen and paper exercise. 
Participants were given 3 sheets, each of 10 examples of either types A, B or AB. 
one after the other. The order of presentation depended on which of two conditions 
the participants were assigned to. They either learned the compound stimulus tirst. or 
Chapter 4 Feature Creation 138 
learned the parts first. The order of learning about types A and B was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed that each stimulus 
contained an invariant part that was either normal or mirror image. They were told to 
examine the examples and try to spot this part in each example. When they had done 
this, and shown the part to the experimenter, they were asked to outline the part in 
each of the 10 stimuli, one at a time, to give themselves a chance to become familiar 
with the part. Participants were instructed to try to remember the part, as they would 
be tested on it later. 
After all three sheets were complete the transfer phase of the experiment 
began. In this phase stimuli were displayed on a computer. All participants did the 
transfer tasks in the order of single stimuli, pairs of stimuli, and sequential pairs of 
stimuli. On a trial in the single stimulus task a stimulus appeared on the screen until 
participants responded with one of the category labels from the training stage by 
pressing one of three keys. (Using small paper stickers the keys q, w, and e on a 
normal qwerty keyboard were labeled "type 1 ", "type 2", and "type 3" respectively. 
For each participant types were named in the order the participant experienced the 
stimuli.) Stimuli appeared in the center of the screen, the same size they were on the 
A4 paper in training. After a response there was a blank screen of 500 ms. Trials of 
each set of stimuli were in a random order. After all the single stimuli were 
presented, participants were presented with the pairs of stimuli. A trial of the pairs of 
stimuli task was the same, except two stimuli appeared, one slightly to the left of 
center, and the other slightly to the right, such that there was a gap the size of one 
stimulus between the stimuli. After the pairs task, participants moved on to the 
sequential pairs task. In the sequential pairs of stimuli task, stimuli appeared one 
after the other, in the center of the screen. The first stimulus was displayed for 1000 
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ms, with a blank screen for 500 ms before the second stimulus appeared until 
participants responded. Participants responded by pressing either 0 or p, labeled 
"yes" and "no" respectively with small paper stickers. 
Results 
Two kinds of analyses will be considered. First, the results for the single 
stimuli and pairs of stimuli transfer sets are presented by condition (A~B~AB and 
AB~A~B). Planned comparisons were run. Second, the performance in the 
sequential pairs of stimuli condition will be used to provide a score for each 
participant measuring how aware they are that the compound stimulus is made up 
from the two parts. Regression analyses will be used to see if the awareness is a 
reliable predictor of classification of the ambiguous A'B and A-B stimuli. 
Performance on the a, band ab stimuli in the single stimuli transfer stage was 
worse in the AB~A~B condition, as observed in Experiments 3 and 4. Many 
participants could not classify ab stimuli as type AB, after having learning types A 
and B. Table 12 presents the responses for each stimulus for participants who 
performed significantly above chance on A, Band AB stimuli. The performance of 
the A' B stimuli, that contains one mirror image element and one normal element, 
that is of interest. This stimulus does not contain the configural features of AB, so 
the AB~A~B group with a single feature ab for stimulus AB should not classify 
A'B as type AB. Their proportion of AB responses to A'B should be lower than 
group A~B~AB. The proportion of AB responses to A'B is almost identical for 
each group, !( 15)=0.03, 12>0.05. 
The pairs of stimuli transfer set was designed to be like the Schyns and 
Rodel's (1997) two snapshot procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2. The results for 
the pairs of stimuli transfer stage are shown in Table 13. Performance on the old 
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Table 12 
Mean proportion of responses for the single stimuli transfer stage of Experiment 11 for 
participants significantly above chance on types A, Band AB in transfer. 
Elements first Compound first 
(A~B~AB, n=12) (AB~A--7B, n=5) 
Response Response 
A B AB A B AB 
Stimulus A 0.92 0.08 0.01 0.96 0.04 0.00 
B 0.03 0.96 0.01 0.04 0.90 0.06 
AB 0.07 0.04 0.89 0.l4 0.04 0.82 
A'B 0.49 0.l8 0.33 0.44 0.24 0.32 
-
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Table 13 
Mean proportion of responses for the pairs transfer set from Experiment 11 for 
participants significantly above chance on types A, Band AB in transfer. 
Elements first Compound first 
(A~B~AB, n=12) (AB~A~B, n=5) 
Response Response 
A B AB A B AB 
Stimulus A-N 0.98 0.02 0.01 0.98 0.02 0.00 
B-N 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.06 
AB-N 0.05 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.02 0.90 
A-B 0.07 0.01 0.93 0.22 0.08 0.70 
A'-B 0.40 0.l1 0.49 0.36 0.l6 0.48 
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training stimuli, A-N, B-N, and AB-N was poorer in the AB-7A-7B condition. This 
is consistent with performance on the single stimuli transfer set. Participants failing 
to perform significantly above chance were eliminated from each condition. The 
remaining participants in both groups classified the stimulus A-B as type AB most of 
the time. The proportion of AB responses for stimulus A-B was just significantly 
higher in the A-7B-7AB condition, 1(15)=2.145, 12<0.05. This is consistent with a 
feature creation hypothesis. However, the significant difference is due to one 
participant in the A-7B-7AB condition almost never classifying stimulus A-B as 
type AB. The other participants in the A-7B-7AB condition show a performance 
similar to those in the AB-7A-7B condition - the mean proportion of type AB 
responses to stimulus A-B was 0.83 in the A-7B-7AB condition with the single 
participant eliminated, and 0.93 in the AB-7A-7B condition. As the difference is 
only marginally significant, and due to just one participant, no more will be made of 
it. Collapsed across training condition, the A' -B stimulus was classified as type AB 
less often than stimulus A-B, 1(16)=3.88, 12<0.01. This pattern of results is true for 
both training conditions. The only difference between the A-B and A' -B stimuli is 
the absence of the configural features in the imagined combination. Therefore that 
performance differs between these two stimuli suggests that participants in both 
conditions were aware of the configural feature in stimulus type AB. There is no 
almost no difference between the proportion of type AB responses to stimulus A'-B 
between the two training conditions, 1(15)=0.05,12>0.05. 
In summary the different orders of learning, either A-7B-7AB or 
AB-7A-7B, has no effect on participants classification of the critical stimuli A'B, 
A-B and A' -B. However, individual participants do differ on the proportion of AB 
responses to each of these stimuli. The next analysis investigates whether this 
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individual variation in classification of these ambiguous stimuli can be explained by 
participants' awareness that the compound contains the parts. 
Table 14 shows the proportion of responses indicating that the 2nd stimulus in 
each sequence pair appeared as a mirror image in the 1 st stimulus. For the control 
pairs AN~A', BN~B' and ABN~A'B', performance was accurate and 
approximately equal in each learning condition. For the control pairs N~A, N~B, 
N~AB, AN~B' and BN~A', performance was also accurate and approximately 
equal in both learning conditions. The pairs of interest, ABN~A' and ABN~B', 
designed to measure participants awareness that the compound stimulus contained 
the parts, performance was intermediate between the two sets of control stimuli. 
Averaging the results across both critical stimuli for each participant, there is no 
significant difference in the proportion of yes answers between the two experimental 
conditions, 1(15)=1.18, 12>0.05 - the different orders of training have no significant 
effect of the awareness that the compound element in made from the other two 
elements. 
F or each participant who performed above chance on the A, Band AB 
stimuli and the A -N B-Nand AB-N stimuli, an awareness score was constructed, , , 
by taking the average proportion of "yes" responses for sequence stimuli AB~A' 
and AB~B'. Scatter plots (Figures 34 through 36) show that awareness was a poor 
predictor of classification of the critical stimuli. Less than 10% of the variability in 
the proportion of type AB responses to stimulus A'B ([2=0.090), A-B ([2=0.001), and 
A'-B ([2=0.003) was predicted by this awareness score. Although the correlation 
coefficient was significantly different from zero, 1( 15)=4.71, 12<0.0005, for the A' B 
stimulus, neither correlation for the A-B and A' -B stimuli was significant, 
1C 15)=0.54. 12>0.05, and 1( 15)=0.76, 12>0.05, respectively. Although there is e\'idence 
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Table 14 
Proportion of "yes" response in the sequential pairs transfer stage indicating the latter 
stimuli is contained as a mirror image in the former for participants significantly above 
change on types A, Band AB in the single and pairs transfer stages in Experiment 11. 
Condition 
Stimulus pair A~B~AB AB~A~B 
AN~A' 0.81 0.70 
BN~B' 0.71 0.80 
ABN~A'B' 0.92 0.90 
ABN~A' 0.74 0.80 
ABN~B' 0.76 0.53 
N~A 0.l3 0.07 
N~B 0.22 0.l3 
N~AB 0.14 0.30 
AN~B' 0.26 0.l3 
BN~A' 0.l3 0.07 
-
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Figure 34. The proportion of type AB responses for the single stimulus 
A' B transfer stimuli as a function of the awareness that the compound 
is made from the parts for Experiment 11. 
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is made from the parts for Experiment 11. 
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Figure 36. The proportion of type AB responses for the single stimulus A'-B 
transfer stimuli as a function of the awareness that the compound is made 
from the parts for Experiment 11. 
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that the classification of the critical stimuli is influenced by a participant's 
knowledge that the compound is made up from the parts, the small size of the effect. 
and absence of a significant effect for other critical stimuli, shows that the large 
variability in the classification of the critical stimuli is not explained by the 
experimental manipulations. 
Discussion 
Participants' classification of the ambiguous stimuli varied greatly. This 
variation was not predicted by the order of learning the categories. Participants' 
awareness of the configuration being made up from the parts only predicted a small 
proportion of variability in categorization of the critical stimulus. Experiment 11 
therefore provides no evidence of a feature creation effect, and only slight evidence 
for the role of awareness. The following experiments aim to demonstrate a feature 
creation effect, and further to demonstrate that features qualitatively alter the 
perception of stimuli. 
Experiment 12 
Experiment 11 failed to demonstrate a feature cr~ation effect. The remaining 
experiments in this chapter are concerned with investigating feature creation with a 
new type of stimuli. Experiment 12 uses similar logic to Schyns and Rodet's (1997) 
original experiment. The Martian cells stimuli are replaced with checkerboard 
stimuli. Checkerboard stimuli were chosen because they are complex, like Martian 
cells, and because they are used by other researchers in categorization and perceptual 
learning (e.g., McLaren, 1997; Wills & McLaren, 1998). The checkerboards contain 
invariant, category diagnostic patches of black and white squares: elements a and b. 
Participants learn about three types, type A containing element a, type B containing 
element b and type AB containing element a above and adjacent to element b. 
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Participants either learn the single element stimuli first or the compound stimulus 
first. If participants learn the compound first they may learn features to represent 
patches of squares across the conjunction of element a and element b. Participants 
who learn the elements first should have learning of features of the boundary of 
elements a and b in the compound blocked by their prior learning of features for each 
element. To allow presentation of the hypothesized element features without 
presenting features unique to the compound of the elements, the invariant patches in 
the compound checkerboard are rearranged within a checkerboard (instead of a two 
snapshot procedure in transfer). This new stimulus, type BA, contains element b 
above and adjacent to element a. Thus type BA contains the features of each 
element, but not features unique to the conjunction of element a above element b. 
Therefore, type BA should be classified as type AB by the group learning the 
elements first, who do not have any features unique to the conjunction. But the group 
who learned the compound first, who may have formed features unique to the 
conjunction, should be less likely to classify type BA as type AB, a type BA does 
not contain these conjunction unique features. 
Method 
Participants. 33 students from the University of Warwick took part in the 
experiment for payment, and did not participate in any other experiment in this 
chapter. 
Stimuli. Two square (4x4) prototype checkerboards were created for each 
participant. The first prototype board, prototype A, was made from an equal number 
of black and white squares in random positions. The second prototype. prototype B. 
was made by randomly selecting half of the white squares of prototype A and 
changing them to black, and selecting half of the black squares of prototype A and 
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changing them to white. (This procedure makes the prototypes maximally 
dissimilar.) A pair of example prototypes is shown in Figure 37. 
The prototype boards were used to build four kinds of rectangular (4x8) 
checkerboard stimuli (Figure 38). The stimuli measured 11 mm across and 22 mm 
high. Stimulus type A consists of prototype A and random noise checkerboard. For 
each presentation of a type A stimulus the random noise checkerboard was newly 
generated. Half the time prototype A made the top half of the rectangular 
checkerboard, half the time prototype A was presented in the bottom half of the 
checkerboard. Stimulus type B was as stimulus type A, except prototype A was 
replaced with prototype B. Stimulus AB was always prototype A above prototype B. 
Stimulus BA was always prototype B above prototype A. All stimuli were presented 
on a gray background. 
The size of the checkerboards was decided upon so that the chance of 
learning features that cross the boundary of two adjacent elements should be 
approximately equal to the chance of learning features within an element. If the 
boards are two small, then single elements are too small to learn, as the probability 
of similar elements occurring by chance is too high. If the boards are too large, then 
the borderline area across two elements is small compared to the area of an element, 
which means the probability of learning configural features it too low. Pilot work 
revealed that adding noise in the form of swapping the color of some of the squares 
made learning checkerboards of this size very difficult for many participants. For 
this reason, no noise was added. 
Design. Participants first learned to discriminate checkerboard types A, Band 
AB from random noise checkerboards by classifying checkerboards as "type 1", 
"type 2", "type 3" or "other", A between participants factor varied the order of 
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Figure 37. A pair of checkerboard prototypes from Experiment 12. 
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Figure 38. A stimulus set from Experiment 12 (generated from the prototypes in 
Figure 37). 
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discrimination learning (Table 15). In the A-tB-tAB condition participants first 
learned to discriminate type A checkerboards from random noise checkerboards by 
responding "type 1 ~~ or "other" after each checkerboard. After reaching a set learning 
criterion of 20 correct categorizations in a row participants moved on to 
discriminating type B checkerboards from random noise ("type 2" or "other"). and 
finally type AB checkerboards from random noise ("type 3" or "other"), In the 
AB-tA-tB condition participants learned to discriminate type AB checkerboards 
from noise ("type 1" or "othee~)~ followed by type A from noise ("type 2" or 
"other"), followed by type B from noise ("type 3" or "other"). 
They were then asked to classify checkerboard types A~ B, AB and BA and 
random noise checkerboards as either ""type 1", "type 2", "type 3" or "other", It was 
predicted that participants in the AB-tA-tB condition may learn to classify type AB 
checkerboards using features on the boundary between prototype A and prototype B. 
Learning of these features should be blocked in the A-tB -tAB condition, as 
participants have already learned features a and b and these should be sufficient for 
discrimination. The absence of the features representing the boundary between 
element a and element b in the BA stimulus should reduce the likelihood of 
participants in the compound first condition classifying type BA as type AB 
compared to the elements first group. 
Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet room. Participants were 
seated in front of a computer and the keyboard and monitor were adjusted as 
necessary. Participants read the instructions from the computer screen and \vere 
given an opportunity to question the experimenter. They were told that they could 
learn to identify which checkerboard belonged to which type by learning patches of 
squares that would appear some\vhere in each type. Three example boards were 
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Table 15 
The design of Experiment 12. 
Condition 
A-7B-7AB 
AB-7A-7B 
Training Discriminations 
Type 1, other Type 2, other Type 3, other 
A, noise 
AB, noise 
B, noise 
A, noise 
AB, noise 
B, noise 
Transfer 
A, B, AB, BA, noise 
A, B, AB, BA, noise 
. 
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displayed below the instructions. The example prototype was randomly generated. 
and was not used during the experiment. Participants were shown where the 
prototype pattern appeared in all three boards. The experiment then started with 
instructions for the first learning block. Participants were told they would see 
checkerboards one after the other, and that they should categorize each one as either 
"type 1" or other. Although they would have to guess at first, they were told they 
should eventually be able to learn by paying attention to the correct answer. Each 
trial in the learning block was proceeded by 500 ms of blank gray screen. A 
rectangular checkerboard stimulus was then displayed in the center of the screen. 
After 2000 ms a 15 mm high "?" prompt was displayed underneath the board in 
until the participant responded pressing keys labeled "type 1" or "other". The 2000 
ms pause was to encourage participants to look at all parts of the checkerboard 
before responding. (Using small paper labels, the keys z, x, c, and v on a normal 
qwerty keyboard were labeled as "type 1 ", "type 2", "type 3" and "other" 
• 
respectively.) The stimulus remained on the screen and the prompt was overwritten 
with the correct response "type 1" or "other", again 15 mm high. The feedback lasted 
2000 ms, after which time the screen was cleared. The next trial then began 
automatically. On each trial a type 1 checkerboard or a newly generated random 
noise checkerboard was selected for presentation. The selection was random. After 
participants had made 20 correct responses in a row they moved onto the next 
learning block. The second and third learning blocks were the same as the first, 
except that the type of checkerboard and labels used were changed. 
After the third learning block the transfer block began with instructions 
telling participants that they would see more checkerboards to classify. They \\ere 
told that the checkerboards could belong to any type, and to look at all the parts of 
-
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each board carefully before making a response. The format of each trial was the 
same as the learning block, except the feedback was omitted. There were 50 trials. 
10 of each of checkerboard types A, B, AB, and BA and 10 random noise 
checkerboards. The trials were in a random order. 
Results 
33 undergraduates participated. One participant in the AB~A~B first 
condition failed to complete the training phase after one hour, and was excluded 
from the following analysis. This leaves 16 participants in each of the two conditions 
of the experiment. The mean number of trials to criterion is displayed in Table 16. 
Both conditions show an effect of practice, with less trials to criterion being taken 
when learning later types. The individual variation in blocks to criterion is large. 
The performance in the transfer phase of the experiment is displayed in Table 
17. In the A~B~AB condition, performance on the old training items type A, B 
and AB is good, at about 800/0 accurate. The new item type BA is classified as types 
A, Band AB about equally. In the AB~A~B condition performance on type A and 
B is good, but performance on the compound stimulus, type AB, is poor. Type AB is 
classified as type A or type B most of the time. Because of this, the lower rate of 
classification of type BA as type AB in the AB~A~B condition compared to the 
A~B~AB, 1(31)=2.11, ~<0.05, cannot be taken as evidence for a feature creation 
effect. It seems more parsimonious to account for this result by noting that if 
participants do not classify the type AB stimulus as type AB, because they cannot 
remember it, then they will not be able to classify the type BA stimulus as type AB 
either. Unfortunately eliminating participants who did not perform significantly 
above chance on the old training items in transfer (i.e .. 6 or more correct responses 
out of 10). demonstrating memory for the old training items. eliminates all but t\\l) 
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Table 16 
Mean number of trials to criteria in each of the training blocks for Experiment 12. 
Condition Type A Type B Type AB 
A~B~AB 70 56 27 
AB~A~B 50 48 41 
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Table 17 
Mean proportion of responses in the transfer stage of Experiment 12. 
Elements first (A~B~AB) Compound first (AB~A~B) 
Response Response 
A B AB Noise A B AB Noise 
Stimulus A 0.82 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.74 0.00 0.18 0.08 
B 0.01 0.82 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.83 0.04 0.11 
AB 0.06 0.11 0.80 0.02 0040 0.28 0.31 0.01 
Noise 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.89 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.81 
BA 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.05 0.24 0.66 0.07 0.03 
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of the participants from the AB~A~B condition. (12 participants remain in the 
A~B~AB condition.) Further detailed analysis is therefore not possible. 
Discussion 
Participants in the A~B~AB condition demonstrated good memory for 
each of the training categories in test. However participants in the AB~ A ~ B 
condition were not able to maintain a memory for type AB. Because of this, their 
lower proportion of AB classifications to the type BA stimulus cannot be taken as 
evidence for a feature creation effect, but may be explained simply be observing that 
if participants can't remember type AB they are unlikely to classify anything as type 
AB. Better memory in the A~B~AB condition is in fact consistent with a feature 
creation hypothesis. According to the feature creation hypothesis, in the A ~ B~ AB 
condition only two features need be maintained in memory, {a, b}, but in the 
AB~ A ~ B condition three features, {a, b, ab}, must be maintained. 
Experiment 13 
Experiment 13 differs from Experiment 12 only in a slight change to the 
training stimuli. In this experiment the stimuli were manipulated to reduce the 
likelihood of learning of a single conjunction feature for the AB stimulus. In other 
words, the manipulation was introduced to disrupt the formation of features across 
the boundary of elements a and b in the AB stimulus. This should make the task 
easier for the AB~A~B group, who would now only have to maintain two features 
in memory. If the manipulation that prevents the learning of a conjunction feature, 
performance in transfer should now be the same across both groups A~B~AB and 
AB~A~B. Further all participants in this experiment should be more likely to 
categorize the transfer item A-B as type AB, as all participants should be less likely 
to have learned a single configural feature for stimulus AB, and will instead 
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represent it using the two elements which are also present in stimulus A-B. The 
manipulation used was the introduction of colors to the checkerboards in the learning 
phase. In the learning phase, the top and bottom of the checkerboards were given 
different colors. One half was colored pink and red instead of white and black 
respectively, and the other half light blue and dark blue instead of white and black 
respectively. Thus the patterns of light and dark was the same for stimuli in training 
and test. 
Method 
The method is the same as for Experiment 12, except for differences 
described here. 
Participants. 32 students from the University of Warwick took part in the 
experiment for payment, and did not participate in other experiments in this chapter. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were generated in the same way as Experiment 12. The 
only difference was that colors were added to all the stimuli in the training phases. 
The top and bottom halves of the checkerboards were given different colors. One 
half was red and pink, and the other dark blue and light blue instead of black and 
white respectively. Stimuli in the transfer phase of the experiment were black and 
white as in Experiment 12. Although the old colored training stimuli appeared in 
black and white in the transfer phase, participants could still identify them as the 
pattern of light and dark squares was still the same. On each trial in the training 
phase the assignment of colors to the top or bottom of the checkerboard was random. 
The diagnostic part of each type of checkerboard could appear in any color. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as Experiment 12, except additional 
instructions were given. Participants were told to ignore the colors in the training 
stage, and just pay attention to the pattern of light and dark squares, as this is what 
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would help them learn which type was which. Participants were told that the 
checkerboards in the transfer phase would be black and white versions of the training 
checkerboards, and not to worry about this, but just to categorize them as best they 
could. 
Results 
All 32 participants completed the experiment. The mean number of trials to 
criterion is displayed in Table 18. Both conditions show an effect of practice, with 
less trials to criterion being taken when learning later types. Compared to 
Experiment 12, participants took approximately half the number of trials to criterion. 
suggesting the color manipulation did indeed make learning easier. 
The performance in the transfer phase of the experiment is displayed in Table 
19. The pattern of performance on the old transfer items the same as that observed in 
Experiment 12. In the A~B~AB condition, performance on the old training items 
a, band ab is good, at about 800/0. In the AB~A~B condition performance on the 
elements a and b is good, but performance on the compound stimulus, type AB, is 
poor. Type AB is classified as type A or type B most of the time. 
The proportion of type AB response to the new transfer item type BA is high 
in condition A~B~AB. Participants in this condition classified type BA as type AB 
most of the time, and is significantly higher than in the AB~A~B condition, 
1(31)=4.90, }2<O.OOOL However, as in Experiment 12, this cannot be taken as 
evidence for a feature creation effect, because of the poor performance of 
participants in the AB~A~B condition on the old transfer item type AB. All but 
three participants in this condition showed the poor performance on this item. 
Eliminating these participants does not leave enough in the condition for a sensible 
comparison, but the difference between the two conditions was in the direction 
Chapter 4 Feature Creation 
Table 18 
Mean number of trials to criteria in each of the training blocks for Experiment 13. 
Condition Type A Type B Type AB 
A~B~AB 29 26 23 
AB~A~B 32 27 25 
-
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Table 19 
Mean proportion of responses in the transfer stage of Experiment 13. 
Elements first (A~B~AB) Compound first (AB~A~B) 
Response Response 
A B AB Noise A B AB Noise 
Stimulus A 0.74 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.75 0.05 0.12 0.08 
B 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.81 0.09 0.08 
AB 0.01 0.09 0.89 0.01 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.06 
Noise 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.89 
BA 0.15 0.09 0.67 0.09 0.38 0.43 0.12 0.07 
-
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predicted, with a very low proportion of type AB responses to type BA in condition 
AB~A~B but not A~B~AB. 
One last prediction remains to be tested. It was hypothesized that the 
introduction of different colors for each part of the stimulus would encourage the 
type AB stimuli to be learned as two halves, in both conditions. Thus the proportion 
of type AB responses to type BA stimuli should be higher in this experiment than 
Experiment 12, as fewer participants should form the configural feature abo 
Performance on the new transfer item, type BA, does differ from Experiment 12. As 
predicted the proportion of type AB responses to type BA stimuli is larger than in 
Experiment 12,1(63)=2.67,12<0.001. This comparison is across experiments, and so 
must be viewed with care, as participants were not randomly assigned to either 
experiment. 
Discussion 
The pattern of results is similar to that observed in Experiment 12. 
Participants in the A~B~AB condition classified type BA stimuli as type AB 
significantly more often than participants the AB~A~B condition. However, as in 
Experiment 12, participants in condition AB~A~B did not successfully maintain a 
representation of the type AB stimuli over learning of the intervening types. Thus 
although the difference in classification of the type BA stimuli is consistent with a 
feature creation hypothesis, it is more likely that forgetting is responsible for the 
difference. 
Experiment 13 differed from Experiment 12 only in the introduction of 
coloring the stimuli in the learning phase, to disrupt the learning of features of the 
boundary of the conjunction between elements a and b in type AB stimuli. Thus the 
proportion of type AB response to type BA stimuli should be significantly higher in 
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this experiment as participants should have been less likely to learn conjunction 
features. This was indeed the case. Thus although neither experiment alone provides 
compelling evidence for feature creation, this comparison across the two 
experiments is suggestive of a feature creation effect. 
What is needed is a paradigm to investigate feature creation that does not 
involve participants having to remember features over long blocks of intervening 
trials. Experiment 14 provides such a paradigm. 
Experiment 14 
Experiment 14 has three stages in which participants classify 10 x 10 square 
black and white checkerboards. Each checkerboard can be considered then as having 
four quadrants, each 5 x 5 squares. In the first stage, participants learn to classify two 
types: types A and B. Type A contains an invariant 5 x 5 square area of 
checkerboard, element a, appearing in one of the quadrants. The remaining quadrants 
are filled with a random pattern of black and white squares that varied from trial to 
trial. Likewise, type B checkerboards contains a different 5 x 5 square area of 
checkerboard, element b. The quadrant the diagnostic feature appears in varies from 
trial to trial for each type. 
When participants reach criterion they move on to learn three new types: type 
AB, type CD and type E-F. Each type now contains two diagnostic quadrants. Type 
AB contains the previously learned elements a and b, in random locations, with the 
constraint that element a always appears above element b. Although this two 
quadrant feature could be learned as a single unit, it was hypothesized that prior 
learning of the two parts of the large feature should block learning of a configural ab 
feature. Type CD contained two new elements, c and d, that appeared at random with 
the constraint that c always appeared above d. Here, \vith no prior experience. it was 
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hypothesized that participants would learn the two joined features as a single 
configural unit, feature cd. Type E-F also contained two new elements. e and f, 
appearing in random locations, with the constraint that e never appeared directly 
above or below f. Because the two elements in type E-F did not consistently appear 
in the same location relative to one another, participants must learn two separate 
features to represent type E-F . 
In the final stage of the experiment participants classified briefly presented 
checkerboards as type AB, type CD or type E-F. They saw old examples of type AB, 
type CD and type E-F, and, in addition, three new types of stimuli. The new types 
were a checkerboard with element b above element a (type BA), a checkerboard with 
element d above element c (type DC), and a checkerboard with element f above 
element e (type FE). If participants do indeed have a configural representation 
feature cd, then they should not classify DC as type CD, because it does not contain 
the feature cd. In contrast, participants should classify types BA and FE as types AB 
and EF respectively. 
Method 
Participants. 24 University of Warwick undergraduates took part for 
payment. Participants had not taken part in any other experiment in this chapter. 
Stimuli and Design. Seven 5 x 5 checkerboard prototypes were created for 
each participant. Each of a prototype's 25 squares was randomly assigned to be 
either black or white with equal probability. One of the prototypes was used as the 
example feature in the instructions. The remaining 6 prototypes were used to 
construct the stimuli. These six prototypes will be referred to as elements a through f. 
The checkerboard stimuli displayed to participants always measured lOx 10 
squares. Either no quadrants or one or two quadrants were replaced \vith a or b 
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elements. In the initial stage of the experiment participants learned to categorize 
three types of stimuli, type A, type B, and other completely random checkerboards. 
Type A stimuli always included element a in one quadrant. The quadrant was 
selected at random on each trial. The remaining squares of the checkerboard were 
randomly assigned to be black or white on each trial. Thus the only invariant part of 
the stimulus is element a. Likewise for type B. The completely random 
checkerboards were included to ensure participants learned both types A and B. 
When participants reached criterion on these boards (over 900/0 correct) they learned 
three new checkerboard types, type AB, type CD and type E-F. Type AB boards 
element a above element b. The two quadrants could either appear in the left part of 
the board or the right. The remainder of the board was random, as previously 
described. Type CD boards contained the (previously unseen) elements c and d in the 
same arrangement, with the remainder being random. Type E-F boards contained 
elements e and f, in random quadrants, with the constraint that one never appeared 
above the other. (The dash denotes that the features were separate.) The remaining 
two quadrants were random. It was hypothesized that a configural feature, cd, would 
be learned to represent the conjunction of elements c and d. Learning of the 
analogous feature for the AB boards, ab, would be blocked by prior learning of 
features for a and b separately in the first part of the experiment. Separate features 
for elements e and f would have to be learned as the elements occur in many 
different locations relative to one another. 
In the final stage of the experiment participants classified the previously 
described types AB, CD and E-F. In addition they classified three new types of 
stimuli, BA, DC, and FE. Checkerboard BA contained element b above element a, 
with the remaining half of the board being random. Likewise for type DC and FE. As 
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BA and FE both contain the same features as types AB and E-F respectively. these 
could be classified. However, type DC does not contain the configural feature cd, 
and thus should not be classified as type CD. 
Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet room. Participants were 
seated in front of a computer and the keyboard and monitor were adjusted as 
necessary. Participants read the instructions from the computer screen and were 
given an opportunity to question the experimenter. As in the previous checkerboard 
experiments they were instructed that boards belonging to the same type all had a 
common invariant patch, and that they should try to learn this patch. Three example 
boards were displayed below the instructions. The example prototype was randomly 
generated, and was not used during the experiment. Participants were shown where 
the prototype pattern appeared in all three boards. The experiment then started with 
the first learning block. Participants were told that they would see two types of 
checkerboard mixed in with some random boards. They were told that they would 
have to guess which type was which at first, but that by paying attention to the 
feedback after each board they should be able to learn. They were instructed to try to 
be as accurate as possible. Each trial was proceeded by 500 ms of blank gray screen. 
A square checkerboard stimulus was then displayed in the center of the screen. The 
stimulus remained on the screen until the participant responded with keys labeled 
""type A", ""type B", or ""other". (Keys z, x, c, v, band n on a normal qwerty keyboard 
were labeled ""type A", ""type B", ""type C", ""type D", "type E" and "other" 
respectively.) Below the checkerboard the correct response was displayed as 
feedback, either "A'~ or "B" or '"other", in 15 mm high text. The feedback lasted 
2000 ms, after which time the screen was cleared. The next trial then began 
autOlnatically. Blocks of '27 stimuli, equal numbers of type A, type B and random 
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stimuli, were repeated until participants completed a block with no more than two 
mistakes. The random stimuli were included to ensure participants learned both type 
A and type B, and did not just learn one type. 
After reaching criterion instructions for the second stage of the experiment 
were displayed. Participants were told that now they would learn three new types. 
They were told that now each type contained two parts, and they should try to learn 
both for each type. They were told that one of the new types contained both parts 
from the first stage. The format for a trial was the same as in the previous stage, 
except the stimuli and feedback labels were different. Participants were presented 
with blocks of 20 stimuli. In each block there were 5 type AB checkerboards, 5 type 
CD checkerboards, 10 type E-F checkerboards, and 5 completely random 
checkerboards. There were twice as many E-F checkerboards as any other type, as 
pilot work demonstrated that these were harder to learn than the other types. Blocks 
were repeated until participants made no more than two errors in a block. When 
participants reached criterion, the instructions for the third and final stage of the 
experiment were displayed informing participants that they would see boards appear 
briefly, and they should try to categorize them as in the second learning stage. A trial 
began with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, in the center of the screen. A checkerboard 
was then displayed for 650 ms before being covered over with a mask of random 
black and white pixels larger than the checkerboard. The purpose of this 
manipulation was to prevent ceiling effects in the classification of checkerboards. 
Participants responded with one of the labels "type C", '"type D", .. type E", or 
"other". They were instructed to respond other if they were just guessing which 
checkerboard had been displayed, to reduce chance correct responses to any of the 
types of checkerboards. 70 trials of checkerboards were run, 10 of each of types AB. 
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CD, E-F, BA, DC, FE, and 10 random checkerboards in a random order. After the 
last trial the experiment ended. 
Results 
Six participants failed to complete the experiment in the time allowed. Their 
results are excluded from this analysis. On average the remaining participants 
reached criterion after a mean of 3.7 and 4.7 blocks for the first and second learning 
phases respectively. Of interest is performance in the transfer stage (Figure 39). For 
the new items a correct response is defined as responding with the label of the type 
whose elements it contains. The brief exposure of the checkerboards ensured 
performance on the old training items was below ceiling. Of interest is the 
comparison between an old item and the corresponding new item, where the two 
elements appeared in a novel configuration. In the elements condition, (types E-F 
and FE), where participants were hypothesized to have a feature for each element e 
and f, performance is about equal for the two types. In the compound condition 
(types CD and DC) DC is classified as CD less often than CD is. This is as predicted. 
If participants have a feature cd that they use to represent type CD, they should not 
classify DC as CD, as DC does not contain feature cd. In the blocked condition, 
where participants experienced types A and B before learning about type AB. the 
pattern of results is intermediate between the other two conditions. This supports the 
notion that learning types A and B before AB partially blocks the formation of 
feature abo 
This descriptive pattern of results is confirmed with the following inferential 
statistics. As a change in proportion is to be compared across 3 conditions, the log 
odds method is used (Allerup & Elbro, 1998). This method is superior to the more 
common 3 x 2 ANOV A (stimulus type x swapping of elements) that might be run 
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Figure 39. The mean proportion of correct responses for the transfer 
stimuli in Experiment 14. (Error bars are standard error of the mean.) 
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here, where an interaction would be taken as evidence of a feature creation effect, 
because the log odds methods controls for the potential floor and ceiling effects. For 
each participant three log odds scores were calculated, one for each condition. Odds 
were calculated for each of the possible six test stimuli (three types x swapping 
elements over, not including the random checkerboards). The odds-value is defined 
as the probability of an event happening divided by the probability of it not 
happening. The probabilities were estimated using the proportion of correct 
responses for each stimulus type. For each of the three stimulus types, log odds were 
calculated, defined as the natural logarithm of the quotient of the odds. Each log 
odds score therefore reflected, for a given stimulus type, the difference between the 
proportion correct when the stimuli appeared as in training and the proportion correct 
when the stimulus appeared with the two elements in novel locations, i.e., the 
difference in height of each pair of adjacent bars in Figure 39. A one way ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference in this log odds score between the three conditions, 
F(2, 34)=22.28,12<0.0005 (Huynh-Feldt ~=0.96). (This would be equivalent to a 
significant interaction in the 3 x 2 ANOV A.) I-tests showed that the log odds scores 
for the for the compound and blocked conditions differed significantly, 1(17)=2.41, 
12<0.05. The difference between the log odds scores for the compound and elements 
conditions was also significant, 1(17)=7.45, 12<0.000005, as was the difference 
between the blocked and elements conditions, 1(17)=3.70, 12<0.005. 
Discussion 
Performance in transfer was as predicted by the feature creation hypothesis. 
In type E-F boards elements e and f did not appear in consistent locations relevant to 
one another. Participants were hypothesized, therefore, to form t\\"o features, e and [ 
to represent each element. Consistent with this interpretation both type E-F and FE 
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stimuli were classified as type EF in transfer as both types contain features e and f. 
In type CD stimuli, the elements c and d did appear in a consistent configuration 
across stimuli, and therefore participants were hypothesized to learn a single feature 
cd to represent this configuration. Participants classified type DC stimuli as type CD 
less often than type CD stimuli, consistent with a feature creation hypothesis, as type 
DC stimuli does not contain feature cd, but type CD does. Intermediate between 
these two patterns of responding was performance on type AB and type BA stimuli, 
where although elements a and b did appear in a consistent location relative to one 
another, prior experience with each element singly was hypothesized to create 
features for each element, partially blocking the formation of a feature for the 
conjunction of the elements. 
Experiment 15 
A second interpretation of the result from Experiment 14 exists which does 
not involve feature creation. Instead the explanation is based on the change in 
location of the elements between training and transfer. Experiment 15 investigates 
this alternate explanation. If participants were impaired at recognizing elements in 
novel locations, then they might be worse on stimulus DC than either of the other 
two transfer stimuli, BA and EF. In more detail, in the compound condition of 
Experiment 14, the test stimulus, DC, had element d at the bottom of the stimuli, and 
element c at the top of the stimulus. Participants had never seen either of the 
elements in these locations before. For the other two test stimuli, BA and FE, 
participants had seen the elements of these stimuli in the location they appear in in 
the test stimuli before. This confound may therefore explain the reduced 
performance in the DC condition compared to the BA and FE conditions. 
Previous experimental \vork in visual search suggests that this alternate 
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explanation may be valid. Treisman, Vieira and Hayes (1992) have demonstrated 
that a stimulus that appears in more frequently in certain locations is better detected 
in these locations. Further, and of importance here, is that the effect is specific to the 
particular stimulus that appears frequently in that location, and not just any stimulus 
appearing in that location. 
A second reason related to consider the effects of element location is 
predicted by the feature creation hypothesis. Consider an element that consistently 
occurs at the top of a checkerboard. The top part of the element always occurs next 
to the gray background. The bottom part of the element may appear next to squares 
that change color on each trial. This has the effect of changing the appearance of the 
bottom part of the element from trial to trial. Thus it will be easier for participants to 
learn a representation of the top part of the element than the bottom part. In transfer, 
when the element appears in a new location at the bottom of the board, the easy-to-
learn top part of the element is now adjacent to black and white squares, and will 
therefore be harder to recognize. Thus, this feature creation account makes the same 
predications as the location account. 
Experiment 15 is designed to test these alternate explanations. Participants 
will learn to classify two types of checkerboard, each type containing an element in a 
consistent location. In transfer, two new checkerboards will be introduced, where the 
elements appear in non-consistent locations. If there is a significant effect of 
changing the location of a feature then performance should be worse on these new 
items. 
Method 
Participants. 7 University of Warwick undergraduates took part for payment. 
No participant had previously taken part in other experiments in this chapter. 
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Stimuli and Design. Three 5 x 5 checkerboard prototypes were created for 
each participant, using the same algorithm as in Experiment 14. One of the 
prototypes was used as the example feature in the instructions. The remaining 2 
prototypes were used to construct the stimuli. These two prototypes will be referred 
to as elements a and b. 
The checkerboard stimuli displayed to participants always measured lOx 10 
squares. Either no quadrants or one quadrants were replaced with one of the 
elements. In the initial stage of the experiment participants learned to categorize 
three types of stimuli, type A, type B, and other completely random checkerboards. 
Type A stimuli always included element a in one quadrant. The quadrant was 
selected at random on each trial, from one of the top two quadrants. The remaining 
squares of the checkerboard were randomly assigned to be black or white on each 
trial. Thus the only invariant part of the stimulus is element a. Similarly the only 
invariant part of type B is element b, which always appeared in one of the bottom 
two quadrants. The completely random checkerboards were included to ensure 
participants learned both types A and B. 
In the transfer phase, new types, A' and B' were introduced. A' and B' 
differed from A and B , in that the element now appeared in the opposite half of the 
checkerboard. Where the element had appeared in the bottom half of the 
checkerboard, it now appeared in the top half, and vice versa. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 14, with the 
intermediate phase omitted. In the first training phase participants classified type A, 
type B and random boards to the same criterion as in Experiment 14. In the transfer 
phase, participants classified 10 of each of types A, B, A', and B' and 10 random 
boards. They were specifically instructed to look out for elements in novel locations 
in the transfer phase. 
Results 
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Participants took between 3 and 8 blocks to reach criterion in the learning 
phase. Performance in the transfer phase was collapsed across elements. Thus, two 
conditions are compared: performance on checkerboards where the element appeared 
in a familiar location, and performance where the element appeared in a novel 
location. There was a significant difference between the two conditions, !( 6)=4.01, 
12<0.01. Proportion correct in the familiar location condition (mean=0.80, S.E.=0.05) 
was higher than in the novel location condition (mean=0.39, S.E.=0.07). 
Discussion 
Participants were worse at classifying checkerboards when the diagnostic 
patch of a checkerboard appeared in a novel location. Thus it is possible that, as 
previously described, the results of Experiment 14 could be accounted for it terms of 
the location explanation rather than as feature creation. 
Experiment 16 
The results of Experiment 15 suggest that the novel location explanation may 
indeed account for the results of Experiment 14, without resort to a feature creation 
effect. The design and procedure of Experiment 16 are the same as Experiment 14. 
However, the stimuli are slightly different so that the effect of location is controlled 
across conditions. That is, for every new transfer stimulus, all elements appear in 
novel locations. Therefore this experiment could potentially demonstrate a feature 
creation effect that cannot be accounted for using the novel location explanation. 
Method 
Participants. 24 University of Warwick undergraduates took part for 
payment. No participants took part in other experiments in this chapter. 
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Stimuli and Design. Seven 5 x 5 checkerboard prototypes were created for 
each participant, as in Experiment 14. However the checkerboards participants \vere 
presented with were a different shape to that used in Experiment 14. They always 
measured 5 squares across by 16 squares down, and thus were columns of black and 
white squares. The elements appeared at some vertical location on the column , 
spanning the width of the entire column. In the initial stage of the experiment 
participants learned to categorize three types of stimuli, type A, type B, and other 
completely random checkerboards. Numbering the rows of squares from the top, 
Type A stimuli always included element a near the top of the checkerboard column, 
beginning at random at either row 2 or row 3. The small variation in location was 
introduced to reduce the likelihood that participants learned only a tiny part of a 
checkerboard. The remaining squares of the checkerboard were randomly assigned 
to be black or white on each trial. Thus the only invariant part of the stimulus is 
element a. Type B contained element b, near the bottom of the checkerboard, 
beginning at row 8 or 9. Completely random "other" checkerboards were included to 
ensure participants learned both types A and B. Note that throughout the experiment 
an element never appears right at the top of the checkerboard, or right at the bottom. 
It is assumed that if parts of an element that appeared at the edge of the board, then 
these would be easier to learn. This is because their appearance would remain 
constant, not be being altered by adjacent random squares, varying from trial to trial. 
If the two elements were swapped over to create the new stimuli for the transfer 
stage, the part that of the element that was at the edge of the board would now be in 
the center of the board, and would appear different in the different context. 
Performance on these items would therefore be worse. Although this effect would 
not produce an artificial feature creation result, as it would be equal across all three 
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conditions, the possibility of this effect was eliminated by keeping the top two and 
bottom two rows of every checkerboard random. 
The checkerboards for the second training phase, type AB, type CD and type 
E-F, were created as follows. Type AB boards contain element a immediately aboye 
element b. The first row of element a in type AB began at either rows 2, 3 or 4. The 
remainder of the board was random, as previously described. Type CD boards 
contained the (previously unseen) elements c and d in the same arrangement, with 
the remainder being random. Type E-F boards contained elements e and fwith e 
above f, but with two rows of random squares separating the elements, to ensure 
each element must be learned as a single feature. The first row of element e began at 
row 2, and the rows of element f began at row 9. The remaining squares were 
random. It was hypothesized that a configural feature, cd, would be learned to 
represent the conjunction of elements c and d. Learning of the analogous feature for 
the AB boards, ab, would be blocked by prior learning of features for a and b 
separately in the first part of the experiment. Separate features for elements e and f, 
would have to be learned as the elements are separated by a strip of random squares, 
varying on each presentation. 
In the final stage of the experiment participants classified the previously 
described types AB, CD and E-F. In addition they classified three new types of 
stimuli, BA, DC, and FE. Checkerboard BA contained element b immediately above 
element a, with the remaining rows of the board being random. The rows of element 
a began at either rows 2, 3 or 4. Types DC and EF were similarly constructed. For all 
the new transfer stimuli elements appeared in novel locations. This was not true of 
all stimuli in Experiment 14, where only one transfer stimulus had elements 
appearing in a novel location. 
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Procedure. The procedure is the same as Experiment 14, except participants 
were warned that in the transfer phase the elements could appear in any location, and 
not just the locations they had seen them in, and they should lookout for this. 
Results 
The analysis of results here is the same as Experiment 14. Four participants 
did not complete the experiment within the one hour allowed, and are excluded from 
the following analysis. On average the remaining participants reached criterion after 
a mean of 4.0 and 3.5 blocks for the first and second learning phases respectively. 
Of interest is performance in the transfer stage (Figure 40). For the new items 
a correct response is responding with the label of the type whose elements it 
contains. In all conditions, performance is worse on the new transfer items, 
replicating the location effect demonstrated in Experiment 14. The difference 
between the old checkerboard and the corresponding new checkerboard is largest in 
the compound condition, consistent with the hypothesis the feature creation effect. 
As in Experiment 14, log odds scores were constructed for the three 
conditions. A one way ANOV A revealed a marginally significant difference in this 
log odds score between the three conditions, F(2, 38)=2.80,12=0.073 (Huynh-Feldt 
~=1.00). t-tests showed that the log odds scores for the for the compound and 
blocked conditions differed significantly, 1(19)=2.11, 12<0.05. The difference 
between the log odds scores for the compound and elements conditions was 
marginally significant, 1(19)=1.90, 12=0.073. The marginal significance of these 
results suggests a replication of this experiment would be necessary before using this 
experiment alone as evidence for a feature creation effect. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 16 establish a feature creation effect that cannot be 
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Figure 40. The mean proportion of correct responses for the transfer 
stimuli in Experiment 16. (Error bars are standard error of the mean.) 
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accounted for using the location hypothesis. For all of the new transfer stimuli. the 
elements appeared in novel locations. Participants categorized these stimuli less 
accurately than the corresponding stimuli with elements in familiar locations , 
consistent with the location hypothesis. However, the difference between 
classification accuracy for type DC stimuli and type CD stimuli (where participants 
were hypothesized to represent the stimulus using a single configural features for the 
conjunction of elements c and d) was greater than for type AB and type BA or type 
E-F and type FE (where participants were hypothesized to use two features - one for 
each element), consistent with the feature creation hypothesis. (This effect was much 
smaller than the effect in Experiment 14, which suggests that part of the effect in 
Experiment 14 was due to the location explanation.) Because in type CD stimuli 
elements c and d were always adjacent, with c above d, participants were 
hypothesized to form a single feature cd. This feature is not present in type DC, and 
so participants should not categorize type DC as type CD. Participants were 
hypothesized to have learned separate features for each of the elements in types E-F 
and AB. These features occurred in novel locations in the new transfer stimuli FE 
and BA. Thus although participants should be worse at classifying these stimuli, 
because they have been shown to be worse at identifying features in novel locations, 
they did show some tendency to categorize these stimuli accurately. This is because 
the features were present in the new transfer stimuli although they occurred in novel 
locations. In type E-F elements e and f are separated by some rows of random 
squares. Thus participants must learn two features, e and f, for each element. For 
type AB, which contained elements a and b adjacent to one another. participants 
already had learned the features separately when learning types A and B in the first 
stage of the experiment. Thus, learning of a single feature, ab, was blocked. 
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General Discussion 
Experiment 9 replicated Schyns and Rodet's (1997) feature creation effect. 
Experiment 10 provides evidence that the effect may instead be due to participants' 
beliefs about the relative location of the features. Experiment 11 finds slight 
evidence to support this using an alternate stimulus set. Experiments 12 to 16 
investigate feature creation using checkerboard stimuli. Together Experiments 12 
and 13 provide evidence that features are created during a categorization task 
directly analogous to Schyns and Rodet's by showing that the learning of feature a 
single feature can be prevented by encouraging parsing of parts separately. 
Experiment 14 addresses some methodological problems in porting Schyns and 
Rodet's design to these new stimuli, and demonstrates a feature creation effect. 
Experiment 15 provides evidence for an alternate explanation, based on features 
being better recognized in familiar locations, but Experiment 16 demonstrates a 
feature creation effect that cannot be explained by this location based-account. 
Similarity and The Creation of New Features 
The concept of similarity pervades the psychological literature (Ananiadou, 
2000). With perceptual stimuli, the implementation of similarity in models differs: 
some models use a spatial metaphor (e.g., Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & 
Townsend, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986), and 
others use feature matching (Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1982). The creation of 
new features will impact upon models using either implementation. In feature 
matching models, the creation of a new feature will alter similarity between items by 
(potentially at least) adding a new feature that may be compared between objects. In 
n10dels that use a spatial metaphor, the creation of a new feature will transform the 
similarity space. For example, Palmeri and Nosofsky (in press) found that after 
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training participant on random distortions of checkerboards a multidimensional 
scaling recovery of participants' perceptual space revealed the prototypical 
checkerboards to be extreme points in psychological space. The idea that these 
checkerboards were extreme points before training seems unfeasible as. given the 
random nature of the stimuli generated, that the three prototypes generated (out of a 
possible 2256= 1.2x 1 077) just happened to be extreme points seems very unlikely. The 
fact that the psychological space differed from the assumed physical space (where 
similarity is based on the number of squares in common, and prototypes were 
category central tendencies) allowed an exemplar model to explain the prototype 
effect - where performance is most accurate of the prototypes, rather than the distant 
examples of each category. Note that selective/attentional weighting of dimensions 
(Nosofsky, 1986) is not sufficient to describe these changes in perceptual space. That 
the learning of features, and the resulting reorganization of perceptual space, allows 
exemplar models to predict a prototype effect that has been considered by some to be 
problematic for the models (see McLaren, Bennett, Guttman-Nahir, Kim, & 
Mackintosh, 1995; but see also Lamberts, 1996) and demonstrates the importance of 
considering the creation of features. 
Biases in Feature Creation 
When confronted with a set of novel stimuli participants could potentially 
learn any of a large set of possible features. The choice of features is important 
because it determines the usefulness of these features when encoding subsequent 
stimuli. Choosing features that describe the stimuli very accurately will lead to 
choosing features that describe the noise in the particular examples available to 
participants. Alternatively, if the choice of possible features is too greatly restricted, 
adequate features nla), not be available from the restricted set of possible features. 
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The problem of restricting the set of possible features that could be learned to 
prevent learning noise in current examples (allowing generalization to new 
examples), but not so much as to prevent a successful representation of the stimuli 
forming, is called the bias-variance dilemma (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 
1992). Put simply, participants must be biased against learning some types of feature 
to prevent them learning irrelevant features, but not so biased that they cannot learn 
useful new features. Certainly identification of bias in the creation of new features 
will be important in developing a model of feature creation. Relevant evidence is 
reviewed here. 
Participants seem to require time to learn new features, allowing them to 
encounter a large enough set of training examples. In Schyns and Rodet's (1997) 
Martian cell experiments and also Schyns and Murphy's (1994) Martian boulder 
experiments participants learned features after the order of ten 2 s presentations of 
each stimulus. In the checkerboard experiments (Experiments 4 to 8) presented here 
participants took of the order of 100 presentations of similar duration. In Goldstone's 
(2000) curved line segment experiment participants took slightly more trials, 
approximately 400, over which they gradually learned features (as demonstrated by 
gradually reducing classification latencies). Shiffrin and Lightfoot's (1997) 
participants took approximately 20,000 trials, again gradually learning features of the 
character made from spatially separate straight line segments (as measured by 
reduction in search slopes in a visual search task). Requiring more than one 
presentation of a stimulus to learn features is certainly a sensible strategy, as \\"ith 
only one presentation participants could not deduce which parts of the stimulus are 
invariant, and which parts will vary from exposure to exposure. But why is there 
such a large variation in learning times? I suggest that this is due to interaction with 
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other biases. As Goldstone points out, one such bias may be for learning of features 
to represent spatially contiguous units (Palmer, 1992; Palmer & Rock 199-+). In 
Schyns and Rodet's experiment the features were already segmented from the rest of 
the stimulus, appearing as cell bodies amongst spatially separate random cell bodies. 
In the checkerboard experiments in this chapter (and also, to some extent, in 
Goldstone's experiments) the diagnostic invariant feature needed to be segmented 
from the rest of the stimulus. Although in Shiffrin and Lightfoot's experiment the 
line segments were already segmented, it was only possible to create diagnostic 
features integrating several spatially separate segments. Goldstone compared two 
conditions that differed on whether the curved line segments to be integrated were 
connected or spatially separate (see also Czerwinski, Lightfoot, & Shiffrin, 1992). 
Although participants' categorization latency reduced with practice in both 
conditions the reduction was greater in the connected condition. Thus it seems that 
participants may be biased towards learning spatially separate units, although this 
bias can be overcome at the expense of additional training examples. An important 
caveat to this is that stimuli to be unitized must all be viewable in a single fixation. 
Goldstone demonstrated that stimuli that were enlarged so that they could not be 
taken in a single fixation showed no evidence of being unitized. 
It may be that participants only learn new features when current features are 
not adequate for some new task This is certainly consistent with the blocking 
demonstrated in the checkerboard experiments in this chapter, and in the experiments 
of Schyns and colleagues (Schyns & Murphy, 1994; Schyns & Rodet, 1997). where 
the existence of previously learned features that can be used in a new categorization 
prevents the creation of new features that would be learned in the absence of the 
previously learned features. Almost certainly, with prolonged practice, this blocking 
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can be overcome (Schyns & Murphy, 1994). 
Another important factor may be whether participants are consciously trying 
to form new features. In Schyns and Rodel's (1997) experiment, and the experiments 
in this chapter, participants were instructed to look for features. Pilot work using the 
checkerboard stimuli demonstrated that few participants showed any learning of the 
categories without instructions on how to spot the features. In other experiments 
(Goldstone, 2000; Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997) participants were not instructed to try 
to learn features, but also took much longer to show evidence of learned features. 
However, the absence of explicit instructions does not exclude the possibility 
consciously trying to learn new features. In Goldstone's experiment, participants 
gave a self report of the strategy they felt they had used. In the condition where line 
segments were required to be unitized, 75% of participants reported trying to 
remember an "overall image" of the stimulus, against only between 7% and 25% in 
the other condition where unitization was not required or beneficial. I do not wish to 
claim that conscious effort is always required for learning new features - this would 
certainly be at odds with a large body of evidence in the perceptualleaming 
literature - just to suggest that explicit instruction and conscious effort can greatly 
speed the process. Consistent with this is an example from perceptual learning. 
Ahissar (1999; Ahissar & Hochstein, 1997) trained participants on the detection of 
odd orientation line segment in an array of line segments under very brief exposure. 
After over a thousand trials most participants' detection was not significantly above 
chance accuracy. However another set of participants who received only one single 
easy trial, where the odd orientation differed greatly from the orientation of the 
distractors, performed much more accurately, and significantly above chance, on the 
more difficult discrimination. 
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Properties of New Features 
Although features speed the processing of stimuli (Goldstone, 2000; Shiffrin 
& Lightfoot, 1997), and qualitatively alter the perception of stimuli as demonstrated 
in the experiments presented here (see also Schyns & Rodet, 1997) little is known 
about the other properties of features. One possibility is that with practice features 
become like simple primitive visual features, with properties such as attentional 
capture. Certainly the claim that features were only cognitive constructs (see Schyns 
et aI., 1998 for an overview) can be extended because of the evidence that learned 
features can dramatically reduce categorization latency (Goldstone, 2000) and search 
slopes in visual search (Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997). For features to have an impact 
in these perceptual tasks, significantly reducing detection time, it seems that there are 
either large top down processes from cognition to perception facilitating detection of 
the features, or that the locus of learning is perceptual rather than cognitive. 
Conclusion 
There is mounting evidence that new features may be created to meet the 
requirements of new tasks, facilitating perception. Although an experiment in this 
chapter indicates an alternative explanation for Schyns and Rodel's (1997) finding 
that new features may be created, the other experiments demonstrate this result with 
a new class of stimuli. 
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Summary 
The Effect of Category Variability in Perceptual Categorization 
Two very different views have been advanced in the categorization literature 
concerning how people learn categories from labeled examples. The exemplar view 
suggests that people store some or all examples, and categorize new items by their 
similarity to these stored items. What we call the distributional view suggests, 
instead, that people fit probability distributions using the examples from each 
category, and classify new items by reference to these probability distributions. A 
key differential prediction between these viewpoints concerns the classification of 
new examples precisely intermediate between the nearest examples from two 
categories that differ in variability. The exemplar approach, illustrated using the 
generalized context model (N osofsky, 1986), predicts that the intermediate item 
should typically be classified in the lower variability category. This is because the 
examples of the low variability category are clustered nearer in perceptual space to 
the new examples, and are therefore more similar. By contrast the distributional 
approach, illustrated using general recognition theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986), 
predicts classification into the higher variability category, as these new examples are 
more likely to belong to the high variability category. The experiments in Chapter 2 
investigated classification of items intermediate between two categories differing in 
variability. Neither prediction was confirmed experimentally - instead a highly 
variable pattern of results was found. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that classification 
behavior can be strongly influenced by the salience of the difference in variability 
between the categories. The greater the salience of the variability, the more likely 
participants are to classify the new examples into the higher variability category. 
Experiments 3 and 4 showed great variation between participants on the efTect of 
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increasing the difference in variability between the two categories. When the 
difference in variability was increased, some participants increased the proportion of 
high variability responses to the intermediate items, and others showed a decrease. 
Neither the exemplar nor distributional viewpoints can predict the behavior of the 
majority of participants. This presents a serious challenge to the continuum of 
models of categorization between the exemplar and distributional viewpoints (e.g., 
back propagation and radial basis function models). 
Identification and Categorization of Simple Perceptual Stimuli: A Memory and 
Contrast Strategy 
Traditionally research rooted in categorization assumes that the cognitive 
system has access to an accurate representation of the absolute magnitudes of the 
properties (e.g., frequency, loudness, size) of the complex multidimensional stimuli 
that people routinely encounter (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986). 
However, research rooted in identification of simple perceptual stimuli suggests 
people have very poor representations of absolute magnitude information. People are 
poor at making absolute magnitude judgments, and are typically only able to divide 
stimuli into about five 'bins' on a single dimension (cf., Miller, 1956). In addition, 
judgments about absolute magnitude are strongly influenced by preceding material 
(e.g., Ward & Lockhead, 1971). The experiments in Chapter 3 investigated such 
sequence effects in categorization tasks. Strong sequence effects were found. 
Classification of a borderline stimulus between the two categories was more accurate 
when preceded by a distant member of the opposite category than a distant member 
of the same category. This category contrast effect is a serious challenge to existing 
models of classification - an exemplar model of categorization, adapted to predict 
sequence effects by assuming recently encountered stimuli are more intluential in the 
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categorization decision, is constrained to predict the opposite pattern of results. A 
memory and contrast (MAC) strategy, where categorization is instead based on the 
relative perceived difference between the current stimulus and the preceding 
stimulus, is able to predict the pattern of results. 
Feature Creation 
Recent work in categorization (e.g., Goldstone, 2000; Schyns et aI., 1998; 
Schyns & Rodet, 1997) and visual search (Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997) suggests that 
new visual features are constructed after experience with novel stimuli. These 
features facilitate the detection of the novel stimuli. Schyns and his colleagues 
(Schyns & Murphy, 1994; Schyns & Rodet, 1997) also demonstrate that new 
features qualitatively alter the perception of the stimuli. Different training orders 
were used to induce different sets of novel features in two groups of participants, 
with one group hypothesized to use a single to represent a stimulus, and the other 
hypothesized to use two features. This explanation is used to explain the two group's 
orthogonal categorizations of identical critical stimuli. The critical stimulus consists 
of two separate views of parts of the compound stimulus. The group with a single 
feature to represent the compound stimulus should not classify this stimulus into the 
same category, as the entire compound is never shown. However, the group with 
separate features for each part should, as both separate features are present in the 
critical stimulus. Replications of these experiments in Chapter 4 casts doubt on this 
claim. Addition of a simple background context to the test stimuli removed the 
difference in categorization between the two groups, with neither group classifying 
the critical stimulus into the same category as the compound stimulus. This is 
consistent with the alternate hypothesis that the two groups have the same feature 
set, but differ in their knowledge that the compound stimulus is made up from a 
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conjunction of the other stimuli. With the addition of the background context it is 
clear that the parts viewed on test are not joined to any other parts. and hence the that 
they cannot be part of the compound stimulus. 
The remainder of the experiments in Chapter 4 are concerned with 
establishing a feature creation effect in a new class of checkerboard stimuli. Three 
methodological solutions to problems are provided in the development of a new 
paradigm: (a) participants do not have to remember features over long blocks of 
trials with similar stimuli; (b) a potential confound where by the feature creation 
effect obtained can be explained by features being better recognized in familiar 
locations is eliminated; (c) the avoidance of sequential presentation of the parts of 
the test stimuli is eliminated, allowing the nleasurement of reaction times. A feature 
creation effect is demonstrated that is consistent with participants learning the largest 
block of invariant squares in the checkerboard to represent stimuli. It is also shown 
that learning of a feature can be blocked by prior learning of features. 
Category Contrast Effects in the Category Variability Experiments 
Given the demonstration of sequence effects with simple geometric stimuli in 
Chapter 3, it seems likely that the category variability experiments of Chapter 2, 
which also used simple visual stimuli, would also show sequence effects. A meta-
analysis of the data from the experiments in Chapter 2 was run to explore the 
possibility of category contrast effects. In the experiments in Chapter 2, the trials 
were in a random order. The critical pairs were not over-represented as they were in 
the experiments of Chapter 3. As we are only interested in a small proportion of 
possible pairs of trials, a large amount of data is necessary to investigate these 
effects. The two circles \vith dots experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) had a very 
small number of trials, and so do not pro\'ide enough data for the analysis. Ho\\e\'er. 
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the rectangles and ellipses experiments (Experiments 3 and 4) do contain a sufficient 
number of trials, provided stimuli are collapsed into groups. For each category the 
ten stimuli were collapsed into three groups: near, intermediate and distant. The three 
stimuli nearest the category boundary were in the near group, the three furthest from 
the boundary were in the distant group, and the remaining items in the intermediate 
group. With such a grouping, there is enough data to consider the effect on 
classification of a near stimulus of the immediately preceding stimulus. Specifically. 
the size of the category contrast effect may be determined by comparing 
classification accuracy of a near stimulus when preceded by a distant stimulus from 
either the same category, or the other category. Figure 41 shows the category 
contrast effect for Experiment 3. The mean proportion of correct responses to near 
stimuli on trial n that were preceded by a distant stimulus on trial n-l was plotted as 
a function of whether the distant stimulus came from the same category or the other 
category. As the category structures were not symmetrical, jumps from the low 
variability category towards the high variability category (low to high jumps) are 
plotted separately from jumps from the high variability category towards the low 
variability category (high to low jumps). Figure 42 shows the analogous plot for 
Experiment 4. A category contrast effect, where performance is better when the 
distant stimulus came from the other category, is evident in the data from both 
experiments, for both types of jumps. For both experiments, high to low jumps give 
a bigger category contrast effect than low to high jumps. This description of the 
results in confirmed by a 2 x 2 ANOVA (category of tone on trial n- 1 xjump 
direction). For Experiment 3 there was a main effect of category of tone on trial !l- L 
F(l, 31)=9.61, p<O.OOS. There was no main effect of jump direction, F(L 31)=1.15. 
p>O.05. The interaction was significant, F(l, 31 )=5.83. p<O.05. For Experiment -t 
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Figure 41. The mean proportion of correct responses on trial n as a function 
of the whether the distant stimulus on trial n-l came from the same 
category or the opposite category for Experiment 3. The two lines 
correspond to trial pairs where there was either a jump from the low 
variability category towards the high variability category, or vice versa. 
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Figure 42. The mean proportion of correct responses on trial n as a function 
of the whether the distant stimulus on trial n-l came from the same 
category or the opposite category for Experiment 4. The two lines 
correspond to trial pairs where there was either a jump from the low 
variability category towards the high variability category, or vice versa. 
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there was also a main effect of category of tone on trial n-1, F(l, 31 )=11.35, 
p<0.005. There was no main effect of jump direction, F(l, 31 )=2.86, p>0.05, 
although the effect was approaching significance. The interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 31)=2.66, p>0.05, but was approaching significance. 
The category contrast effect is smaller than was observed with the tones 
experiments in Chapter 3 (Experiments 6 and 8), and approximately the same size as 
observed in the Nosofsky stimuli experiment (Experiment 7). A MAC strategy 
account of this difference in effect size is given later. The low to high jumps yielded 
a smaller category contrast effect than the high to low jumps. A MAC strategy 
predicts this result. Consider the category structure illustrated in Figure 43. The 
largest within low variability category jump (between items 1 and 5) is smaller than 
the smallest between category jump (between items 5 and 6). However, many of the 
possible within high variability category jumps (e.g., between items 10 and 6) are 
larger than the smallest between category jump. Thus the category contrast effect 
measured using jumps from the low variability category towards the high variability 
category (i.e., 1---75 compared to 1---76 - up jumps) will be zero, as there is never any 
confusion over whether one has jumped up the scale far enough to be in a new 
category. However, the category contrast effect measured from the high variability 
category towards the low variability category (i.e., 10---76 and 10---75 - down jumps) 
will be larger, as the large within category jump 10---76 could be confused with a 
between category jump. This is true even if two ~ parameters are used in Equation 
23, one for up jumps and one for down jumps. Numerical modeling (not presented 
here) using the MAC model detailed in Chapter 3 confirms this argument. for both 
the one and two ~ parameter models. 
The existence of category contrast effects in the data from the category 
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----------~----------r- ~ 
1 234 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 43. Two categories separated where one category is more variable than the 
other. 
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variability experiments raises the question of whether the MAC strategy can account 
for the effects of category variability, and change in the relative variability, on the 
classification of items intermediate between the two categories. 
A Memory and Contrast Account of Category Variability Effects 
The MAC strategy can predict the category variability effects observed in 
Chapter 2 with a slight extension of the model. Separate ~ parameters for jumps up 
the scale and jumps down the scale need to be introduced, rather than one parameter 
for jumps in both directions. This addition of this free parameter can be justified on 
two counts. First, jumps up a dimension seems qualitatively different from jumps 
down the scale. It seems very likely that participants can always tell which direction 
a jump is in (provided it is sufficiently large, as it is in the category contrast 
experiments). Second, with asymmetrical categories the optimum ~ parameter for 
jumps up the scale is different to the ~ parameter for jumps down the scale. This is 
because the relative sizes of the within category and between category jumps differs 
for jumps up the scale and down the scale. 
One further observation need be made before the MAC explanation of the 
variability effect is described: Small deviations from the optimal ~ parameters 
hardly reduce overall classification accuracy in a random sequence of examples. 
Thus participants may be inaccurate in choosing the optimal parameters. Therefore, 
it is likely that under such circumstances each participant may use different pair of ~ 
parameters. Figure 44 shows the probability of classifying items into the low 
variability category as a function of the item's position along a single dimension, as 
predicted by the MAC strategy. The category structure used is that illustrated in 
Figure 43. (Specifically, items 1 to 10 had values 1,2.3,4,5.10.12.14,16 and 18 
on the single dimension.) The overall classification of a given item is determined by 
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Figure 44. The probability of a correct response as a function of the value 
of the stimulus on the single dimension. The three lines correspond to 
the predictions of the MAC model with three different pairs of £ parameters. 
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taking the average of all the probabilities of classification of the item into the low 
variability category when the item is preceded by each possible training stimulus. 
The three lines on Figure 44 correspond to three different values of pairs of ~ 
parameters. The central line corresponds to the optimal values of the two ~ 
parameters, with an overall average accuracy of91.5% on training items. The lower 
line corresponds to an overall accuracy of 89.20/0, and the upper line to an accuracy 
of 89.30/0. Small deviations from the optimal values of the ~ parameters produce only 
very small accuracy reductions, but show a large change in the proportion of items 
intermediate between the two categories classified into the low variability category 
(or into the high variability category). Thus the individual variations in the 
sensitivity to variability are accounted for. If it is assumed that participants select 
different ~ parameters for the 1:2 and 1:4 (or 1:2 expanded) category pairs in 
Experiment 3 (and 4), then the change in the proportion of transfer items classified 
into either category can also be explained. This assumption is not unlikely, given the 
change in the stimuli between the two conditions. 
In summary, the MAC can strategy predict the category variability effects 
observed in the experiments in Chapter 2. However, the size of the category contrast 
effect observed in the Chapter 2 experiments is small, approximately four times 
smaller than predicted by the simple MAC strategy. This suggests that a MAC 
strategy is not the sole strategy used by participants. If the MAC strategy is only 
making a small contribution to participants' performance, as is evident form the 
small category contrast effect, then it cannot be the entire explanation for the 
variability effects. However, if information from comparison with stimuli from trials 
further back in the sequence (i.e., n-2, n-3, ... and so on) is being used a ~lAC 
strategy predicts a much smaller category contrast effect. A borderline stimulus 
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preceded by a distal stimulus on trial n-1 is unlikely to have been preceded by 
another borderline stimulus on trial n-2, and therefore the stimulus on trial n-2 is 
likely to reduce the error induced by the distant stimulus on trial n-1, reducing the 
size of the category contrast effect. If one simply averages the probability of 
responding with a given category label deduced from the jump between trial n and 
trial n-1, with the corresponding probability with the jump between nand n-2, then 
the category contrast effect is approximately halved in magnitude. Figure 45 shows 
the category contrast effects predicted for the category structure shown in Figure 43 
using the MAC strategy with a single .£ parameter (similar predictions are made by 
the two parameter model). The top panel shows the large category contrast effect 
predicted using only the jump size from trial n-1 to trial n, (for optimal.£=O.045). A 
larger category contrast is predicted for jumps down the scale category, as described 
above. The bottom panel shows the corresponding effects when the jump size from 
trial n-2 to trial n is also used. If the correct classification cannot be deduced from 
either jump size, the probabilities for classification into the low variability category 
are calculated using both jumps, and then averaged together. (Cases when the 
classification can be deduced are those when the stimulus on trial n is a more 
extreme category member than a stimulus from the same category on trial n- 1 or trial 
n-2.) Thus the MAC strategy can predict smaller category contrast effects. Further, 
this adaptation to use extra information from further back in the sequence does not 
alter the fact that changing the .£ parameters for the up and down jumps (within the 
range that allows high accuracy) will alter the position of the generalization gradient. 
Extension of the Mac Model to More Distant Trials 
In the above discussion it was suggested that a MAC strategy may be 
extended to make use of relative magnitude information deduced from trials further 
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Figure 45. The mean probability of a correct response on trial n as a function 
of the whether the distant stimulus on trial n-l came from the same category 
or the opposite category. The two lines correspond to trial pairs where 
there was either a jump from the low variability category towards the high 
variability category or vice versa. 
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back than trial n-l. Three questions need to be addressed when considering this 
extension. First, how the availability of the relative magnitude information from the 
comparison of trial n and trial n-K changes with K. As x increases presumably the 
relative magnitude information is less available - forgetting. Secondly, whether the 
use of information from trial n-K, changes as a function of the intervening material 
(trials n-x+l, n-K+2, ... , n- l ). Mori's (1989) demonstration that in absolute 
identification the use of information from trial n-l increases as the availability of 
information of trial n is decreased suggests that the use of information may well 
depend on the intervening material. The final question is how the information from 
each of the preceding trials is combined to maximize the likelihood of a correct 
response. These second and third questions may be related - the method of 
combining the information may well depend on the intervening material. 
The answer to the first question, of availability of information from previous 
trials, is an empirical question. Such availability can be measured using a simple 
discrimination task, where participants are asked to make same / different judgments 
for the first and last items in a sequence. By varying the number of intervening 
items, a measure of the availability about the relative magnitude of the difference 
between the stimuli can be obtained. It is possible that this availability will depend 
on the nature of the stimuli. 
In considering the answers to the last two questions posed above, in the 
absence of empirical data, let us assume that information is available equally from 
trial n-l and trial n-2. This is almost certainly not the case, but such an assumption 
makes consideration of the last two questions simpler. Here an extension of the 
model to include information from trial n-2 is given. In a categorization task wher~ 
feedback is given, the participants' task is to categorize the stimulus given on trial n. 
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given knowledge of the categorizations on trial n-l and trial n-2, and the jump sizes 
between the these previous trials and the current trial. If participants do indeed use 
information from trial n-2 in addition to information from trial n-l, it is not clear 
what strategy participants might use to combine the two sources of information. In 
the simple discussion earlier in this chapter, two probabilities of responding with a 
given category label were calculated, one from the n-2 to trial njump size and the 
other from n-l to trial n jump size. These two probabilities were then averaged 
together. This is certainly not the optimal strategy, as it leads to only a slight increase 
in overall accuracy. On trials where the n-l to n jump size leads to a low accuracy of 
a categorization of the stimulus on trial n, averaging of the probability with the 
probability from calculated from the n-2 to njump leads, averaged across all possible 
stimuli on trial n-2, to a reduction in error. However, for instances where the n-l to n 
jump size leads to a high probability of a correct categorization, averaging of the 
probability with the corresponding probability from the n-2 to njump leads, on 
average, to an increase in error. This is because most of the time the stimulus on trial 
n-2 is not the same as the stimulus on trial n-l. The slight increase in overall 
accuracy is only due to the fact that sometimes the jump between the stimulus on 
trial n-2 and trial n leaves no uncertainty as about the correct categorization, when 
the stimulus on trial n-l does. For example, consider the following sequence of 
stimuli from the category structure in Figure 20: 5~2~4. Using the jump of +2 
between trial n- 1 and trial n the categorization of the stimulus on trial n is not 
determined. The jump mayor may not correspond to a crossing of the category 
boundary. However if the trial n-2 to trial njump size of -1 is considered, given that 
it is known that stimulus 5 belongs to category A, and category A members are low 
in value on the stimulus dimension. then a stimulus one unit lo\ver must also be also 
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belong to category A. Hence the categorization of the stimulus on trial !1, which \\-as 
uncertain if only information from trial n-l was used, is no longer uncertain. 
As the two sources of information are conditionally independent given n. i.e., 
knowledge of the trial n-l to trial njump size does not allow prediction of the trial n-
2 to trial njump size and vice versa when the value of the stimulus on trial n is 
known, then the optimal strategy is to combine log probabilities. However, the 
discussion of the combination of the two probabilities is slightly academic for two 
reasons. First, it is unlikely that the perceptions of all sizes of jumps are equally 
reliable. The reliability of the perception of different jump sizes is an empirical 
question. It is already demonstrated that large jump sizes in absolute identification 
show a greater degree of assimilation (e.g., Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Chapter 3). 
Second, it is possible that there is interaction in the perception of jump sizes, with 
the size of the jump between trial n-l and trial n affecting perception of the jump size 
between trial n-2 and trial n. In other words, the perception of the two jump sizes 
may not be independent. 
Feature Creation and MAC 
Evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that experience with novel stimuli can lead to 
the creation of new features. If one conceives of stimuli as represented in a 
psychological space, then this would lead to stimuli moving substantially about in 
the psychological space. However, it is not clear how a MAC account might sit with 
the creation of new features, because in a MAC account this perceptual space 
representation is not assumed. 
When categorization is based on presence or absence of a feature. there is no 
need to resort to a MAC strategy. For example. when deciding whether a vivid color 
red is present or absent in a stimulus composed othen\ise of vivid blue and vi\-id 
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green is easy. When categorization is based on the degree to which a feature is 
present, participants may need to resort to a MAC strategy. For example, consider a 
set of stimuli made by interpolating between two novel stimuli, such as the Bezzier 
curves used by Goldstone (1994). Goldstone (2000) demonstrates that new features 
are created to after exposure to similar stimuli. Although it remains an open 
empirical question as to whether participants categorizing these stimuli into two 
groups will show a category contrast effects it seems likely that they might. 
Goldstone (1994) demonstrated that in a classification task participants show 
improved discriminability of a pair of adjacent stimuli that fall across the category 
boundary compared to a control pair within the category. This leads to the intriguing 
possibility that participants create new features to improve discriminability. Before 
the creation of the new features, classification was based on the degree of many 
existing features that varied continuously between stimuli. In the absence of absolute 
magnitude information, participants would be forced to use a MAC strategy. New 
features may have been created, that would allow the categorization to be reframed 
in terms of the presence or absence of these new features, and therefore the task 
which would no longer require a MAC strategy. Such a shift in categorization 
strategy was not observable in the experiments in Chapter 4 as the creation of new 
features was not possible, given the simple one dimensional nature of the stimuli. 
The empirical test of this possible change in strategy would be to measure 
simultaneously the category contrast effect and the reduction in classification latency 
and increase in discriminability consistent with the creation of new features. In more 
detail, the design of the experiment would be as follows. Create a novel dimension 
by taking two novel features, and then create a set of stimuli morphed between the 
two features. Expose participants to this stimulus set in a distractor task \\\1crc they 
Chapter 5 General Discussion 187 
do not make categorizations to allow new features to be learned to represent the 
stimuli. Then in a categorization task with the same stimuli observe the category 
contrast effect, the reduction in categorization latency, and the improvement in 
discriminability on the category bound (relative to equivalent within category 
discriminations). Initially a large category contrast effect should be observed. If 
additional new features are created to facilitate the categorization, there will be a 
reduction in categorization latency, and an increase in discriminability on the 
category bound, together with a reduction in the category contrast effect. These 
changes would correspond to a transition from a MAC strategy, to a simple 
classification based on the presence or absence of new features. 
In summary, the hypothesis is that while participants may initially have to 
rely upon a MAC strategy to classify stimuli varying along a psychological 
continuum, new features may be created to facilitate categorization, provided the 
stimuli are of sufficiently high dimensionality. This hypothesis is certainly consistent 
with the extensive reanalysis of the categorization literature for the most frequently 
used category structure conducted by Smith and Minda (2000). They demonstrated 
that provided prototype models could reproduced an accuracy advantage for 
frequently seen items, the models fit the data as well as exemplar models. A MAC 
model will produce a very similar pattern of responding to a prototype model \vhen 
predicting averages over all preceding stimuli, and the creation of new features for 
frequently viewed items would provide the improved accuracy for old training items. 
Summary of Chapter 
In the preceding discussion links between the three experimental programs in 
this thesis were described. It was shown that a MAC strategy is able to predict the 
category variability effects. In categorization of more complex stimuli. it \vas 
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suggested that reliance upon a MAC strategy may be replaced with use of new 
features created to reframe the categorization task in terms of the presence or 
absence of features, rather than in terms of the degree of presence of features. 
Related experimental work was suggested to investigate these hypotheses. The final 
sections of this chapter are further suggestions for extension of the work presented in 
this thesis based on submitted grant proposals. 
Further Work: Memory and Contrast in Identification and Categorization 
The following experiments described are designed to inform the extension of 
the simple MAC model described in Chapter 3. First, the basic category contrast 
effect could be replicated and the generality and magnitude of the effect explored, 
using the methodology from Chapter 3. Extension of this effect to other dimensions 
(e.g., loudness, line length, brightness, orientation) will establish its generality. 
Comparison of the magnitude of the effect across experiments will indicate the 
relative reliance upon relative magnitude information, or alternatively, how the 
availability of relative magnitude over time changes between stimuli. The use of 
categories constructed from multidimensional stimuli will further explore the 
generality of the effect. Experiment 7 has demonstrated the category contrast effect 
for multidimensional stimuli used by exemplar theorists (semi-circles of varying 
radius, with radii of varying orientation: Nosofsky, 1986). In this demonstration both 
dimensions were correlated, separable, and diagnostic of category. With 
multidimensional stimuli, the size of the difference between stimuli on one 
dimension at which it is optimal to switch categorization response can be made to 
depend in carefully controlled ways on the value of the stimuli on a second 
dimension. The degree to which participants are able to use information on the 
second dimension is predicted to depend on their ability to percei\c absolute 
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magnitude or infer it from experimental context. This work will enable the 
construction of a new theory of representation of multidimensional stimuli based on 
relative magnitude information. 
Through analysis of the effects of previous stimulus/response pairs on a 
current response using multivariate information transmission (McGill, 1954), the 
relative dependency of the current trial on previous trials can be determined. Such an 
approach has been successfully used in absolute identification (Gamer, 1953; 
McGill, 1957; Mori, 1989). The central idea is that inter-trial dependencies over 
various spans (e.g., between trial n and trial n-k) can be controlled in such a way that 
information transmission between trial n-k and trial n may be computed directly. 
Such analysis will reveal any use of information other than that from immediately 
preceding trials in the categorization decision. 
Previous work has not separated out effects of intervening trials from effects 
of intervening time. In separate experiments, manipulation of the inter-trial intervals 
will allow observation of how between trial dependencies vary as a function of the 
availability of perceived differences between trials. One such manipulation is 
illustrated in Figure 46. In the even spacing condition, greater effect of more recent 
trials is predicted on trial n, i.e., the amount of information transferred from trial n-l 
to trial n should be greater than the amount of information transferred from trial n-2 
to trial n, and so on. When the difference between the availability of previous trials is 
smaller the amount of information transferred should be less disparate. The results , 
of experiments will allow direct comparison of these categorization studies to the 
large literature on temporal memory and forgetting. 
Measurement of the sequential effects obseryed in absolute identification, 
and (within the same experiment) the category contrast effect, will allow the effect of 
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Condition 
Previous Trials • • • • 
Bunched n-3 n-2 n-1 n 
Even Spacing • • • • 
n-3 n-2 n-1 n 
• 
Time 
Figure 46. Two conditions where the spacing of trials varies. 
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previous stimuli on the perceived magnitude of the current stimulus to be factored 
out. After estimates of the subjective magnitude of the current stimulus have been 
determined in an absolute identification task, existing models of categorization, such 
as the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986), will be applied using these derived subjective 
magnitudes as input. In other words, the biased estimates of absolute magnitudes 
observed in an absolute identification task can be used to provide an independent 
assessment of the data participants have available to them in a categorization 
decision. Such data will be vital in constraining the developing unified account of 
identification and categorization. Appropriate data will be obtained from a small 
number of participants during extended sessions of alternating absolute identification 
and categorization. Such a procedure was used in Experiment 8, and will be 
extended to other stimulus sets. 
Until now only stimulus sets that are evenly distributed along a dimension 
have been considered (with the exception of the stimulus structure in the category 
variability experiments). The MAC account predicts altering of the spacing of the 
stimulus set along a dimension, so that, for example, if one category's inter-stimulus 
spacing is larger than the other categorization performance will be affected 
substantially (because the relation between lTD and category-shift probability will 
become asymmetrical). Data on the ability of participants to deal with categories 
differing in variability will be important in informing modeling on the categorization 
process. 
Performance on pseudo-random trial sequences where the relative 
frequencies of the magnitude of the change in stimuli between adjacent trials are 
manipulated could be manipulated in a series of experiments. The MAC model 
predicts that if participants are sensitive to jump sizes, and determine an optimal 
-
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jump size for changing responding, then such a manipulation may lead to erroneous 
estimation of the correct jump size. This would be the case if general properties of 
the sequence effects act as initial learning biases, as is the case for assumptions of 
category distribution (Flannagan et ai., 1986). Evidence for the use of such 
expectations would provide vital constraints on the modeling. 
The final suggestions for further experimental work to explore the MAC account 
concern manipulation of the availability of absolute magnitude information. A 
plausible working hypothesis is that reducing the certainty of absolute magnitude 
information would encourage use of a MAC strategy. Manipulations in luminance 
and duration of visual stimuli and signal to noise ratio of auditory stimuli have been 
successfully used in absolute identification to manipulate the relative inter trial 
sequential dependencies previously discussed (McGill, 1957; Mori, 1989). Similar 
methods could be adopted to vary the predicted necessity of MAC-like strategy 
usage. The withholding of feedback in alternating blocks could also be used to 
reduce the availability of absolute magnitude information. Such a manipulation is 
known to alter sequential dependencies in absolute identification (Mori & Ward, 
1995); according to the MAC model this will lead to predictable effects on 
categorization performance. Multidimensional stimuli may also be used to 
investigate this issue. With a stimulus structure where the absolute magnitude on one 
dimension is needed to select the optimal jump size on a second dimension should 
reduce the effectiveness of MAC strategies, and therefore we predict smaller 
category contrast effects (and probably poorer average accuracy). 
The proposed experimental work would inform the development of the ~1AC 
model in two ways: (a) Inclusion of information from more than one preyious trial in 
the decision process, as described above. The relative weighting of trials \\"ould be 
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provided by data from the proposed experiments. Links with existing models of 
memory will be established using the data from the varying inter-trial interval 
experiments. The assumption that responses are not independent can be examined by 
seeing whether the response sequences violate the assumptions of a Markov model 
(Feller, 1950). (b) The MAC model and standard exemplar models can be 
conceptualized as lying at opposite ends of a continuum. At one end the MAC model 
presented here embodies the hypothesis that the decision process is based entirely on 
the difference between the current and the immediately previous trial together with 
knowledge of the category label associated with the previous trial. At the other end 
the exemplar model says the decision process is based on the jump size between 
every previous example and the current example, together with category labels for 
each previous exemplar. The development of a hybrid model would be useful in 
describing data obtained from the proposed experiments. Should the information 
limits of the response process be revealed in categorization by the studies, then a 
hybrid model must be adapted to explain how information selected varies as a 
function of information available. 
Further Work: Feature Creation for Novel Visual Stimuli 
The experiments proposed here focus on two key questions concerning how 
these novel features may function: (a) Can features attract attention to themselves, 
facilitating their detection? (b) In building a representation of a stimulus, can 
features of the same stimulus be processed in parallel? Existing evidence relevant to 
the first question is reviewed in the General Discussion of Chapter 4. For the second 
question, relevant evidence is briefly reviewed below. 
Detection of Multiple Targets 
In searching an array of stimuli for two or more targets, there are two 
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possible tasks participants may be required to do. The first task, an OR task, is where 
one must find one of the targets in an array. In second type of task, the A.XD task, 
one must search for all of the targets in the array. In an OR search task Neisser 
(1963) demonstrated participants were no slower to search one of 10 possible target 
letters than they were to scan for a single target letter. Treisman (1988) obtained a 
similar result when participants searched for colors. Participants can scan for any of 
three different colors simultaneously in an array of homogeneous stimuli as quickly 
as they could scan for a single target. However when participants searched for any 
one of three targets from different stimulus dimensions, they were slower than when 
they searched for only one of the targets (see also Muller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995; 
Quinlan & Humphreys, 1987; but see also Moore & Osman, 1993). 
Typically, featural AND tasks produce different results, with search rates 
being slower in AND tasks than OR tasks (e.g., Quinlan & Humphreys, 1987). 
Duncan (1980) had participants search for digit targets occurring among letter 
distractors in a display of four stimuli arranged in a diamond. The stimuli were either 
presented simultaneously, or one diagonal at a time. If search is in parallel there 
should be no difference in accuracy between the simultaneous and sequential 
conditions, because the same amount of time is available to study each stimulus in 
each condition. If there was only one digit, then there was indeed no difference 
between the two conditions. However, with two targets, there was a reduction in d' 
for the sequential display condition. In a related experiment Duncan (1985) 
replicates this effect when participants search for oblique lines amongst vertical 
lines. 
It may be important to discriminate between participants being required to 
count the number of targets, as opposed to identifying the number of targets. 
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Experiments by Sagi and lulesz (l985a; 1985b) make this point clear. Participants 
were required to report the number of horizontal or vertical targets in a brief 
presentation of an array of identical oblique lines. (In fact participants made a binary 
response, indicating whether there were n or n+ 1 targets.) The proportion of correct 
responses did not vary with the number of targets suggesting targets were detected in 
parallel. As Sagi and lulesz point out, this is much like subitizing (Atkinson, 
Campbell, & Francis, 1976; Kaufman, Lord, & Volkman, 1949). However, if 
participants reported whether the non-oblique line segments were of the same 
orientation or not, using exactly the same displays, the proportion of correct 
responses fell as the number of targets increased. Although Sagi and lulesz's first 
result seems contrary to the results of Duncan their experiment differs in two ways. 
Firstly, the number of distractors is much larger, and thus formed a texture of line 
segments. With only 4 distractors in Duncan's experiment, it is not clear that 
participants could not subitize distortions of the texture. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the reduction in d' in Duncan's experiments could be explained by 
interference from giving two responses simultaneously. In his single target condition 
only one response need be made, but in his double target condition, two responses 
needed to be made within 2 seconds of one another. 
Arguin (1988) used a paradigm for AND search that required participants to 
locate two targets, and give a single binary response dependant on the relative 
location of the two targets. Participants detected two targets, each in a horizontal row 
of identical distractors, one above the other. Stimuli were either red or green, and a 0 
or an X. Targets always differed from distractors on the basis of a single feature. 
Participants responded with one of two possible keys depending on which of two 
orientations an imaginary line bet\\'een the two targets took. Both targets had to be 
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located in order to deduce the orientation and respond. Two conditions were 
compared, one where the both targets were the same, and one where one targets were 
different. Mean reaction times did not differ between the two conditions. Two targets 
whose distinctive features are unique in the display can be processed simultaneously 
even when targets are distinguished from the distractors on different feature 
dimensions. However, baseline reaction times were much higher when the target in 
one row was used as the distractors of the other group compared to a condition when 
the single feature discriminating the target from its distractors was unique in the 
visual field. The data from further experiments were consistent with a spatially 
parallel search through one row (group) followed by a second parallel search through 
the remaining row. The cost in RTs in these conditions was attributed to the need to 
switch attention from one group to the other. 
In summary, multiple targets may be detected in parallel across the visual 
field when they occur amongst identical distractors. If the distractors are not 
identical, then the field may be segmented into groups of identical distractors, and 
each group searched in parallel but with serial switching between groups. There is no 
evidence that the identity of odd features is available in parallel across the visual 
field. 
The identity of odd features is available in parallel if they occur in the same 
stimulus. Moore and Osman (1993) investigated the difference between the AND 
and OR tasks further. Participants had to search for two targets. One target might be 
red, and the other an X. (Note that this is not the same as searching for a red X, 
although a red X does contain both targets.) The targets were not the only singletons 
in the display. Of importance here is that there was no difference between response 
latency for AND and OR tasks when the two different features to be detected \VerI? of 
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the same stimulus. That is, features within a single object were detected 
simultaneously. (Two features from the same dimension (e.g., red and green) in 
different locations were not be detected in parallel. Performance in the AND task is 
slower than performance in the OR task.) 
Further evidence that (a) features of one object and processed in parallel, and 
(b) that objects are processed one at a time is provided by Duncan (1984). Stimuli 
were a box with a line through it presented in brief, foveal displays. The box could 
vary on two features (size and position of a gap), as could the line (orientation and 
the type of line - dotted or dashed). Two judgments concerning the same object 
could be made simultaneously without loss of accuracy, but two judgments, each 
concerning a feature a different object, could not. Control experiments demonstrate 
the effect cannot be explained on the basis of similarity of the judgments, or by the 
spatial location of the features. It would seem that features of the same object may be 
detected and identified in parallel consistent with the idea that features of single 
objects may be encoded in a common representation (e.g., the object files of 
Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Treisman, 
1992). 
The second series of experiments will examine effects of simultaneous search 
for several new features either within one stimulus, or between two stimuli. 
The possible future experiments discussed here are designed to investigate the 
attentional properties of features learned during categorization. Two possible series 
of experimental work are proposed. The purpose of the first series of experiments is 
to investigate the attentional properties of features created object categorization. 
These experiments would use a visual search and related paradigms to investigate 
attentional properties induced during a prior categorization phase. For example. 
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participants could perform a visual search task in which they search for category 
diagnostic features among heterogeneous distractors. The distractors could either be 
other diagnostic features, non-diagnostic features or novel features. If diagnostic 
features were increased in salience, and non-diagnostic features reduced in salience 
compared to novel distractors, differing predictions for the relative latency in the 
different kinds of search are expected. Search for the target amongst non-diagnostic 
features should be faster than search among novel items, and search for the target 
amongst other diagnostic features should be slowest. These predictions are at odds 
with the predictions generated from a familiarity account (Johnston & Hawley, 1994; 
but see also Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982). Lubow and Kaplan 
(1997) investigated the role of pre-exposing stimuli as either targets or distractors 
before visual search. Their pre-exposure stage was short and is unlikely to have 
induced attentional properties in the stimuli. They found that when targets and 
distractors can be differentiated on the basis of familiarity, search is faster. In the 
proposed experiment a familiarity based account, unlike the attention account, would 
predict search for diagnostic features among non-diagnostic features should be 
slower than a search for diagnostic features among novel features. 
Improved discriminability and changes in attentional properties with 
experience can act as two competing forces. As discriminability improves with 
unmasked pre-exposure in humans (Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995), a set of distractor 
stimuli will become less similar to one another. According to Duncan and 
Humphrey's (1989) similarity based account of visual search, this reduction in 
distractor similarity should make searching for a target harder. Howeyer, if the 
ability of these distractors to attract attention to themselves is also reduced by 
negative priming (Tipper, 1985), then a target should be easier to find. Thus the 
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effect of exposure improving discriminability of distractors and the negative priming 
act in opposite directions. 
Empirical evidence suggests that categorization experience helps one 
discriminate between the category prototypes, and also helps one discriminate 
between exemplars of the same category (McLaren et aI., 1994). Thus although the 
features that discriminate between exemplars one category were non-diagnostic for 
the task, the similarity between representations of these features decreases. Different 
diagnostic features will become less similar to one another, as will non-diagnostic 
features, and diagnostic features will also become less similar to non-diagnostic 
features during the initial categorization phase. Assuming that learned features 
become less similar from novel features, visual search theories based on similarity 
(e.g., Duncan & Humphreys, 1992; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989) would predict that 
searching for a diagnostic feature amongst novel items should be easiest (Table 20). 
It is also possible that the target could also be varied, being either a 
diagnostic feature, non-diagnostic, or novel. Crossing this factor with the similar 
variation of the distractors in visual search would produce a 9 cell design. This 
would include useful control conditions of searching for a non-diagnostic target 
amongst other non-diagnostic distractors, and novel targets amongst novel 
di stracto rs. 
Using a similar paradigm to Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) an alternative 
measure of the attentional properties of learned features can be provided. After 
extensive training on a categorization as before, participants would move onto a 
search task. This search task differs from that described above in that the new target 
will only appear in certain locations. Participants will be told to ignore certain 
locations, as the new target will never appear there. However, if old diagnostic 
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Table 20 
Predicted similarities during visual search with categorization features. 
Target 
diagnostic 
diagnostic 
diagnostic 
Distractors Target -distractor Distractor-distractor 
similarity similarity 
diagnostic low low 
non-diagnostic low low 
novel low high 
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features appear in these locations, and attract attention, then the appearance of these 
old features should reduce detection accuracy for new target items. A positive result 
in this experiment would establish the generality of the effect, and provide evidence 
that could not be accounted for in terms of experience altering similarity between 
stimuli. 
In the Shiffrin and Schneider design each search consisted of 4 items 
arranged in a square. Participants knew the target would appear in one of the two 
locations on one diagonal. The old target distractor sometimes appeared on the other 
diagonal. Using the attention is a spot light analogy, for participants to attend to both 
items on one diagonal their spotlight would have to be quite broad, encompassing 
the other diagonal. Thus although participants knew not to attend to one diagonal 
they may have been unable not to do this, and still have attended to both items on the 
other diagonal. For this reason, a condition should be included where the 4 stimuli 
are arranged in a rectangle, where the target appears on one of the locations on a 
short side of the rectangle, so participants can attend to both these locations without 
having to attend to the distractor only locations. A control condition where the old 
diagnostic features appears in an attended location will be useful. If there is no effect 
in the attended location, then we would not expect any effect in the unattended 
location. 
After extensive training on a visual search tasks the search slopes can be 
greatly reduced (Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997). However the search slopes never 
become completely flat. However a signal detection theory model which assumes 
features are detected in parallel is able to account for this results by assuming that 
each feature detector takes a variable amount of time to respond. The response can 
only be made when all feature detectors have reported. With more distractors in a 
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display, there is more likely to be a single detector that takes a long time to respond, 
and thus search slopes will be positive, even though search is in parallel. Thus it is 
not clear whether search for the learned features takes place in parallel or series after 
extensive training. Pashler (1998) investigated search under two conditions, using a 
different paradigm. In one condition the stimuli were degraded by blurring them. If 
stimuli are processed in series, then each stimulus must be un-blurred, and this will 
be an increased cost for each item, thus search slopes will be steeper in the degraded 
condition compared to the non-degraded condition. If stimuli are processed in 
parallel, the noise added by blurring will be removed in parallel, and therefore there 
will be a fixed increase in reaction time, but not an increase in search slopes. Pashler 
found that his results were almost perfectly consistent with parallel processing. 
This paradigm could be extended using two different kinds of noise. In 
addition to the blurring condition, there will also be a "high level" noise condition, 
where for example, some of the squares of the checkerboard features are flipped 
from black to white. This high level noise can only be compensated for by using the 
information in the representation of the checkerboard features. The blurring 
however can be corrected without resort to this information. If the checkerboard , 
features are processed in parallel then one might expect parallel performance for the 
blurring and the square swapping degradations. If the checkerboard features are 
processed in series then an increase in search slope in the square swapping condition 
would be predicted. If an increase in search slope is observed for the blurring 
condition and the square swapping condition, then that would suggest that the 
blurring of features cannot be compensated for in parallel as it can for Pashler's 
stimuli. 
Another paradigm that could be used is the probe dot detection paradigm (cf. Klein, 
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1988; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Watson & Humphreys, 2000). This \\'ould allow 
assessment of the extent to which diagnostic features learned during categorization 
tasks attract attention automatically to themselves. Following a learned 
categorization task, diagnostic and non-diagnostic features will be presented briefly. 
A small probe dot would then appear at the location of either the diagnostic or the 
non-diagnostic feature. Participants would indicate when they detect the probe dot 
(on some "catch trials': no probe will appear). If diagnostic features attract attention 
automatically, then probe dot detection latencies should be reduced for probes falling 
at the location of diagnostic features relative to probes falling at the location of non-
diagnostic features. 
The above experiments would provide evidence about the attentional 
properties of new features. The following proposed experiments are designed to 
investigate how new features might be used in the construction of the representation 
of objects. Specifically, the experiments are designed to establish whether newly 
created features in the same object may be detected simultaneously. Two 
experiments are proposed. In the first participants would learn two categorizations of 
one set of stimuli. For one categorization one set of features would be diagnostic, 
and for the other categorization another set of features would be diagnostic. After 
every stimulus participants would be cued to make one categorization or the other. 
Before some stimulus display participants would be told which categorization was 
required. Exposure time of the stimulus before masking would be titrated for each 
participant so they were making about 150/0 errors on average. Accuracy (or d' from 
signal detection theory) in for trials where the categorization was known would then 
be compared with trials where the categorization was unknown. If participants are 
able to build all of the features of one object simultaneously there should be no 
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difference between the two conditions. A reduction in accuracy for stimuli where 
participants were not told before hand which categorization was to be tested would 
indicate that participants do not build all the features in parallel. 
In a second study participants might detect the presence of two features in 
stimuli on the screen. If all the features of one stimulus can be perceived at the same 
time then if both features occur in the same stimulus, their detection should be faster 
then their detection if they occur in two different stimuli. Participants would make a 
simple binary response indicating whether the features were one above the other, or 
side by side. Note that the location of the two features would need to be controlled 
for. A possible control is illustrated in Figure 47. The left-hand panel illustrates a 
display with the features (hatched areas) inside the same stimulus (checkered area). 
The right-hand panel shows the features in two different stimuli. The physical 
location of the two features relative to the fixation point (that would be in the center 
of the screen) is the same in both displays, as well as the overall area of the screen 
filled with stimuli. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the basic category variability (Chapter 2), category contrast 
(Chapter 3) and feature creation (Chapter 4) effects were described. The MAC 
strategy, that accounted for the category contrast effect was shown to be able to 
predict the results from the category variability experiments. A hypothesis describing 
the relationship between feature creation and a MAC strategy was proposed, together 
with suggestions for future experimental work to investigate this hypothesis. Further 
specific and extensive suggestions for future work were described to support the 
development of the MAC hypothesis, and to investigate possible low le\'t~l properties 
of newly created features. 
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Figure 47. Displays controlling for the location of two features across two conditions 
of Study 6: within obj ect and between obj ects. Hatched areas represent features and 
checkerboard areas represent the rest of a stimul us. 
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The work presented in this thesis challenges a crucial assumption in extant 
models of categorization - that stimuli are represented in an multidimensional space. 
Implicit in this assumption is the notion that information about the absolute 
magnitude of stimuli on various dimensions forms the basis for classification. 
Modeling and empirical work in Chapter 2 demonstrated that generalization from 
known categories is not well predicted by a whole class of models (from exemplar 
models to decision bound or distributional models). Chapter 3 provided experimental 
evidence of strong sequence effects, where the material immediately preceding a 
categorization has a large influence over the categorization decision. It was 
demonstrated that an alternate theory of categorization, where classification is based 
solely on comparison to immediately preceding items, offers an account of the data 
from Chapters 2 and 3. The experiments in Chapter 4 demonstrated that experience 
with stimuli alters subsequent classification, consistent with the hypothesis that 
experience creates new features used to represent the stimuli. It was hypothesized 
that where it is possible the creation of a new feature allows participants to switch 
from a strategy of comparing the current stimulus with the immediately preceding 
material to reach a classification decision to a classification strategy based on the 
presence or absence of a new feature. 
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